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Abstract
Secure Protocols for Privacy-preserving Data Outsourcing, Integration, and Auditing
Gaby Dagher, Ph.D.
Concordia University, 2016
As the amount of data available from a wide range of domains has increased tremendously in recent
years, the demand for data sharing and integration has also risen. The cloud computing paradigm
provides great ﬂexibility to data owners with respect to computation and storage capabilities, which
makes it a suitable platform for them to share their data. Outsourcing person-speciﬁc data to the
cloud, however, imposes serious concerns about the conﬁdentiality of the outsourced data, the pri-
vacy of the individuals referenced in the data, as well as the conﬁdentiality of the queries processed
over the data. Data integration is another form of data sharing, where data owners jointly perform
the integration process, and the resulting dataset is shared between them. Integrating related data
from diﬀerent sources enables individuals, businesses, organizations and government agencies to per-
form better data analysis, make better informed decisions, and provide better services. Designing
distributed, secure, and privacy-preserving protocols for integrating person-speciﬁc data, however,
poses several challenges, including how to prevent each party from inferring sensitive information
about individuals during the execution of the protocol, how to guarantee an eﬀective level of privacy
on the released data while maintaining utility for data mining, and how to support public auditing
such that anyone at any time can verify that the integration was executed correctly and no partic-
ipants deviated from the protocol. In this thesis, we address the aforementioned concerns by pre-
senting secure protocols for privacy-preserving data outsourcing, integration and auditing. First, we
propose a secure cloud-based data outsourcing and query processing framework that simultaneously
iii
preserves the conﬁdentiality of the data and the query requests, while providing diﬀerential privacy
guarantees on the query results. Second, we propose a publicly veriﬁable protocol for integrating
person-speciﬁc data from multiple data owners, while providing diﬀerential privacy guarantees and
maintaining an eﬀective level of utility on the released data for the purpose of data mining. Next,
we propose a privacy-preserving multi-party protocol for high-dimensional data mashup with guar-
anteed LKC -privacy on the output data. Finally, we apply the theory to the real world problem
of solvency in Bitcoin. More speciﬁcally, we propose a privacy-preserving and publicly veriﬁable
cryptographic proof of solvency scheme for Bitcoin exchanges such that no information is revealed
about the exchange’s customer holdings, the value of the exchange’s total holdings is kept secret,
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Sharing and integrating interrelated data from diﬀerent sources has become critical in many contexts,
such as sharing data between scientiﬁc researchers, identifying fraudulent insurance claims, epidemic
monitoring and forecasting, and ﬁghting terrorism. Data sharing and integration enables individuals,
businesses, organizations and government agencies to perform better data analysis, make better
informed decisions, and provide better services. In a recent report 1 that analyzes the services of
the health and human services agencies, it is estimated that the U.S. government loses $342 billion
every year in improper payments due to the lack of integration of patient information with other
key data such as quality and cost.
One common approach for data sharing is data outsourcing to the cloud. The cloud computing
paradigm is a new computing platform that enables data owners to have access to large-scale com-
putation and storage at an aﬀordable price. Data-as-a-service (DaaS) is one of the cloud computing




compelling service for data owners, as they no longer need to invest in hardware, software and oper-
ational overhead. Despite all these beneﬁts, data owners are reluctant to adopt the DaaS model, as
it requires outsourcing their person-speciﬁc data to an untrusted cloud service provider, which raises
several major concerns. The ﬁrst concern is how to protect the conﬁdentiality of the data while
being stored on the cloud. More speciﬁcally, how to prevent the cloud service provider (and other
tenants who share the cloud resources, services and physical infrastructure) from gaining access to
the raw data. The second concern is how to enable the cloud to process queries on the stored data
while revealing nothing about the queries to the cloud. The third concern is how to protect the pri-
vacy of the individuals whose personal information is stored in the outsourced data, and ensure that
the query results cannot be used to either identify an individual or to reveal sensitive information
about him. Typically, the data is de-identiﬁed before it is uploaded to the cloud such that direct
identifying information about the individuals has been removed. However, the de-identiﬁcation the
data does not prevent record/attribute linkage attacks, as was shown in the cases of AOL [BZ06]
and Netﬂix [NS08]. Hence the strong demands for advanced privacy protection techniques, such as
privacy-preserving data publishing (PPDP), a mechanism for publishing person-speciﬁc data such
that useful information can be obtained from the published data while preserving the privacy of
individuals.
On the other hand, integrating person-speciﬁc data in a distributed environment for the purpose
of sharing the resulting dataset raises several concerns, some of which are analogous to the those
in data outsourcing. The ﬁrst concern is about protecting the privacy of the individual in the
data being integrated such that the resulting integrated data cannot be used by any party to learn
sensitive information about individuals. The second concern is how to make sure the integration
process is secure and privacy-preserving. That is, how to ensure that all data owners adhere to their
integration instructions while not being able to learn any useful information about other parties’
data. The third concern is how to perform the integration such that the integrated data maintains
certain level of useful information for data mining and analysis.
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Table 1: Summary of the thesis contributions
Protocols

















SecDM (Chapter 4)    
SecSVD (Chapter 5)    
Fusion (Chapter 6)    
Provisions (Chapter 7)  
In the context of data sharing and integration, especially when dealing with person-speciﬁc data,
it is often required to have an auditing mechanism in place to verify the correct execution of the
data sharing and integration protocol. For example, the U.S. Health Information Technology for
Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH) requires the Department of Health & Human Services
(HHS) to periodically audit covered entities and business associates to ensure their compliance with
the HIPAA Privacy, Security, and Breach Notiﬁcation Rules 2. During the execution of a protocol in
untrusted environment, participants must prove they are following the protocol at each step. This
auditing mechanism is called private veriﬁability, where the produced proofs may only convince
the other participants in the protocol by being contingent on their interactions and/or individual
secrets. On the other hand, public veriﬁability, a higher standard than private veriﬁability, enables
any internal or external party at any time to verify that the protocol was executed correctly.
1.2 Contributions
To address the aforementioned challenges related to person-speciﬁc data sharing and integration,
we study the problem of privacy-preserving data outsourcing, integration, and auditing and propose
protocols for achieving that securely. Table 1 summarises diﬀerent characteristics of the proposed
protocols. The key contributions of this thesis are summarized as follows.
1.2.1 SecDM: Secure and Privacy-preserving Data Outsourcing
Recall that Data-as-a-service (DaaS) is a cloud computing service that emerged as a viable option
to businesses and individuals for outsourcing and sharing their collected data with other parties.
2http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/audit/
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Although the cloud computing paradigm provides great ﬂexibility to consumers with respect to
computation and storage capabilities, it imposes serious concerns about the conﬁdentiality of the
outsourced data as well as the privacy of the individuals referenced in the data.
In Chapter 4 of this thesis, we formulate and address the problem of querying encrypted data
in a cloud environment such that query processing is conﬁdential and the result is diﬀerentially
private. Unlike other work in the literature [BAAD14][GLM+13a][WAEA11][Yon14][TH13] for data
outsourcing, our solution maintains the privacy and utility properties of the outsourced data while
simultaneously ensuring data conﬁdentiality, query conﬁdentiality, and privacy-preserving results.
More speciﬁcally, we propose a framework where the data provider uploads an encrypted index
of her anonymized data to a DaaS service provider that is responsible for answering range count
queries from authorized data miners for the purpose of data mining. To satisfy the conﬁdentiality
requirements, we leverage attribute based encryption to construct a secure kd-tree index over the
diﬀerentially private data for fast access. We also utilize the exponential variant of the ElGamal
cryptosystem to eﬃciently perform homomorphic operations on encrypted data. Experiments on
real-life data demonstrate that our proposed framework can eﬃciently answer range queries and is
scalable with increasing data size. Note that while comminution and network latency costs should
be taken in accounts for practicality [DCFG+14], we focus in this thesis on computational costs
when generating our experimental results.
1.2.2 SecSVD: Secure and Privacy-preserving Set-Valued Data Data In-
tegration with Public Veriﬁability
Privacy-preserving data integration is a mechanism that enables multiple data owners to securely
integrate their data for the purpose of data mining. Applying such a mechanism on set-valued
data in a malicious environment, however, involves several challenges, including how to handle the
high-dimensional nature of set-valued data, how to prevent malicious parties from inferring sensitive
information during the integration process, how to guarantee an eﬀective level of privacy on the
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released data while maintaining utility, and how to enable independent public veriﬁability of the
protocol.
In Chapter 5 of this thesis, we propose the ﬁrst publicly veriﬁable protocol for integrating person-
speciﬁc set-valued data from two or multiple data owners, while providing ε-diﬀerential privacy guar-
antee and maintaining an eﬀective level of utility on the released data. Our proposed approach can
handle both horizontally and vertically partitioned data, and is secure in the malicious adversarial
model with dishonest majority.
1.2.3 Fusion: Secure and Privacy-preserving Relational Data Integration
In the last decade, several approaches concerning private data release for data mining have been
proposed. Data integration, on the other hand, is a mechanism for merging data from several data
providers. Fusing both techniques to generate mashup (integrated) data in a distributed environment
while providing privacy and utility guarantees on the output involves several challenges. That is,
how to ensure that no unnecessary information is leaked to the other parties during the integration
process, how to ensure the mashup data is protected against certain privacy threats, and how to
handle the high-dimensional nature of the data while guaranteeing high data utility.
In Chapter 6 of this thesis, we propose Fusion, a privacy-preserving multi-party protocol for
high-dimensional data integration with guaranteed LKC -privacy for the purpose of data mining.
Our contribution is twofold. First, we design a secure and distributed protocol for evaluating an in-
formation gain-based score function. Second, we propose a hieratical approach for high-dimensional
data integration where the resulting dataset is LKC -private. Experiments on real-life data demon-
strate that the anonymous mashup data provide better data utility, the approach can handle high
dimensional data, and it is scalable with respect to the data size.
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1.2.4 Provisions: Secure and Privacy-preserving Data Auditing in Bitcoin
Bitcoin exchanges function like banks, securely holding their customers’ bitcoins on their behalf.
Several exchanges have suﬀered catastrophic losses with customers permanently losing their sav-
ings. A proof of solvency demonstrates that the exchange controls suﬃcient reserves to settle each
customer’s account.
In Chapter 7 of this thesis, we propose Provisions, a privacy-preserving proof of solvency whereby
an exchange does not have to disclose its Bitcoin addresses; total holdings or liabilities; or any
information about its customers. Provisions is the ﬁrst protocol to enable Bitcoin exchanges to
provide a proof of reserves with a corresponding proof of liabilities and prove their solvency in a
complete privacy-preserving manner. We also propose an extension which prevents exchanges from
colluding to cover for each other’s losses. We have implemented Provisions and it oﬀers practical
computation times and proof sizes even for a large Bitcoin exchange with millions of customers.
1.3 Organization of the Thesis
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 introduces two recent privacy models, and several cryptographic primitives involving
public encryption schemes with homomorphic properties, commitments, veriﬁable mixing, and
zero knowledge proofs.
• Chapter 3 provides an in-depth literature review of the state-of-the-art techniques for privacy-
preserving data publishing, conﬁdentiality in data outsourcing, searching on encrypted data,
and interactive and non-interactive privacy-preserving data mining.
• Chapter 4 studies the problem of secure and privacy-preserving data outsourcing. We propose
a secure cloud-based data outsourcing and query processing framework that simultaneously
preserves the conﬁdentiality of the data and the query requests, while providing diﬀerential
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privacy guarantee on query outputs. The results of this chapter are currently under review
in [DFMC].
• Chapter 5 studies the problem of secure and privacy-preserving set-valued data integration
with public veriﬁability. We propose a publicly veriﬁable protocol for integrating person-
speciﬁc data from multiple data owners, while providing diﬀerential privacy guarantee and
maintaining an eﬀective level of utility on the released data for the purpose of data mining.
The results of this chapter are currently under review in [DCF].
• Chapter 6 studies the problem of secure and privacy-preserving relational data mashup. We
propose a multi-party protocol for high-dimensional data mashup with guaranteed LKC -
privacy on the output data. The results of this chapter have been published in [DIAF15][ADFH14].
• Chapter 7 studies the problem of secure and privacy-preserving data auditing in Bitcoin.
We propose a cryptographic proof of solvency scheme for Bitcoin exchanges such that no
information is revealed about the exchanges customer holdings, the value of the exchanges
total holdings is kept secret, and multiple exchanges performing the same proof of solvency
can contemporaneously prove they are not colluding. The work in this chapter is a collaborative
eﬀort with a team from the computer science department at Stanford University. The results
of this chapter have been published in [DBB+15b].




In this chapter, we present some background for the research presented in this thesis. We ﬁrst
introduce the data privacy models in Section 2.1, and then introduce the cryptographic primitives
in Section 2.2.
2.1 Privacy Models
In [Dal77], Dalenius provided the following deﬁnition for protecting the privacy of individuals in
published person-speciﬁc data.
Deﬁnition 1 Privacy Protection [Dal77]. Access to the published data should not enable the
attacker to learn anything extra about any target victim compared to no access to the database,
even with the presence of any attacker’s background knowledge obtained from other sources. 
As a result, diﬀerent privacy models have been proposed in the literature, e.g., K-anonymity [Sam01a]
[Swe02b], -diversity [MKGV07], and LKC-Privacy [MFHL09], to provide diﬀerent levels of privacy
protections based on the degree of the background knowledge of the attacker. However, Dwork et
al. [DMNS06] later proved that with the presence of any attacker’s background knowledge, absolute
privacy protection cannot be achieved. In this section, we will present two of the main privacy
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protection models, namely, diﬀerential privacy [DMNS06] and LKC-privacy [MFHL09], where the
former makes no assumptions on the attacker’s prior knowledge, and the latter assumes a bound on
the number of attributes L previously known to the attacker. Note that these privacy models will
be later utilized in the remaining of the thesis to provide privacy guarantees on the output data of
our proposed protocols.
2.1.1 Diﬀerential Privacy [DMNS06]
Diﬀerential privacy is a privacy model introduced by Dwork et al. for the purpose of preserving
data conﬁdentiality without making no assumptions about the attacker’s background knowledge.
Diﬀerential privacy provides a strong guarantee that the presence or the absence of an individual
will not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the ﬁnal output of any function.
Deﬁnition 2 ε-Diﬀerential Privacy. Given any two datasets D1 and D2 that diﬀer on at
most one record, a sanitizing mechanism M achieves ε-diﬀerential privacy if for any output Dˆ ∈
Range(M):
Pr[M(D1) = Dˆ] ≤ eε × Pr[M(D2) = Dˆ] (1)
where the probabilities are taken over the randomness of M . 
Deﬁnition 3 Global Sensitivity [DMNS06]. Given a query function f : D → Rd that maps
dataset D to a vector of d reals, the global sensitivity of f is:
S(f) = max
D1,D2
||f(D1) − f(D2)||1 (2)
where D1 and D2 are any two neighbouring datasets that diﬀer on at most one record. 
To achieve diﬀerential privacy when using query function f , the principal approach is to perturb
the true output of f by adding to it random noise that is adjusted based on S(f). In [DMNS06],
the authors proposed generating the noise according to the Laplace distribution, Lap(λ), where the
probability distribution function is Pr(x|λ) = 12λe
|x|
λ , the mean is 0, and the standard deviation is
λ which is determined based on the global sensitivity S(f) and the privacy parameter ε.
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Theorem 2.1.1 [DMNS06]. For any function f : D → Rd that maps datasets to reals, the
privacy mechanism M :
M(D) = f(D) + Lap(S(f)/ε) (3)
satisﬁes ε-diﬀerential privacy. 
2.1.2 LKC-Privacy [MFHL09]
Let L be the maximum number of values of quasi-identiﬁer attributes QID of the adversary’s
background knowledge on any individual in a data table T . Let S be a set of sensitive values. A
data table T satisﬁes LKC-privacy if, and only if, for any values of quasi-identiﬁer attributes of the
adversary’s background knowledge on an individual qid with |qid| ≤ L,
1. |T [qid]| ≥ K, where T [qid] is the group of records in T containing qid and K > 0 is a minimum
anonymity threshold, and
2. ∀s ⊆ S, P (s|qid) ≤ C, where P (s|qid) is the conﬁdence with which the adversary can infer
that the target victim has sensitive value s, and 0 < C ≤ 1 is a maximum conﬁdence threshold.
LKC-privacy is a generalized privacy model of K-anonymity [Sam01a][Swe02b], conﬁdence bound-
ing [WFY07], and -diversity [MKGV07], which gives the ﬂexibility to the data providers to employ
these traditional privacy models.
2.2 Cryptographic Primitives
In this section, we introduce the fundamental building blocks for the cryptographic protocols that
will be presented this thesis.
2.2.1 Veriﬁable Mix Network [JJR]
A mix network allows a list of encrypted messages to be jointly shuﬄed and re-randomized such
that no participant knows the permutation mapping the inputs to outputs. A veriﬁable mix network
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produces a publicly veriﬁable transcript proving that the output list is correct (i.e., the messages
were only reordered, not modiﬁed nor replaced).
2.2.2 Exponential ElGamal [CGS97]
ElGamal [EG85] is a public key encryption scheme based on the hardness of computing discrete loga-
rithms (and a stronger assumption called decisional Diﬃe-Hellmen). Exponential ElGamal [CGS97]
is a variant that is additively homomorphic and suitable for short messages. Exponential ElGamal
consists of the following algorithms:
KeyGen(). A 2048-bit safe prime p is chosen randomly such that p = α · q+1 for a 256-bit prime
q and some integer α (parameter sizes comply with current NIST recommendations [BR11]).
Let g be a generator of the multiplicative subgroup Gq. The private key x is chosen randomly
from Z∗q and the public key y is computed as y = gx mod p (henceforth, assume all operations
are done mod p).
Enc(m, y, r). To encrypt a short message m with public key y, choose random integer r from Z∗q
and compute the ciphertext as c = 〈c1, c2〉 = 〈gr, gmyr〉.
Dec(c, x). To decrypt ciphertext c with private key x, ﬁrst compute gm = c2 ·c−x1 and solve for m
(recall it is short) using a lookup table of pre-computed values or appropriate algorithm (such
as Pollard’s rho).
Exponential ElGamal is additively homomorphic, meaning a given encrypted message Enc(m, y, r) =
〈c1, c2〉 can be added to a second encrypted message Enc(m′, y, r′) = 〈c′1, c′2〉 without decryption:
Enc(m + m′, y, r + r′) = 〈c1 · c′1, c2 · c′2〉. Enc(m, y, r) can also be multiplied by a constant a homo-
morphically: Enc(am, y, ar) = 〈ca1 , ca2〉.
2.2.3 Distributed Exponential ElGamal Decryption [Bra06]
Given ElGamal ciphertext (α, β), where the secret key x ∈ Zp is shared between n parties, each
participant Pi from P1, . . . ,Pn publishes βxi , where xi is a private key share of Pi. The plaintext
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can then be derived by computing: α/
∏n
i=1 β
xi . Note that Distributed Key Generation (DKG)
protocol [Ped91] can be utilized to create the shared secret key, where each participant only knows
its own share of the secret key.
2.2.4 Mix and Match [JJ00]
Mix and Match is a multi-party protocol for obliviously evaluating an encrypted input against
a plaintext lookup table, where all values are encrypted (with an encryption scheme as above).
The output is a ciphertext corresponding to the lookup table, and no participant knows the actual
looked up value. In the mix phase, the participants use a veriﬁable mix network to blind and
perform row-wise permutation of the lookup table in a distributed fashion. In the matching phase,
the participants determine in a distributed fashion whether two given ciphertexts are equal using
a primitive called plaintext equality test (PET). More speciﬁcally, given two ElGamal ciphertexts
(α1, β1) and (α2, β2), the participants jointly evaluate whether the underlying plaintexts for (α1, β1)
and (α2, β2) [denoted by (α1, β1) ≡ (α2, β2)] are equal as follows:
1. Each participant Pi performs the following:
(a) Select zi ∈U Zp, where ∈U denotes uniform and random selection.
(b) Compute (αi, βi) = (αzi , βzi) and broadcast it.
2. All participants jointly apply the Distributed Exponential ElGamal Decryption protocol to
decrypt (γ, δ) = (Πni=1αi,Πni=1βi). If plaintext (γ, δ) is equal to 0, then (α1, β1) ≡ (α2, β2);
otherwise, (α1, β1) ≡ (α2, β2).
2.2.5 Bulletin Board [Ben87]
A bulletin board is an append-only public broadcast channel where participants of a protocol coor-
dinate their actions and publish their proofs. At the conclusion of the protocol, the contents of the
bulletin board can be considered a transcript of an execution of the protocol.
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2.2.6 Multiparty Coin Tossing [BOO10]
A coin tossing protocol allows a random bitstring to be jointly generated by a set of participants
such that no participant knows the resulting bitstring, and a single honest participant is suﬃcient
for ensuring the ensuing bitstring follows a uniform random distribution.
2.2.7 Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs (NIZKP) [Sch91] [CP92]
Zero knowledge proofs are used for proving that a given statement is true without revealing any
information about the statement itself beside that it is true. A protocol is zero-knowledge proof if
it satisﬁes the following properties:
• Completeness: if the statement is true, the honest prover can convince the honest veriﬁer of
this fact.
• Soundness: if the statement is false, a malicious prover cannot convince an honest veriﬁer that
the statement is true, except with some small probability.
• Zero-knowledge: if the statement is true, a malicious veriﬁer learns nothing but this fact.
Zero knowledge proofs can be adapted from basic Σ-protocols such as the Schnorr proof of
knowledge of a discrete logarithm [Sch91] or the Chaum-Pedersen proof of representation of a Diﬃe-
Hellman tuple [CP92], using Fiat-Shamir [FS90] to compile into a non-interactive zero-knowledge
protocol (NIZKP). If one wishes to avoid the random oracle model, any alternative Σ-protocol to
NIZKP compilation [HL10] is suﬃcient. Note that many protocols we use internally utilize NIZKPs,
including Mix and Match, veriﬁable mix networks, and multiparty coin tossing.
2.2.8 Cut-and-Choose [Rab79]
When an eﬃcient zero-knowledge proof is not admissible, we can utilize the more general technique
of a cut-and-choose protocol. In a non-interactive setting, a participant wishing to demonstrate
a value is well-constructed (without revealing how they were constructed) will construct a large
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number of candidate values and then utilize a public source of randomness, i.e., a beacon [CH10],
to randomly select a subset for auditing purposes. The participant will show how each candidate
in the subset was constructed, inferring belief that the remaining candidates were also constructed
correctly.
2.2.9 Pedersen Commitments [Ped92]
A commitment scheme enables someone to commit to a chosen message while keeping it hidden to
others, with the capability to reveal the message later. Pedersen commitment to a message m ∈ Zq
is deﬁned as com = gm · hr where g and h are ﬁxed public elements of G and the quantity r is
chosen at random in Zq. The generators g and h are chosen once in a way that ensures no one knows





In this chapter, we ﬁrst present an overview of privacy-preserving data publishing (PPDP) and
survey various PPDP research proposals in the context of set-valued data in both non-interactive
and interactive settings. Next, we survey conﬁdentiality in data outsourcing for both centralized
and distributed environments. Afterwards, we provide an in-depth literature review about searching
on encrypted data that covers searchable encryption, functional encryption and secure function
evaluation. Finally, we present the state of art in computations with public veriﬁability.
3.1 Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing
3.1.1 Overview
Privacy-preserving data publishing (PPDP) is a data release mechanism where useful information
can be obtained from the released data while the privacy of individuals in the data is reserved.
A common PPDP approach is anonymization. Several privacy models have been proposed in the
literature for providing diﬀerent types of privacy protection. For example, the (α, k)-anonymity
model [WLFW06] applied generalization and suppression techniques to protect against record and
attribute linkages. The ε-diﬀerential privacy model [Dwo06] aimed at protecting against table linkage
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and probabilistic attacks by ensuring that the probability distribution on the published data is
the same regardless of whether or not an individual record exists in the data. Mohammed et
al. [MCFY11] proposed a generalization-based anonymization algorithm in a non-interactive setting
for releasing diﬀerentially private records for data mining. Cormode et al. [CPS+12] proposed a
framework for using spatial data structures to provide a diﬀerentially private description of the data
distribution. Xiao et al. [XXY10] proposed another framework that uses kd-tree based partitioning
for diﬀerentially private histogram release. These frameworks support range queries while providing
privacy guarantee.
Another PPDP approach for privacy protection is anatomization. Xiao and Tao [XT06] proposed
the anatomy method that partitions the data vertically in order to disassociate the relationship
between the quasi-identiﬁer (QID) attributes and the sensitive attributes (ST), while satisfying the
-diversity privacy requirement. This approach generates two tables: a QID table that contains
all quasi-identiﬁer attributes, and an ST table that contains all sensitive attributes. Both tables
contain an anatomy group attribute (GID) such that all records belonging to the same anatomy
group will have the same GID value in both tables. If an anatomy group has an  distinct set of
sensitive values where each value exists exactly once in the group, then the probability of linking a
record to a sensitive value using GID value is 1/. Since the anatomy approach only considers the
single association between QID attributes and ST attributes, Jiang et al. [JGWY10] proposed a new
approach based on anatomy that considered the functional dependencies among the data attributes
in a single table. This approach splits the table into several sub-tables according to the functional
dependencies such that the decomposed sub-tables satisfy the privacy requirement of -diversity for
each sensitive association. Nergiz and Clifton [NC11] proposed another decomposition approach
using anatomy for query processing on outsourced data that consists of multi-relational tables.
In the rest of this chapter, we will survey privacy-preserving data publishing in the context of
set-valued data in both non-interactive and interactive settings.
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3.1.2 Non-Interactive Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing on Set-Valued
Data
In this related line of work, the raw data is ﬁrst anonymized while maintaining an eﬀective level of
data utility, and then released for the purpose of data mining and analysis.
Centralized Environment
Several approaches have been proposed to anonymize set-valued data [TMK08, HN09, TMK11,
CMF+11] where the data is hosted by one party. Terrovitis et al. [TMK08] proposed a km-
anonymization model based on a bottom-up global generalization, where m is the maximum number
of items an adversary might know in any given transaction. He and Naughton [HN09] removed the
constraint on the background knowledge of the adversary to provide a k-anonymity privacy guarantee
by proposing a greedy algorithm based on a top-down local generalization. Terrovitis et al. [TMK11]
improved the eﬃciency of [TMK08] by proposing optimization methods, namely Local Recoding
Anonymization (LRA) and Vertical Partitioning Anonymization (VPA), which are based on global
recoding. Chen et al. [CMF+11] argued that k-anonymity does not provide a suﬃcient privacy
guarantee when applied on set-valued data, instead proposing a probabilistic top-down algorithm
that utilizes context-free taxonomy tree to release set-valued data satisfying diﬀerential privacy. Al-
though data anonymization has been studied extensively on relational data [FWCY10], set-valued
data is typically high-dimensional so solutions for relational data are ineﬀective due to the curse of
high dimensionality [Don00].
Distributed Environment
To the best of our knowledge, no work has been done on anonymizing set-valued data from diﬀer-
ent sources for the purpose of data release. However, there is a related line of work on relational
data [JX09, JC06, MAFD14, AMFD12]. Jiang and Clifton [JC06] proposed an algorithm for secure
integration of vertically partitioned data between two parties while satisfying k-anonymity. Jurczyk
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and Xiong [JX09] proposed a multi-party framework for horizontally partitioned data over n parties,
where n > 2. The output is an integrated and anonymized data satisfying l-site-diversity, where l
represents the minimal number of partitions to which records in each equivalence class belong. Al-
hadidi et al. [AMFD12] and Mohammed et al. [MAFD14] proposed two-party protocols for securely
generating integrated data satisfying ε-diﬀerential privacy from horizontally partitioned data and
vertically partitioned data, respectively. Unlike our protocol that supports both horizontally and
vertically partitioned data in the malicious adversarial model, the aforementioned approaches han-
dle data that is either horizontally or vertically partitioned, in the semi-honest adversarial model.
Mohammed et al. [MFD11] proposed a method for integrating vertically-partitioned relational data
in the malicious setting; however, this method satisﬁes the k-anonymity privacy model and it is not
publicly veriﬁable.
3.1.3 Interactive Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing on Set-Valued Data
This is another related line of work where the data owners jointly compute a data mining function
on their private data, and learn the correct output and nothing else.
Centralized Environment
There have been serval works concerned with privacy-preserving data mining on a single set-valued
data [BLST10, LQSC12, WCH+07, GLM+13b]. Bhaskar et al. [BLST10] and Li et al. [LQSC12]
proposed two diﬀerent approaches for mining frequent itemsets from set-valued data such that the
output data satisfy diﬀerential privacy. Wong et al. [WCH+07] and Giannotti et al. [GLM+13b]
focused on the problem of secure association rule mining on a set-valued data in an outsourcing
environment. In [WCH+07], the authors proposed an encryption scheme based on substitution
cipher techniques in order to non-deterministically map each item in a transaction to a set of n
items, but no formal privacy guarantee was provided. The authors in [GLM+13b] proposed an
encryption scheme for data transformation that satisﬁes item k-anonymity, i.e., each item in the
outsourced set-valued data is indistinguishable from at least k-1 items.
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Distributed Environment
Kantarcioglu and Clifton [KC04] proposed a multi-party approach for privacy-preserving mining
of association rules on horizontally partitioned set-valued data. Using commutative encryption to
design a secure two-party protocol for division computation, Zhang et al. [ZRZ+13] proposed a two-
party approach for privacy-preserving association rule mining on set-valued data. These methods
cannot be applied to our problem as they do not provide any formal privacy guarantee on the output
data. Wahab et al. [WHZ+14] recently proposed a multi-party approach for mining association rules
while satisfying the diﬀerential privacy model. However, this approach requires a trusted central
authority and assumes that all parties operate is the semi-honest setting. There have been several
works about privacy-preserving data mining on relational data that guarantee certain level of privacy
on the output. For instance, Dwork et al. [DKM+06] proposed a method for answering count queries
on a horizontally partitioned data in a malicious multi-party environment, by returning noisy counts
that satisfy diﬀerential privacy. Narayan and Haeberlen [NH12] proposed a protocol for a semi-honest
two and multiple party environment where the answers to SQL-style count queries are noisy counts
satisfying diﬀerential privacy. These approaches are not applicable to the problem in Chapter 5 as
they are neither designed to handle high dimensional data, nor support public veriﬁability.
3.2 Conﬁdentiality in Data Outsourcing
Another area related to our work is conﬁdentiality in data outsourcing, where data is stored and
managed by one or more untrusted parties that are diﬀerent from the data owner. Queries are
executed on the data while keeping the data conﬁdential and without revealing information about
the queries.
3.2.1 Centralized Environment
A commonly used mechanism for ensuring data conﬁdentiality is encryption. Some approaches
proposed to process queries over encrypted data directly. However, such approaches do not provide
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a good balance between data conﬁdentiality and query execution. For example, methods in [HILM02]
[HMT04] attach range labels to the encrypted data, thus revealing the underlying distributions of the
data. Other methods depend on order-preserving encryption [AKSX04][EAAG06]; however, these
methods reveal the data order and are subject to inference and statistical attacks. Homomorphic
encryption, on the other hand, is a promising public cryptosystem that allows query execution on
encrypted data [GZ07a][Gen09]; however, its high computation cost makes it prohibitive in practice.
In Chapter 4, we employ the exponential variation of ElGamal [CGS97] encryption scheme in one
area of our solution by taking advantage of its additive homomorphism property. We show that
this scheme is eﬃciently employed because the encrypted message is small enough for the scheme to
remain practical.
Instead of processing queries directly over encrypted data, some approaches have proposed us-
ing indexing structures for fast data access and eﬃcient query execution [WCL+10][WL06][GZ07b].
Some indexing schemes have constraints on the type of queries they support. For example, hash-
based indexing [DVJ+03] and privacy homomorphism [HIM04] only support equality queries, whereas
bucket-based indexing [HILM02] and character-oriented indexing [WDWS04][WWS05] support equal-
ity queries as well as partially supporting range queries. To support both equality queries and range
queries, a category of approaches propose using disk-based indexes such as B-tree [BM70] and B+-
tree [Com79] and spatial access indexes such as kd-tree [Ben75] and R-tree [Gut84]. Our work in
Chapter 4 ﬁts in this category because we utilize an encrypted kd-tree index for eﬃcient and secure
traversal. Wang et al. [WAEA11] proposed a framework based on B+-tree index for query processing
on relational data in the cloud. However, in order to protect data conﬁdentiality against the cloud,
the proposed solution generates a superset of the result and requires the client (querying user) to
perform predicates evaluation in order to compute the ﬁnal result. Hu et al. [HXRC11] proposed a
framework based on R-tree index for secure data access and processing of k-nearest-neighbor (kNN)
similarity queries. However, the proposed approach partitions the R-tree index constructed over the
outsourced data into two indexes, one is hosted by the cloud and the other is hosted by the client.
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In addition, a high communication bandwidth is required to achieve access conﬁdentiality. Recently,
Wang and Ravishankar [WR13] proposed a framework for performing half-space range queries using
an R̂-tree index that is encrypted using Asymmetric Scalar-product Preserving Encryption (ASPE)
scheme [WCKM09]. Their method ensures data conﬁdentiality and requires low communication and
storage overhead on the client side. However, it does not provide a privacy guarantee, nor does it
provide full conﬁdential query processing because it leaks information on the ordering of the mini-
mum bounding box of the leaf nodes and requires result postprocessing because it introduces false
positives. Barouti et al. [BAAD14] proposed a protocol for secure storage of patient health records
on the cloud, while allowing health organizations to securely query the data. The proposed protocol,
however, does not provide privacy guarantees on the query results, while requiring high communi-
cation overhead on the client side. Blass et al. [BNVH12] proposed a conﬁdential pattern counting
protocol for clouds using MapReduce. The authors propose an eﬃcient somewhat homomorphic
encryption scheme that preserve the conﬁdentiality of the data and the queries. However, similar
to [BAAD14], the proposed approach does not provide privacy guarantees on the query results.
3.2.2 Distributed Environment
In a distributed data outsourcing environment, the data is partitioned and outsourced to a set of
independent and non-colluding servers. To ensure data and query conﬁdentiality, a distributed pro-
tocol is needed to securely process the query without disclosing the data in each of the outsourcing
servers. Such protocols typically use secure multiparty computation (SMC) [Yao82][Gol04], a cryp-
tographic technique that computes a secure function from multiple participants in a distributed
network. For example, Shaneck et al. [SKK09] proposed an approach for computing kNN queries on
horizontally partitioned data, Vaidya and Clifton [VC05] proposed an approach for secure answering
of top k queries on vertically partitioned data while satisfying k-anonymity, whereas Rastogi and
Nath [RN10] and Shi et al. [SCR+11] addressed the problem of private aggregation of time-series
data such that the outcome statistic is diﬀerentially private.
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3.3 Searching on Encrypted Data
3.3.1 Searchable Encryption (SE)
Searchable encryption (SE) [SWP00] [DRD08] [BTHJ12] [JJK+13] allows encrypted data hosted
remotely by a third party to be searched by the host on behalf of the data owner while allowing the
former to learn as little information as possible about the underlying plaintext data. Depending on
whether it uses public symmetric encryption or public key encryption, SE schemes can be respectively
split into either searchable symmetric encryption or public key encryption with keyword search. SE
assumes that the encrypted data generated by the data owner and then stored on untrusted remote
server (e.g. cloud). The user who is interested in obtaining some information from the data generates
a trapdoor for the server to use for searching the data. Depending on the number of the data owners
and users, SE can be divided into four categories: single owner & single user, single owner &
multi-user, multi-owner & single user, and multi-owner & multi-user.
Single Owner & Single User (SOSU)
This setting is the most suitable for data outsourcing, where the data owner encrypts the data and
creates trapdoors that will be sent to the host to conduct the search. Several SE schemes have been
proposed to support searching on a single keyword [SWP00][Goh03][CM05][CGKO06][VLSD+10]
[CK10][KPR12]. Song et al. [SWP00] used sequential scan to propose the ﬁrst usable SE scheme.
The approach is to encrypt each word separately, and then enclose a hash value with speciﬁc pattern
in the ciphertext. The search is performed by the server by extracting the hash value and verify that
its pattern matches the pattern of the search keyword. In [Goh03][CM05], the authors constructed
an index per each search document, where the former uses Bloom ﬁlters [Blo70] and the latter
uses a set of bits each of which represents on search keyword stored in advance in a lookup table.
Rather than indexing each document, the authors in [CGKO06][VLSD+10] proposed diﬀerent SE
schemes that create an index per each search keyword, where inverted indexes and pseudo-random
functions are used respectively. Chase and Kamara [CK10] also utilized inverted indexes to propose
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SE schemes for searching on matrix-structured data and labeled data, while supporting the concept
of controlled disclosure such that access is granted only to part of a data. Kamara [KPR12] later
extended [CGKO06] by proposing a scheme that supports sub-linear search time, compact indexes
and eﬃcient data update.
On the other hand, several SE schemes have also been proposed to support searching on mul-
tiple keywords [GSW04][BKM05][BLL06][WWP08a][CJJ+13][ABCK09][LWW+10]. Assuming the
existence of keyword ﬁelds in the search documents, Golle et al. [GSW04] was the ﬁrst to propose
a SE scheme for conjunctive keyword search with amortized linear cost. Ballard et al. [BKM05]
used Shamir’s threshold secret sharing to construct a scheme that is linear w.r.t. the number of
search documents. Byun et al. [BLL06] later proposed a more eﬃcient scheme with respect to com-
munication and storage costs using bilinear mapping. Wang et al. [WWP08a] proposed the ﬁrst
SE scheme for conjunctive keyword search without assuming the existence of keyword ﬁelds using
also bilinear mapping. Based on [CGKO06], Cash et al. [CJJ+13] recently proposed an eﬃcient
(sub-linear) scheme for searching on unstructured and encrypted data. The proposed approach rep-
resents a trade-oﬀ between privacy and eﬃciency, where information about data access patterns is
leaked to the server while the underlying data and queries remain conﬁdential. To support more
advanced search queries on encrypted data such as fuzzy search, Adjedj et al. [ABCK09] utilized
locality sensitive hashing to reduce the dimensionality of biometric data and propose a symmetric
searchable encryption scheme for biometric identiﬁcation. The approach in [LWW+10] proposed by
Li et al. also supports fuzzy search, where edit distance is used to measure the similarity between
keyword semantics and to consequently determine the closest ﬁles to the search query.
Single Owner & Multi-User (SOMU)
This setting is more suitable for data sharing, where the data owner encrypts the data and then share
it with other parties who will be able to create trapdoors and perform their own search. A natural
way to achieve that is to extend an existing SOSU approach and make it suitable for multi-users.
In [CGKO06], the authors described how broadcast encryption can be used to extend their SOSU
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scheme (described earlier) to support a searchable symmetric encryption for multi-users in the SOMU
setting. The search documents are ﬁrst encrypted using the according to the SOSU scheme, and
then the users receive the key for generating the trapdoors via broadcast encryption. The proposed
construction does not require authentication, and supports revocation of users such that revoked
user cannot anymore conduct searches on the encrypted documents. Proxy re-encryption [BBS98]
allows a party to decrypt on behalf of another party by enabling a third party to convert a ciphertext
for one party to another without obtaining any knowledge about their secret keys. In [RVBM09],
Raykova et al. constructed a SOMU scheme by introducing re-routable encryption, a stronger notion
of proxy encryption that protects the identities of the parties involve. The authors utilized Bloom
ﬁlters to build the search structures, where for each search document a Bloom ﬁlter index is created.
They also assumed the existence of a query router server, that performs user authentication, as well
as queries and results transformation. Yang et al. [YLW11] utilized symmetric bilinear mapping
to propose a scheme for data outsourcing with multi-users. Each user is issued a unique key for
generating its own queries, while the cloud maintain a list of helper keys for all authorized users.
Given a user’s search query and his helper key, the cloud constructs a common key based on bilinear
mapping to search the encrypted index. The proposed scheme supports query unforgeability, where
neither the cloud nor other users can construct a valid query on behalf of a user. It also supports
eﬃcient user revocation, where the revocation process does not require key renewal for non-revoked
users, nor requires update to the encrypted index.
Multi-Owner & Single User (MOSU)
In this setting, there exist several data owners, each of which encrypts its own data to target a
certain recipient. Most of the schemes we will review next are based on public key encryption.
With respect to searching on a single keyword, some MOSU schemes in the literature [BDCOP04]
[BSNS08][ABC+08] were constructed based on identity based encryption [Coc01][BF03]. Boneh et
al. [BDCOP04] proposed the ﬁrst MOSU scheme by considering the scenario where an email sender
encrypts its email with the public key of the receiver, while allowing the routing email server to
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search for a speciﬁc keyword in the encrypted email before it forwards it to the receiver. Using its
private key, the receiver generates a trapdoor for a search keyword and sends it to the mail server
via a secure channel, where the latter uses it to perform the search while learning nothing about
the underlying text except of whether or not it contains the search keyword. This system is called
non-interactive public key encryption with keyword search, as it allows for keyword search without
requiring any interaction between the sender and the receiver. The server, however, can store all the
trapdoors it receives from the receiver, and conduct search by itself on future emails. To address
this issue, Baek et al. [BSNS08] proposed a MOSU scheme that enables search keywords that are
used frequently to be refreshed by attaching attaching a time period to them. The shorter the time
period is, the more secure can be obtained. This scheme also removes the need for a secure channel
between the server and the receiver in [BDCOP04] by maintaining a private/public key pair, where
the sender uses the public keys of the receiver and the server for encryption, while the the receiver
encrypts its trapdoors using the public key of the server and sends them through public channels.
Several SE schemes have also been proposed in the literature to support searching on multiple
keywords [BSNS08][PCL05][HL07][BCK09][SVLN+10]. Baek et al. [BSNS08] extended [BDCOP04]
(discussed above) to support conjunctive keyword search. In [PCL05], Park et al. enabled the hosting
server (proxy) to decrypt the documents containing desired search keywords without having access to
the user’s private decryption key. The server, however, cannot decrypt other documents that do not
contain the search keywords. In [HL07], Hwang et al. provided a conjunctive keyword search scheme
that optimizes the storage and communication overhead of both the server and the user. To support
more advanced search queries, Bringer et al. [BCK09] used Bloom ﬁlters with storage [BKOSI07]
to propose a fuzzy search scheme for biometric identiﬁcation over encrypted person-speciﬁc data.
The approach separates the stored data on the server from its indexes, while using locality-sensitive
hashing functions to allow for error-tolerance. Based on hidden vector encryption [BW07], Sedghi et
al. [SVLN+10] used symmetric bilinear pairings of prime order to propose an eﬄuent MOSU scheme
that supports wildcard search while accepting keywords over any alphabet.
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Multi-Owner & Multi-User (MOMU)
To search on a single keyword, Bellare et al. [BBO07] proposed a MOMU scheme where the encryp-
tion algorithm is deterministic to achieve higher eﬃciency. To be able to conduct the search, a deter-
ministic hash of the plaintext is attached to the ciphertext. The scheme is length-preserving, where
each ciphertext and its corresponding plaintext both have the same length. In [BDDY08], Bao et al.
constructed a scheme for the scenario where a group of data owners, each of which has its private key,
can encrypt their documents separately and send them to the hosting server, while each data owner
can generate their own trapdoors and send them to the server to search on all existing documents.
The proposed scheme allows for dynamic data owner enrollment, provides transparent user revoca-
tion, and supports query unforgeability. Several schemes, including [HL07] [WWP09] [WWP08b],
were proposed in the literature in the MOMU setting that support searching on multiple keywords.
No MOMU schemes, however, have been proposed so far to support an advanced level of search
queries such as fuzzy or symmetric search.
3.3.2 Functional Encryption (FE)
Functional encryption (FE) [BSW11] is a recent public-key encryption paradigm that enables both
ﬁne-grained access control and selective computation on encrypted data. In FE system, there exists
a master secret key MSK that is held by a trusted authority. Let x = (I,m) be the encryption of
message m and its access control I, and let f be a function to be evaluated over x. The trusted
authority uses MSK to derive a secret key SKf that is associated with the function f . Given x,
anyone can evaluate f [x] using secret key SKf .
Depending on whether or not the access control index is public, most of the functional encryp-
tion systems belong to one of the following two classes: predicate encryption, which includes
anonymous identity-based encryption (A-IBE), hidden vector encryption (HVE), and inner product
predicate (IPP), and predicate encryption with public index, which includes identity-based en-
cryption (IBE) [Coc01][BF03], attribute-based encryption (ABE) [BSW07], and predicate encryption
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(PE) [BW07]. In this review, we focus on ABE since it supports ﬁne-grained access control that
can be utilized to handle not only keywords but also numerical ranges. Sahai and Waters [SW05]
introduced attribute-based encryption as a new concept of public encryption schemes that allow data
owners to encrypt their data while setting a policy indicating who can decrypt this data. There are
two types of attribute-based encryption schemes: key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE),
and cipher-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE). In the key-policy attribute based encryption
schemes [GPSW06][OSW07][KSW08][LDLW14], the message is encrypted and a ciphertext with a set
of attributes is generated. The decryption of the message is achieved using a secret key with an access
structure if the access structure is satisﬁed by the set of ciphertext attributes. On the other hand,
with regard to cipher-policy attribute-based encryption schemes [BSW07][LS08][Wat11][HSM+14],
a set of attributes is associated with a secret key, while an access structure (ciphertext policy) is
associated with a ciphertext. The decryption of the message is achieved using a secret key with a
set of attributes if the secret key’s attribute set satisﬁes the access structure associated with the
ciphertext.
3.3.3 Secure Function Evaluation (SFE)
Assume f is a function to be executed between a set of parties with individual inputs. Using secure
function evaluation (SFE), each party learns only the output of the function and is otherwise assured
the conﬁdentiality of their individual inputs. Yao [Yao86] introduced the ﬁrst two-party protocol for
SFE, which was later generalized to secure multi-party computation by Goldreich et al. [GMW87].
Our protocols follow the line of research utilizing threshold homomorphic cryptosystems to provide
SFE. This paradigm, also known as computing on encrypted data, was introduced by Franklin and
Harber in the semi-honest model for two/multi party protocols [FH94], and extended to the malicious
model by Cramer et al. [CDN01] for the multiparty setting, and Schoenmakers and Tuyls [ST04]
for the two-party setting. Jakobsson and Juels [JJ00] provided a general protocol in the malicious
model that is adaptable to both settings.
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3.4 Public Veriﬁability
To ensure a protocol executes correctly in the presence of malicious adversaries, participants must
prove they are following the protocol at each step. Often such proofs are convincing to the other
participants in the protocol and contingent on their interaction or individual secrets. A publicly
(or universally) veriﬁable protocol produces a transcript proving correct execution that is veriﬁ-
able by anyone at any time. In the database community, veriﬁability has been studied in the
areas of data authentication [Tam03][DBP07], data streams [CCM09][CKLR11], and public audit-
ing [WCW+13][WLL12]. In veriﬁable computation, a single data owner delegates a computationally
heavy task to the cloud while being able to verify the results [BGV11][CKV10][GGP10][GKR08].
Outside of databases, public veriﬁability is an important property for a number of cryptographic







In recent years, there has been a considerable eﬀort to ensure data conﬁdentiality and integrity of
outsourced databases on the cloud. Several research proposals suggest encrypting the data before
moving it to the cloud [GZ07a, PRZB11]. While encryption can provide data conﬁdentiality, it is less
eﬀective in deterring inference attacks. This reality demands new privacy-enhancing technologies
that can simultaneously provide data conﬁdentiality and prevent inference attacks due to aggregate
query answering. Privacy-preserving data publishing (PPDP) is the process of anonymizing person-
speciﬁc information for the purpose of protecting individuals’ privacy while maintaining an eﬀective
level of data utility for data mining. Diﬀerent PPDP privacy models provide diﬀerent types of
privacy protection [FWCY10]. Diﬀerential privacy [Dwo06] is a recently proposed privacy model that
provides a provable privacy guarantee. Diﬀerential privacy is a rigorous privacy model that makes no
assumption about an adversary’s background knowledge. A diﬀerentially-private mechanism ensures
that the probability of any output (released data) is equally likely from all nearly identical input
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data sets and thus guarantees that all outputs are insensitive to any individual’s data.
In this chapter, we propose a cloud-based query processing framework that simultaneously pre-
serves the conﬁdentiality of the data and the query requests, while providing diﬀerential privacy
guarantee on the query results to protect against inference attacks. Let us consider the following
real-life scenario. Population Data BC (PopData) 1 is a non-proﬁt organization (data bank) re-
sponsible (among other things) for storing and managing patient-speciﬁc health data received from
several hospitals, health organizations and government agencies in the Province of British Colom-
bia, Canada. PopData utilizes explicit identiﬁers to integrate the data, and then de-identiﬁes the
integrated data by separating the explicit identiﬁers from the rest of the data contents. Data miners
interested in querying the data initially sign a non-identiﬁability agreement to prevent them from
releasing research data that can be used to re-identify individuals. When PopData receives a data
mining query, it ﬁrst authenticates the data miner, veriﬁes that she is working on an approved re-
search project, and then executes the query on the de-identiﬁed data and returns the result back to
the data miner. Similar organizations can be found in other countries, e.g., the National Statistical
Service 2 in Australia.
A major concern in this scenario is data privacy. Although the data is de-identiﬁed, data min-
ers can still perform (or accidentally release a research results that can leads to) record/attribute
linkage attacks and re-identiﬁcation of individuals, as was shown in the cases of AOL [BZ06] and
Netﬂix [NS08]. On the other hand, to minimize the workload on PopData, cloud services can be used
to store, manage, and answer queries on the integrated data. However, this rises two other concerns.
One concern is data conﬁdentiality, where the outsourced patient-speciﬁc data must be stored in a
protected way to prevent the cloud from answering queries from unauthorized data miners, and to
protect against potential multi-tenancy problems due to the sharing of services, resources, and phys-
ical infrastructure between multiple independent tenants on the cloud [DWC10]. Another concern
is query conﬁdentiality, where the cloud should be able to execute query requests from authorized
1PopData: https://www.popdata.bc.ca/






































Query q: “number of patients older than 15 




Figure 1: Security requirements for data outsourcing.
data miners without the ability to know what attributes and attribute values are speciﬁed in each
query.
As shown by [BDMN05], count queries can be quite useful for data mining and statistical analysis
applications where miners focus on extracting new trends and patterns from the overall data and
are less interested in particular records.
Figure 1 illustrates the overall process of our proposed framework. Each data owner (e.g. hospital,
health center) submits its raw data to the data bank (data provider). The data bank ﬁrst integrates
all data together, and then applies a PPDP privacy model on the integrated data such that explicit
identiﬁers of record owners are removed, while other attributes (including sensitive attributes) are
anonymized and retained for data analysis. Next, the data bank encrypts the anonymized data and
upload it to the service provider (public cloud). Data miners authenticate themselves to the data
bank and then submit their encrypted count queries to the cloud. The cloud securely processes each
query, homomorphically computes the exact noisy count, and then sends the encrypted result back
to the data miner. The proposed framework, named SecDM, achieves data privacy by supporting
any privacy algorithm whose output is a contingency table data. Attribute-base Encryption (ABE)
and ElGamal schemes are used to achieve data and query conﬁdentiality. While our framework
protects the conﬁdentiality of individual query (data access), we provide a detailed security analysis
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in Section 4.5.3. We analyze in Section 4.4.4 the beneﬁt of outsourcing the data to a service provider
as compared to having the data bank handle the user queries directly and show that the processing
overhead on the data bank is almost 10 times less than the overhead on the service provider.
The intuition of our solution is to generate a kd-tree index for eﬃcient traversal and secure
access on the anonymized data, where the index tree is encrypted using attribute based encryption
and stored on the public cloud. When a data miner desires to query the outsourced data, she sends
her proof of identity to the data provider with her query and receives an encrypted version of her
query, namely, system query, which she sends to the cloud for processing. The cloud uses the system
query to traverse the encrypted kd-tree index and securely compute the total count representing
the privacy-preserving answer to the query. The cloud then sends the answer back to the data
miner, who in turn decrypts the encrypted results using a decryption key provided originally by the
data provider. Our framework protects the conﬁdentiality of each individual query by its predicates
hidden from the cloud. However, it does not hide the search pattern of the queries. We provide
formal deﬁnition of framework properties as well as detailed security analysis in Section 4.5.3.
The contributions of this chapter can be summarized as follows:
Contribution 1. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst work that proposes a com-
prehensive privacy-preserving framework for query processing in a cloud computing environment.
The proposed framework maintains the privacy and utility properties of the outsourced data while
simultaneously ensuring data conﬁdentiality, query conﬁdentiality, and privacy-preserving results.
Previous work [BAAD14][GLM+13a][WAEA11][Yon14][TH13] satisﬁes only a subset of the afore-
mentioned security features.
Contribution 2. To ensure eﬃcient data access while maintaining data conﬁdentiality, we
present an algorithm for constructing an encrypted kd-tree index that hides the data from the cloud
while allowing for conﬁdential query processing. We utilize attribute based encryption in a unique
way to handle range predicates on numerical attributes.
Contribution 3. Most existing work on the problem of data outsourcing in cloud computing
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environments either requires the query issuer to have prior knowledge about the data and sub-
sequently requires storage and communication overhead [WAEA11], or yields results that require
postprocessing on the query issuer’s side [HILM02], or both [HXRC11]. In contrast, data miners
in our proposed framework are considered “lightweight clients” as they are not required to have or
store any information about the data, nor are they required to perform post-processing on the results
(except for decrypting the results). The communication complexity with the cloud is constant with
respect to the size of the dataset and the query type.
Contribution 4. SecDM has two major steps, namely index construction and query processing.
It has linear time complexity on both steps w.r.t. the number of attributes, and it is sub-linear
w.r.t. the data size on query processing. Extensive experiments on real-life data further conﬁrm
these properties.
In Table 2, we summarize the features of the representative approaches in the areas related to our
work, including our proposed solutions. Unlike the other approaches, our proposed solution ensures
data and query conﬁdentiality and privacy-preserving results while assuming that the client has no
prior knowledge about the data being queried and its structure. No further interaction is required
between the cloud and the client once the latter has submitted her query to the cloud, and no local
reﬁnement is required by the client on the ﬁnal result.
The results of this chapter are currently under review in TCC [DFMC].
4.2 Preliminaries
The framework presented in this chapter utilizes two main components: anonymous ciphertext-policy
attribute based encryption (ACP-ABE) scheme [NYO08], and DiﬀGen Algorithm [MCFY11] for data
anonymization. In this section, we ﬁrst introduce the ACP-ABE scheme and deﬁne its properties










































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.2.1 Anonymous Ciphertext-Policy Attribute Based Encryption (ACP-
ABE)
In this chapter, we utilize CP-ABE to preserve the conﬁdentiality of the data mining queries and
the outsourced data (i.e. the data index hosted on the cloud). Our proposed framework requires the
CP-ABE scheme to support attributes with multiple values, including the wildcard functionality (to
indicate that certain attributes are not relevant to the ciphertext policy), while hiding the details of
the access structures associated with ciphertexts. A good candidate satisfying the aforementioned
properties is the CP-ABE scheme proposed in [NYO08]. This scheme is secure under the Decisional
Bilinear Diﬃe-Hellman (DBDH) assumption [Jou00] and the Decision Linear (D-Linear) assump-
tion [BBS04], constructed in the multi-valued attribute setting, supports wildcards, and allows the
access structure to be expressed in conjunctive normal form (i.e. conjunction - AND of disjunctions -
OR). It also prevents the decryptor from obtaining information about the access structure by hiding
what values for each attribute is speciﬁed in the conjunction of all the attributes.
Given a set of attributes {A1, . . . , Ai, . . . , An}, where each attribute Ai has a domain Ω(Ai) =
{vi,1, . . . , vi,j , . . . , vi,|Ω(Ai)|}, the scheme can be constructed according to the following four algo-
rithms:
Setup(1λ). A trusted authority ﬁrst runs Gen(1λ) to generate a tuple [p,G,GT , g ∈ G, e], where
G,GT are cyclic groups, e : G1 × G2 → GT is a bilinear map, and ω∈RZ∗p. For each at-
tribute Ai : 1 ≤ i ≤ n, generate values {ai,j , bi,j ∈R Z∗p} and point Ai,j ∈R G for each
attribute value vi,j ∈ Ω(Ai) : 1 ≤ j ≤ |Ω(Ai)|. The algorithm outputs public key PK =
〈Y, p,G,GT , g, e, {(Ai,j)ai,j , (Ai,j)bi,j}1≤i≤n1≤j≤|Ω(Ai)|〉, where Y = e(g, g)ω. It also outputs master
secret key MSK = 〈ω, {ai,j , bi,j}1≤i≤n1≤j≤|Ω(Ai)〉.
KeyGen(MSK,L). This algorithm takes MSK and a set of attribute values L = {v1,t1 , . . . , vi,ti , . . . , vn,tn},
where vi,ti ∈ Ω(Ai), and outputs a user’s secret key SKL = 〈D0, {Di,0, Di,1, Di,2}1≤i≤n〉, where
D0 = gω−s, Di,0 = gsi(Ai,j)ai,ti .bi,ti .λi , Di,1 = gai,ti .λi , Di,2 = gbi,ti .λi , and si, λi ∈R Z∗p for
1 ≤ i ≤ n such that s = ∑ni=1 si. This algorithm will be used to encrypt user queries and
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generate corresponding system queries that will be executed against the encrypted data on the
cloud.
Enc(PK,M,W ). This algorithm takes public key PK and access structure W = {W1 ∧ . . . ∧
Wi ∧ . . .∧,Wn}, and encrypts a message M ∈ GT . The result is a ciphertext:
CT = 〈C˜, C0, {Ci,j,1, Ci,j,2}1≤i≤n1≤j≤Ω(Ai)〉, where r ∈R Z∗p, C˜ = MY r, and C0 = gr. If vi,j ∈
Wi, then [Ci,j,1, Ci,j,2] = [(Ai,j)bi,j .ri,j , (Ai,j)ai,j .(r−ri,j)] (well-formed group elements), where
ri,j ∈R Z∗p. If vi,j /∈ Wi, then Ci,j,1, Ci,j,2 ∈R Z∗p (mal-formed group elements).











, where [C ′i,1, C ′i,2] := [Ci,j,1, Ci,j,2] if Li = vi,ji .
In the rest of the chapter we will refer to the ACP-ABE scheme as A, and to the Exponential
ElGamal scheme as G.
4.2.2 DiﬀGen Algorithm
Mohammed et al. [MCFY11] proposed data anonymization algorithm for acheiving diﬀerential pri-
vacy in the non-interactive setting based on the generalization technique. The general idea is to
anonymize the raw data D by a sequence of specializations, starting from the topmost general state.
A specialization, written v → child(v), where child(v) denotes the set of child values of v, replaces
the parent value v with child values. The specialization process can be viewed as pushing the cut of
each taxonomy tree downwards. A cut of the taxonomy tree for an attribute Ai ∈ Apr, denoted by
Cut(TAi), contains exactly one value on each root-to-leaf path. The specialization starts from the
topmost cut and pushes down the cut iteratively by specializing a value in the current cut.
DiﬀGen presented in Algorithm 1 ﬁrst generalizes the raw data and then adds noise to achieve ε-
diﬀerential privacy. Initially, all values in Apr are generalized to the topmost value in their taxonomy
trees (Line 1), and Cuti contains the topmost value for each attribute Apri (Line 2). At each iteration
DiﬀGen uses exponential mechanism to select a candidate v ∈ ∪Cuti for specialization, where ∪Cuti
is the set of all candidate values for specialization (Line 7). Candidates are selected based on their
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ALGORITHM 1: (DiﬀGen)
Input: Raw data set D, privacy budget ε, and number of specializations h.
Output: Anonymized data set Dˆ
1: Initialize every value in D to the topmost value;
2: Initialize Cuti to include the topmost value;
3: ε′ ← ε2(|Aprn |+2h) ;
4: Determine the split value for each vn ∈ ∪Cuti with probability ∝ exp( ε′2Δuu(D, vn));
5: Compute the score ∀v ∈ ∪Cuti;
6: for l = 1 to h do
7: Select v ∈ ∪Cuti with probability ∝ exp( ε′2Δuu(D, v));
8: Specialize v on D and update ∪Cuti;
9: Determine the split value for each new vn ∈ ∪Cuti with probability ∝ exp( ε′2Δuu(D, vn));
10: Compute the score for each new v ∈ ∪Cuti;
11: end for
12: return each leaf node with count (C + Lap(2/ε))
score values, and diﬀerent utility functions can be used to determine the scores of the candidates.
Once a candidate is determined, DiﬀGen splits the records into child partitions. The split value
of a categorical attribute is determined according to the taxonomy tree of the attribute. Since
the taxonomy tree is ﬁxed, the sensitivity of the split value is 0. Therefore, splitting the records
according to the taxonomy tree does not violate ε-diﬀerential privacy. For numerical attributes, a
split value cannot be directly chosen from the attribute values that appear in the data set D because
the probability of selecting the same split value from a diﬀerent data set D′ not containing this value
is 0. In this context, DiﬀGen uses the exponential mechanism again to determine the split value
for each numerical candidate vn ∈ ∪Cuti (Lines 4 and 9). Then, the algorithm specializes v and
updates ∪Cuti (Line 8). It also calculates the scores of the new candidates due to the specialization
(Line 10). Finally, the algorithm outputs each leaf partition along with their noisy counts (Line 12)
(see [MCFY11] for more details).
4.3 Problem Formulation
In this section we formally deﬁne the research problem. First, we present an overview of the prob-
lem of conﬁdential query processing, with privacy guarantee on outsourced data in the cloud in
Section 4.3.1. Next, we deﬁne the input components in Section 4.3.2. We then describe the trust
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and adversarial model in Section 4.3.3. Finally, we present the problem statement in Section 4.3.4.
4.3.1 Problem Overview
In this chapter we examine a cloud computing model consisting of three parties: data provider, data
miner, and service provider. The data provider, for example, represents a data bank that owns an
integrated patient-speciﬁc database. The data miner represents a user who is interested in querying
the data for the purpose of performing analytical data mining activities such as classiﬁcation analysis.
The service provider is a public (untrusted) party that facilitates access to IT resources, i.e., storage
and computational services.
The data provider desires to make its data available to authorized data miners. Due to its limited
resources, the data provider outsources the database to a service provider capable of handling the
responsibility of answering count queries from data miners. To prevent the disclosure of patients’
sensitive information, the data provider anonymizes its data and generates a set of records that
satisfy ε-diﬀerential privacy. Even though the outsourced data is anonymized, the data provider
wants to protect the data against the service provider so it cannot answer queries on the data from
untrusted (unauthorized) data miners. The service provider, however, should be able to process
count queries from authorized data miners conﬁdentially and return results that provide a certain
privacy guarantee.
4.3.2 System Inputs
In this section we give a formal deﬁnition of the input components, namely, diﬀerentially private data
and user count queries. Without loss of generality, we assume that the input data is anonymized
using an ε-diﬀerential privacy model [Dwo06], although our approach supports other privacy mod-
els that produce contingency-like tables based on generalization and suppression. We choose ε-
diﬀerential privacy because it provides a strong privacy guarantee while being insensitive to any















































Figure 2: A raw data table D and its taxonomy trees.
data, then we explain how to transform the data using taxonomy trees, and ﬁnally we deﬁne the
types of count queries the user can submit.
Diﬀerentially Private Data
In this section we review how a data provider can generate ε-diﬀerentially private records. We utilize
the diﬀerentially private anonymization algorithm (DiﬀGen) [MCFY11] to maximize the data utility
for classiﬁcation analysis. Suppose a data provider owns an integrated patient-speciﬁc data table
D = {AI , Apr, Acls}, where AI is an explicit identiﬁer attribute such as SSN or Name for explicitly
identifying individuals that will not be used for generating the ε-diﬀerentially private data; Acls is a
class attribute that contains the class value; and Apr is a set of k predictor attributes whose values are
used to predict the class attribute Acls. We require the class attribute Acls to be categorical, whereas
the predictor attributes in Apr are required to be either categorical or numerical. Furthermore, we
assume that for each predictor attribute Ai ∈ Apr a taxonomy tree TAi is used in order to specify the
hierarchy among the domain values of Ai. Figure 2 shows a raw data table D with four attributes,
namely, Country, Job, Age, and Salary and the taxonomy tree for each attribute.
The data provider’s objective is to generate an anonymized version Dˆ = {Aˆpr, NCount} of the
data table D, where Aˆpr is the set of k generalized predictor attributes, and NCount is the noisy
count of each record in Dˆ. The objective of the data miner is to build a classiﬁer to accurately
predict the class attribute Acls by submitting count queries on generalized predictor attributes Aˆpr.
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׫Cuti = {Any_Country, Any_Job, [18-65), [18-99]}
׫Cuti = {Any_Country, Professional,Artist, [18-65), [18-99]}
Any_Count. Artist [45-65) [18-99)Any_Count. Artist [18-45) [18-99)
Any_Count. Prof. [45-65) [18-99)Any_Count. Prof. [18-45) [18-99)
Any_Count. Professional [18-65) [18-99) Any_Count. Artist [18-65) [18-99)
Any_Count. Any_Job [18-65) [18-99)
Country Job Age Salary
Any_Job {Professional, Artist}
[18-65) {[18-45), [45-65)}
Figure 3: Algorithm DiﬀGen for generating ε-diﬀerentially private data with noisy counts.
Table 3: Diﬀerentially-private data table Dˆ
ˆCountry ˆJob Aˆge ˆSalary NCount
Any Country Professional [18-45) [18-99) 4
Any Country Professional [45-65) [18-99) 2
Any Country Artist [18-45) [18-99) 1
Any Country Artist [45-65) [18-99) 5
Example 1 Consider the raw data set in Figure 2. Initially, the algorithm creates one root par-
tition containing all the records that are generalized to 〈 Any Country, Any Job, [18-65), [18-99)
〉. ∪Cut(TAi) includes {Any Country, Any Job, [18-65), [18-99)}. Let the ﬁrst specialization be
Any Job → {Professional, Artist}. The DiﬀGen algorithm creates two new partitions under the root,
as shown in Figure 3, and splits data records between them. ∪Cut(TAi) is updated to {Any Country,
Professional, Artist, [18-65), [18-99)}. Suppose that the next specialization is [18-65)→ {[18-40),
[40-65)}, which creates further specialized partitions. Finally, the algorithm outputs the equivalence
groups of each leaf partition with their noisy counts as shown in Table 3. 
Input Data Transformation
We simplify the representation of the ε-diﬀerentially private records Dˆ = {Aˆpr, NCount} by mapping
the values of each attribute to their integer identiﬁers from the corresponding attribute’s taxonomy
tree.
Numerical Attributes. The domain of each numerical attribute Aˆi ∈ Aˆpr, consists of a set of
ranges that are pair-wise disjoint and can be represented as a continuous and ordered sequence of
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Figure 4: Taxonomy tree TJob for attribute Job.
Table 4: Transformed data table Dˆ
ˆCountry ˆJob Aˆge ˆSalary NCount
1 2 1 1 4
1 2 2 1 2
1 3 1 1 1
1 3 2 1 5
to each range r = [rmin, rmax] such that for any two ranges rj and rl, if rmaxj < rminl , then
IDop(rj) < IDop(rl). For example, if the domain of the generalized attribute Aˆge is Ω(Aˆge) =
〈[18, 45), [45, 65)〉, then IDop([18, 45)) = 1 and IDop([45, 65)) = 2.
Categorical Attributes. The domain of each categorical attribute Aˆi ∈ Aˆpr consists of the
set of values Cut(TAi). We deﬁne a taxonomy tree identiﬁcation function IDt such that for any
two nodes vi, vj : vj = vi, if vi is a parent of vj , then IDt(vi) < IDt(vj). If vi is the root node,
then IDt(vi) = 1. Figure 4 illustrates the taxonomy tree TJob for attribute Job, where each node is
assigned an identiﬁcation value.
Having deﬁned the mapping functions IDop and IDt, we now transform the ε-diﬀerentially
private records Dˆ by mapping the values in the domain of each attribute to their identiﬁers. That
is, for each numerical attribute Aˆi ∈ Aˆpr, we map each range r ∈ Ω(Aˆi) to its corresponding
identiﬁcation value IDop(r). Similarly, for each categorical attribute Aˆi ∈ Aˆpr, we map each value in
v ∈ Ω(Aˆi) to its identiﬁcation value from the taxonomy tree IDt(v). Table 4 shows the diﬀerentially
private data Dˆ after the transformation.
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User Count Queries
The goal of the data miners is to build a classiﬁer based on the noisy count of a query over the gen-
eralized attributes Aˆpr. Therefore, they submit count queries to be processed on the ε-diﬀerentially
private data Dˆ and expect to receive a noisy count as a result to each submitted query. We denote
by user count query any data mining’s count query, and it is formally deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 4 (User Count Query.) A user count query u over Dˆ is a conjunction of predicates
P1 ∧ ... ∧ Pm where each predicate P = (Aˆi Op si) expresses a single criterion such that Aˆi ∈ Aˆpr,
Op is a comparison operator, and si is an operand. If Aˆi is a categorical attribute, then Op
corresponds to the equality operator “ = ” and si is a value from the taxonomy tree TAi . If Aˆi
is a numerical attribute, then si is a numerical range [smini , smaxi ] such that if smini = smaxi then
Op ∈ {>,≥, <,≤,=} ; otherwise, Op is the equal operator (=). 
In general, a user count query u can be either exact, speciﬁc, or generic depending on whether
it corresponds to an exact record (equivalence class), or whether it partially intersects with one
or more records in the ε-diﬀerentially private data Dˆ. Note that both speciﬁc and generic queries
correspond to range queries in the literature. The following is a formal deﬁnition of each type of a
user count query.
Deﬁnition 5 (Exact User Count Query.) A user count query u is exact if for each predicate
P = (Aˆi Op si) ∈ u, si ∈ Ω(Aˆi). 
Deﬁnition 6 (Speciﬁc User Count Query.) A user count query u is speciﬁc if for each predicate
P = (Aˆi Op si) ∈ u:
1. If Aˆi is categorical, then si ∈ Ω(Aˆi).
2. If Aˆi is numerical, then si ∈ Ω(Aˆi) or there exists exactly one range r ∈ Ω(Aˆi) where si ∩ r = φ
and si = r. 
Deﬁnition 7 (Generic User Count Query.) A user count query u is generic if for each predicate
P = (Aˆi Op si) ∈ u:
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1. If Aˆi is categorical, then si ∈ TAi .
2. If Aˆi is numerical, then ∃ rj , rl ∈ Ω(Aˆi) such that si ∩ rj = φ, si ∩ rl = φ, and rj = rl. 
Example 2 The following are examples of user count queries over the ε-diﬀerentially private data
Dˆ presented in Table 3:
Exact: u1 = ( ˆJob = “Artist”) ∧ (Aˆge = [45 − 65))
Speciﬁc: u2 = ( ˆJob = “Artist”) ∧ (Aˆge = [50 − 57))
Generic: u3 = ( ˆJob = “Lawyer”) ∧ (Aˆge = [30 − 70))
Observe that the queries conform neither to the structure nor to the data in Dˆ. That is, attributes
ˆCountry and ˆSalary are missing, the value “Lawyer” is not in the domain Ω( ˆJob), and the range
[30, 70] spans beyond the values covered by all ranges in Ω(Aˆge). All these issues will be addressed
in section 4.4.3 when the data miner submits her user count query for preprocessing. 
4.3.3 Adversarial Model
SecDM consists of three parties: data provider (data bank), data miner, and service provider (cloud).
In our security analysis, the adversary can statically corrupt, in honest-but-curious (HBC) [KMR]
fashion, the service provider or the data miner, but not both. The service provider adversary
tries to gain access to the contents of the anonymized data, and during query execution tries to
infer information about the count queries and their results. On the other hand, the data miner
adversary tries to link sensitive information to patients by attempting to gain information about the
anonymized records identiﬁed by each of her queries, their count values, and the percentage of each
query count. We assume the computational power of each adversary is bounded by a polynomial
size circuit. We also assume that a protocol is in place to provide secure pair-wise communications
between parties in the SecDM framework.
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4.3.4 Problem Statement
Given ε-diﬀerentially private data Dˆ, the objective is to design a framework for outsourcing Dˆ to an
untrusted service provider P that can answer exact, speciﬁc, and range count queries from authorized
data miners on Dˆ. The framework must provide three levels of security: (1) data conﬁdentiality,
where Dˆ is stored in an encrypted form such that no useful information can be disclosed from Dˆ by
unauthorized parties; (2) conﬁdential query processing, where P is capable of processing the queries
on Dˆ for classiﬁcation analysis without inferring information about the queries or the underlying
anonymized data; and (3) privacy preservation, where the result of each query provides a certain
privacy guarantee.
4.4 Solution: SecDM Framework
In this section we ﬁrst present an overview of our proposed privacy-preserving framework for conﬁ-
dential query processing on ε-diﬀerentially private data in the cloud, and then we elaborate on the
key steps of the algorithm, including constructing a secure index, securing the data for outsourcing,
and executing count queries while preserving their privacy.
4.4.1 Solution Overview
The objective of our solution is to provide a secure framework that enables data providers to out-
source their ε-diﬀerentially private data Dˆ to a service provider (public cloud) such that the conﬁden-
tiality of the outsourced data is protected, while the service provider is capable of securely answering
count queries from authorized data miners without being able to infer any information about the
queries and their results, as illustrated in Figure 5. Our framework consists of ﬁve algorithms:
Algorithm 2 - Secure Index Construction (buildIndex): For an eﬃcient data retrieval, a
secure kd-tree index is constructed over all categorical and numerical attributes in Dˆ, where each
non-leaf node is encrypted using the ACP-ABE scheme A.

















(a) The setup phase, where the data provider anonymizes the integrated patient-speciﬁc data and generates
a kd-tree index over the anonymized data for eﬃcient search and retrieval and uploads the index to the
cloud.







(6) Secure Index 
Traversal







Data Provider Data Miner
(b) The query processing phase, where authorized users interested in mining the patient-speciﬁc data obtain
system count queries from the data provider and then submit the queries to the cloud for processing. The
cloud conﬁdentially process the queries and sends the privacy-preserving results back to the users.
Figure 5: SecDM: A Privacy-preserving framework for conﬁdential count query processing on the
cloud.
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procedure to construct the leaf nodes in the kd-tree index. Each leaf node contains a noisy count
encrypted using Exponential ElGamal and a set of tags to be utilized during query execution for
determining the exact percentage that should be used of the noisy count of each reported leaf node.
Algorithm 5 - Query Preprocessing (qPreprocess): A user (data miner) desiring to query
the outsourced data ﬁrst submits a query u to the data provider that preprocess the query and
sends back three components: an encrypted version of the query in the form of a secret key SKu
using anonymous ciphertext-policy attribute based encryption scheme A, a set of ADT tokens for
producing accurate count results, and a decryption key G.x. The user then submits the encrypted
query SKu and the ADT tokens to the service provider.
Algorithm 7 - Index Traversal (traverseIndex): The service provider utilizes the user’s
secret key SKu in order to securely traverse the index tree and determine the leaf nodes satisfying
SKu.
Algorithm 8 - Total Count Computation (compTCount): Using the set of ADT to-
kens, the service provider computes the percentage of the noisy count of each reported leaf node,
homomorphically add all counts together, and then sends the encrypted result to the user.
4.4.2 Secure Index Construction
Given the ε-diﬀerentially private data Dˆ with kc categorical attributes and kn numerical attributes,
the data provider constructs an encrypted index on all attributes in Dˆ in order to support eﬃcient
and secure processing of multi-dimensional range count queries over the k-dimensional data, where
k = kc +kn. That is, it constructs a balanced kd-tree [Ben75] index, where every internal (non-leaf)
node is a k-dimensional node that splits the space into two half-spaces, and each leaf node stores a
noisy count corresponding to a record in Dˆ.
The kd-tree index is constructed with the procedure Secure Index Construction (buildIndex)
presented in Algorithm 2. BuildIndex is a recursive procedure that has four input parameters: Dˆ,
depth i, PK, and y. The ﬁrst input parameter Dˆ is the set of records for which the kd-tree will
46
ALGORITHM 2: buildIndex: Secure Index Construction
Input: Shuﬄed ε-diﬀerentially private data Dˆ
Input: split dimension i
Input: ACP-ABE public key PK
Input: Exponential ElGamal public key y
Output: kd-tree index T
1: if |Dˆ| = 1 then
2: LeafNode ← constLeafNode(Dˆ, y);
3: return LeafNode;
4: end if
5: cut ← median(Aˆi, Dˆ);
6: split(Dˆ, Aˆi, cut, Dˆ1, Dˆ2);
7: vleft ← buildIndex(Dˆ1, (i + 1)modk, PK, y);
8: vright ← buildIndex(Dˆ2, (i + 1)modk, PK, y);
9: create empty node v;
10: v.split dim ← Aˆi ; v.split value ← cut;
11: v.lc ← vleft ; v.rc ← vright;
12: v.genCT (PK);
13: return kd-tree index T ;
be constructed, where each record represents a point in the k-dimensional space. The columns in
Dˆ are shuﬄed a priori to randomize the order of the attributes. The second input parameter i
represents the depth of the recursion that determines the split dimension. It ranges between 1 and
k, where 1 is the initial value. The third input parameter PK is the public key of the anonymous
ciphertext-policy attribute based encryption scheme A, which will be used to secure each internal
node in the index tree. To generate this key a security parameter λ is passed to the setup algorithm:
A.Setup(1λ) ⇒ (PK,MSK). The last parameter y is the public key of the Exponential ElGamal
scheme used to encrypt the noisy counts in the leaf nodes. The function median (Line 5) determines
the median value of the domain Ω(Aˆi), where Aˆi is an attribute from Dˆ. The function split (Line
6) then uses a hyperplane that passes through the median value in order to split Dˆ into two subsets
of records, Dˆ1 and Dˆ2. Note that the median value is chosen for splitting to ensure a balanced
tree where each leaf node is about the same distance from the root of the tree. BuildIndex calls
itself (Lines 7-8) using Dˆ1 and Dˆ2 as inputs in order to determine the left and right children nodes
respectively. When the procedure terminates (Line 13), it returns the kd-tree index T . Next, we
will discuss how internal nodes (Lines 9-12) and leaf nodes (Line 2) are constructed.
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Internal Nodes Construction
Each internal (non-leaf) node v in the kd-tree index corresponds to one dimension (attribute)
Aˆi ∈ Dˆ : 1 ≤ i ≤ k of the k-dimensional space, where the splitting hyperplane is perpendicular to
the axis of dimension Aˆi, and the splitting value cut is determined by the median function (Line
4). Node v has two child nodes, namely, lc and rc, where all records containing values smaller or
equal to the cut value with regard to Aˆi will appear in the left subtree, whose root is v.lc, and
all records containing values greater than the cut value with regard to Aˆi will appear in the right
subtree, whose root is v.rc. Furthermore, node v consists of two ciphertexts, v.CTleft and v.CTright,
where the encrypted message in v.CTleft is a pointer (Ptr) to the child node v.lc, and the encrypted
message in v.CTright is a pointer to the child node v.rc. The intuition is as follows: The service
provider must use the key SKu provided by the user to be allowed to securely traverse the kd-tree
index and compute the answer to the user query u. The structure of SKu and how it is built is
discussed in Section 4.4.3. At any node v in the kd-tree, if SKu satisﬁes the access structure of the
ciphertext v.CTleft, the ciphertext is decrypted and a pointer to the child node v.CTleft is obtained.
Similarly, if SKu satisﬁes the access structure of v.CTright, the ciphertext is decrypted and a pointer
to v.CTright is obtained. If SKu satisﬁes both access structures, then two pointers are obtained,
indicating that both left and right subtrees must be traversed.
Access Structure. The ciphertexts in each node are generated using the anonymous ciphertext-
policy attribute based encryption scheme A, where each ciphertext has an access structure W . Each
numerical attribute Aˆi ∈ Dˆ is represented in the access structure of a ciphertext by two attributes,
Aˆmini and Aˆmaxi , where Ω(Aˆmini ) = Ω(Aˆmaxi ) = Ω(Aˆi). On the other hand, each categorical attribute
is mapped to one attribute in the access structure of a ciphertext. Below is the formal deﬁnition of
an access structure of a ACP-ABE ciphertext.
Deﬁnition 8 (Ciphertext Access Structure W .) Given ε-diﬀerentially private data Dˆ and a
node v from the kd-tree index over Dˆ, the access structure of a ciphertext of v is the conjunction
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W = [WAˆ1 ∧ ... ∧ WAˆi ∧ ... ∧ WAˆk ]. If Aˆi is a categorical attribute, then WAˆi corresponds either to
the wildcard character “ ∗ ” or to a disjunction of values from Ω(Aˆi), where “WAˆi = ∗” means that





each corresponds to either the wildcard character “ ∗ ” or a disjunction of values
from Ω(Aˆi). 
Note that for a given node v, the access structure of the left and right ciphertexts is mainly
concerned with the splitting dimension v.split dim, and the split value v.split value over Dˆ1 or Dˆ2,
where Dˆ1, Dˆ2 ⊆ Dˆ. If v.split dim is a categorical attribute Aˆi, then WAˆi in the access structure
of v.CTleft should correspond to the disjunction of all values val ∈ {Ω(Aˆi) ∪ {1}} such that val ≤
v.split value and for val = 1, where 1 represents “Any” value. Similarly, WAˆi in the access structure
of v.CTright should correspond to the disjunction of all values val ∈ {Ω(Aˆi) ∪ {1}} such that
val > v.split value or for val = 1. On the other hand, if v.split dim is a numerical attribute Aˆi,
then WAˆmin
i
in the access structure of v.CTleft should correspond to the disjunction of all values
val ∈ Ω(Aˆi) for all val ≤ v.split value, and WAˆmax
i
in the access structure of v.CTright should
correspond to the disjunction of all values val ∈ Ω(Aˆi) such that val > v.split value. Regardless of
whether Aˆi is categorical or numerical, all values in {W \ WAˆi} should correspond to “ ∗ ”.
Example 3 Given Dˆ from Table 4, and given node v from kd-tree index:
a) If v.split dim = Job (categorical) and v.split value = 2, then the access structure of the left
and right ciphertexts can be represented as follows:
WL = (Country = ∗) ∧ (Job = 1 ∨ Job = 2) ∧ (Agemin = ∗) ∧ (Agemax = ∗) ∧ (Salarymin =
∗) ∧ (Salarymax = ∗).
WR = (Country = ∗) ∧ (Job = 1 ∨ Job = 3) ∧ (Agemin = ∗) ∧ (Agemax = ∗) ∧ (Salarymin =
∗) ∧ (Salarymax = ∗).
b) If v.split dim = Age (numerical) and v.split value = 1, then the access structure of the left
and right ciphertexts are:
WL = (Country = ∗)∧ (Job = ∗)∧ (Agemin = 1)∧ (Agemax = ∗)∧ (Salarymin = ∗)∧ (Salarymax =
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∗).
WR = (Country = ∗)∧ (Job = ∗)∧ (Agemin = ∗)∧ (Agemax = 2)∧ (Salarymin = ∗)∧ (Salarymax =
∗). 
In procedure buildIndex presented in Algorithm 2, each internal node v is created after deter-
mining its children nodes Vleft and vright (Lines 9-12), where function genCT is responsible for
creating the left ciphertext CTleft and the right ciphertext CTright of the node by calling twice the
ACP-ABE algorithm A.Enc() and passing as parameters the public key PK of A, a pointer to the
child node to be encrypted, and the values in the access structure (without the attribute names):
v.CTleft ← A.Enc(PK,Ptr(v.lc),WL);
v.CTright ← A.Enc(PK,Ptr(v.rc),WR);
For each attribute Aˆi in W that is assigned a wildcard, e.g. (Country = ∗), A.Enc() generates
a random (mal-formed) group elements [Ci,j,1, Ci,j,2] for each value in Ω(Aˆi). On the other hand,
for each attribute in W assigned speciﬁc values, e.g. (Job = 1 ∨ Job = 2), A.Enc() generates a
well-formed group elements for each value speciﬁed, i.e. for value 1 and for value 2, and random
group elements for each remaining value in Ω(Job). As a result, all ciphertexts CT generated by
A.Enc() in the kd-tree index contain the same number of group elements regardless of the access
structure.
Leaf Nodes Construction
In procedure buildIndex, as the multi-dimensional space is being recursively partitioned a leaf node
is created whenever the number of the records being partitioned reaches 1 (Lines 1-2 ). Procedure
Leaf Node Construction (constLeafNode), presented in Algorithm 3, is responsible for generating the
leaf nodes. It takes as input a ε-diﬀerentially private record R and Exponential ElGamal’s public
key y and outputs a leaf node l. After creating an empty node l (Line 1), the noisy count of record
R is encrypted using Exponential ElGamal encryption scheme G and stored in node l (Line 2). We
choose the Exponential ElGamal cryptosystem due to its additive homomorphism property, which
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ALGORITHM 3: constLeafNode: Leaf Node Construction
Input: ε-diﬀerentially private record R
Input: Exponential ElGamal’s public key y
Output: leaf node l
1: create empty node l;
2: l.NCount ← G.Enc(R.NCount, y, r);
3: for each numerical attribute Aˆi ∈ Dˆ do
4: l ← genTAG(R.Aˆi);
5: end for
6: return l;
ALGORITHM 4: indexUpload: kd-Tree Index Upload
1: The Data Provider submits the kd-tree index T to the Service Provider;
2: The Service Provider receives T ;
allows for homomorphically adding encrypted noisy counts together in an eﬃcient way.
For each numerical range value R.Aˆi in R, a deterministic and hiding commitment function
genTAG() is utilized to commit R.Aˆi and randomly generate a unique tag (Line 3-4). Applying
genTAG() to the same value will always generate the same tag (deterministic). Moreover, the cor-
respondence between each tag and its value is kept secret (hiding). As we will see in Section 4.4.3,
using a deterministic function to generate tags for the numerical range values enables the service
provider during query execution to compute the exact percentage of the noisy count of each reported
leaf node with respect to the query being processed.
Once the kd-tree index T has been created, it is submitted to the service provider according to
Algorithm 4. While Algorithm 4 is trivial, it is required in Section 4.5.3 to prove by simulation the
security of the framework.
4.4.3 Conﬁdential Query Processing
In this section, we illustrate how user count queries are executed in order to determine their exact
ε-diﬀerentially private answers while preserving the conﬁdentiality of the data as well as the queries.
First, we explain how the user query is preprocessed and transformed into a system query. Next,
we discuss how the service provider securely traverses the kd-tree index, computes the total count,
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and then sends the result back to the user.
Query Preprocessing
Upon the receipt of a user’s count query u, the data provider ﬁrst transforms u into a conjunction
of subqueries that specify a single-value equality condition over each attribute Aˆi ∈ Dˆ. Next, it
generates a system count query SKu using algorithm A.KeyGen() from ACP-ABE scheme. If an
attribute Aˆi in Dˆ is not speciﬁed by the user in u, then it will be considered in SKu as if the user
is asking for (Aˆi = ∗). The following is the formal deﬁnition of a system count query:
Deﬁnition 9 (System Count Query.) Given ε-diﬀerentially private data Dˆ with k attributes
and a user query u = P1 ∧ ... ∧ Pm | P = (Aˆi Op si), a system count query over Dˆ is a ACP-ABE
user’s secret key SKu representing k subqueries {qAˆ1 , ..., qAˆk} such that:
• If Aˆi is a categorical attribute, then Aˆi is represented in SKu as a tuple of group elements
[Di,0, Di,1, Di,2]
• If Aˆi is a numerical attribute, however, it is represented in SKu as two tuples of group elements
[Dmini,0 , Dmini,1 , Dmini,2 ] and [Dmaxi,0 , Dmaxi,1 , Dmaxi,2 ], where each tuple corresponds to the minimum
and maximum bound of the range subquery qAˆi , respectively. 
The total number of group element tuples in a system query SKu is: |SKu| = kc +2×kn, where
kc and kn are the number of categorical and numerical attributes in Dˆ. |SKu| is independent of the
user query u. We refer the reader to Section 4.2.1 for more details on how an ACP-ABE secret key
is generated.
Procedure Query Preprocessing (qPreprocess) presented in Algorithm 5 illustrates how a system
count query SKu is constructed based on a user’s count query u. Once the user has been authen-
ticated successfully using user identiﬁcation token UIT (Line 2), the next step is to determine the
attribute-value pairs in SKu. For each categorical attribute Aˆi ∈ Dˆ, if predicate (Aˆi, Op, si) exists
in the user count query u and si is in the domain of Aˆi, then the subquery (Aˆi, si.ID) is added to q,
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ALGORITHM 5: qPreprocess: Query Preprocessing
Input: ε-diﬀerentially private data Dˆ
Output: system count query SKu
Output: set of attribute distribution tokens N
1: The Data Provider receives user identiﬁcation token UIT and user count query u from Data
Miner
2: if user authentication is successful using UIT then
3: q ← {}; ADT ← {};
4: for each categorical attribute Aˆi ∈ Dˆ do
5: if (Aˆi, Op, si) ∈ u and si ∈ Ω(Aˆi) then
6: q ← q ∪ (Aˆi, si.ID);
7: else if (Aˆi, Op, si) ∈ u and si /∈ Ω(Aˆi) then
8: n ← findSCS(si);
9: q ← q ∪ (Aˆi, n.ID);
10: else if (Aˆi, Op, si) /∈ u then
11: q ← q ∪ (Aˆi, 1);
12: end if
13: end for
14: for each numerical attribute Aˆi ∈ Dˆ do
15: if (Aˆi, Op, si) ∈ u then
16: (vi,1, vi,2) ← compMinMax(Ω(Aˆi), si, Opi);
17: q ← q ∪ (Aˆmini , vi,1) ∪ (Aˆmaxi , vi,2);
18: N ← N ∪ genADT (Ω(Aˆi), vi1, vi2);
19: else
20: q ← q ∪ (Aˆmini , 1) ∪ (Aˆmaxi , rangemax);
21: end if
22: end for
23: SKu ← A.KeyGen(MSK, q);
24: return SKu, N ;
25: end if
ALGORITHM 6: queryRequest: System Count Query Request
1: The Data Provider sends the following to the Data Miner:
• System count query SKu corresponding to user count query u
• Set of attribute distribution tokens N
• Exponential ElGamal decryption key x
2: The Data Miner receives SKu, N , and x from Data Provider;
3: The Data Miner sends SKu and N to Service Provider;
4: The Service Provider receives SKu and N from Data Miner;
where si.ID is the identiﬁer of the categorical value si in Aˆi’s taxonomy tree TAˆi (Lines 5-6); oth-
erwise, if si is not in the domain of Aˆi, then function findSCS(si) (Line 8) is utilized to determine
the position of si in Aˆi’s taxonomy tree with regard to the solution cut. If si is below the solution
cut, then there exists exactly one node n on the path from si to the root, such that n ∈ Ω(Aˆi). We
53
call such a node the Solution Cut Subsumer (SCS) of si, and the subquery (Aˆi, n.ID) is then added
to q (Line 9). If si is above the solution cut or u does not have any predicate that corresponds to a
categorical attribute Aˆi ∈ Dˆ, then the subquery (Aˆi, 1) is added to q (Lines 10-11), where 1 means
“ANY” value of Aˆi corresponding to the root node of Aˆi’s taxonomy tree TAˆi .
On the other hand, if Aˆi is a numerical attribute and predicate (Aˆi, Op, si) exists in u, then
the values vi,1 associated with Aˆmini and vi,2 associated with Aˆmaxi are determined by the func-
tion compMinMax (Line 15). When Op is the equal operator (=), if si is a single value, then
vi,1 = vi,2 = Range(si), where Range(si) is a function that returns the identiﬁer of the range in
Ω(Aˆi) containing si; otherwise, if si is a range, then vi,1 = Range(Lowerbound(si)) and vi,2 =
Range(Upperbound(si)). If Op = “ ≥ ”, then vi,1 = Range(si) and vi,2 is the identiﬁer of the high-
est range in Ω(Aˆi). Conversely, if Op = “ ≤ ”, then vi,1 = 1 and vi,2 = Range(si). If predicate
(Aˆi, Op, si) does not exist in u for numerical attribute Aˆi (Lines 19-20), then vi,1 = 1 and vi,2 is the
identiﬁer of the highest range rangemax ∈ Ω(Aˆi).
Example 4 Given Table 3 and Table 4, the following are three diﬀerent users’ queries and their
corresponding subqueries in the access structure of the system count query:
a) u = (Age = 50) ⇒ q = (Agemin, 2), (Agemax, 2).
b) u = (Age = [40 − 70]) ⇒ q = (Agemin, 1), (Agemax, 2).
c) u = (Age ≤ 35) ⇒ q = (Agemin, 1), (Agemax, 1). 
Function genADT (Line 18) is used to generate attribute distribution tokens (ADT) for each
numerical attribute Aˆi from Dˆ. Two ADT tokens, ADTmin and ADTmax, are created for each
numerical attribute for the purpose of computing the percentages of the noisy counts of the reported
leaf nodes upon query execution in order to determine the ﬁnal answer (total count) of the query.
Each ADT token consists of two parts: tag and value. Assuming that r is the range for which the
ADT token is constructed, then ADT.tag = genTAG(r) and ADT.value is the percentage of the
partial overlap between query u and range r.
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Figure 6: ADT query overlap.
Example 5 Assume that in ε-diﬀerentially private data Dˆ, Ω(Aˆge) = {[18 − 30), [30 − 45), [45 −
55), [55− 65)}, Ω( ˆSalary) = {[30− 45), [45− 60), [60− 70)}, and user count query u = (Country =
“US”) ∧ (Job = “Engineer”) ∧ (Age = [25 − 49]) ∧ (Salary = [47 − 70]). Figure 6 illustrates the
equivalence classes of all records (numbered from 1,1 to 4,3), the query u (dark gray rectangle), and
the set of leaf nodes identiﬁed by u (six light gray rectangles). The range Age = [25 − 49] spans
over three ranges: [18 − 30), [30 − 45), and [45 − 55). Since [25 − 49] fully spans over [30 − 45),
no ADT token is required for [30 − 45). However, since [25 − 49] partially overlaps with ranges
[18 − 30) and [45 − 55), ADTmin and ADTmax should be created. For range value [18 − 30),
ADTmin.tag = genTAG([18 − 30)) and ADTmin.value = 30−2530−18 = 42%. Similarly, for range value
[45 − 55], ADTmax.tag = genTAG([45 − 55)) and ADTmax.value = 50−4555−45 = 50%. On the other
hand, Salary = [47 − 70] partially overlaps with ranges [45 − 60) and [60 − 75) and ADTmin and
ADTmax must be created. For range value [45 − 60), ADTmin.tag = genTAG([45 − 60)) and
ADTmin.value = 60−4760−45 = 87%. Similarly, for range value [60 − 75], ADTmax.tag = genTAG([60 −
75)) and ADTmax. value= 70−6075−60 = 67%. 
Once the set of attribute-value pairs q have been determined, the system count query SKu is
then generated by encrypting q with ACP-ABE master secret key MSK using algorithm A.KeyGen
(Line 23). Next, the data provider sends the following back to the user: secret key SKu, the set of
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ALGORITHM 7: traverseIndex: kd-tree Index Traversal
Input: kd-tree index root node v
Input: system count query SKu
Output: set of leaf nodes R
1: if v is a leaf node then
2: return v;
3: else
4: if A.Dec(v.CTleft, SKu) then
5: R ← R ∪ traverseIndex(v.lc, SKu);
6: end if
7: if A.Dec(v.CTright, SKu) then




ADT tokens N , and ElGamal decryption key G.x that will be used eventually to decrypt the ﬁnal
result of the query.
kd-tree Index Traversal
To execute a query u on Dˆ, the data miner sends a system count query SKu and a set of ADT
tokens N to the service provider. The service provider uses the secret key SKu to securely traverse
the kd-tree index and identify the set of leaf nodes satisfying u, while it uses N to adjust the noisy
count of each identiﬁed leaf node in order to compute an accurate ﬁnal answer to the query.
Procedure kd-tree Index Traversal (traverseIndex) presented in Algorithm 7 illustrates how the
tree is traversed recursively to answer queries. It takes two input parameters: the root node v of the
kd-tree index and a system count query SKu. If v is an internal node, then the algorithm attempts
to decrypt the left ciphertext v.CTleft and the right ciphertext v.CTright by separately applying the
decryption function Dec from A, with the decryption key SKu, in order to determine whether it
needs to traverse the left subtree, right subtree, or both. If the values of the attributes associated
with SKu satisfy the access structure of v.CTleft, then the decryption of v.CTleft is successful and
the procedure traverseIndex calls itself while passing the left child node v.lc as input parameter
(Line 4-5). Similarly, if the values of the attributes associated with SKu satisfy the access structure
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Figure 7: (a) Access structure of root node v. (b) Generating system count query SKu from user
count query u.
passing the right child node v.rc as input parameter (Line 7-8). When the algorithm reaches a
leaf node v, then v is returned (Lines 1-2). Procedure traverseIndex eventually returns the set R
containing all leaf nodes satisfying SKu (Line 11).
Example 6 Given Example 5, assume that v is the root node where v.split dim = Age (Aˆ3) and
v.split value = 2 (range[30 − 45)). Figure 7.(a) illustrates the access structure of v.CTleft and
v.CTright. Figure 7.(b) shows the system count query (secret key) SKu that was generated from
the user query u such that Age = [50 − 60] equates to Aˆmin3 = 3 and Aˆmax3 = 4.
Since Aˆmin3 = 3 from SKu is not in the access structure of v.CTleft, then the decryption is
unsuccessful, and the left subtree will not be traversed. However, Aˆmax3 = 4 from SKu is in the
access structure of v.CTright, then the decryption is successful and the procedure traverseIndex
traverses the right subtree, whose root node is v.rc. 
Computing Total Noisy Count
Having identiﬁed the set of leaf nodes R satisfying user count query u, the next step is to compute
the ﬁnal answer to the count query.
Procedure Total Count Computation (compTCount) presented in Algorithm 8 illustrates how
the total noisy count is computed. It takes as input a set of leaf nodes R and a set of attribute
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ALGORITHM 8: compTCount: Total Noisy Count Computation
Input: set of leaf nodes R
Input: set of attribute distribution tokens N
Output: ciphertext of total count 〈r, s〉
1: 〈r, s〉 ← 〈1, 1〉 // initialization
2: for each leaf node lj ∈ R do
3: 〈rj , sj〉 ← lj .NCount;
4: for each token ADTi ∈ N do
5: if ADTi.tag ∈ lj then
6: 〈rj , sj〉 ← 〈rADTi.valuej , sADTi.valuej 〉; // scalar multiplication
7: end if
8: end for
9: 〈r, s〉 ← 〈r.rj , s.sj〉; // homomorphic addition
10: end for
11: return 〈r, s〉;
ALGORITHM 9: queryResult: User Count Query Result
Input: Exponential ElGamal decryption key x
Output: Query result ciphertext of total count 〈r, s〉
1: The Data Miner receives ElGamal encrypted result 〈r, s〉 from Service Provider;
2: resu = G.Dec(〈r, s〉, x); // Total noisy count decryption
3: return resu;
distribution tokens N . For each leaf node lj , if there is an ADT token ADTi whose tag matches
any of the tags in lj , then a percentage of the encrypted noisy count 〈rj , sj〉 is computed by raising
rj and sj to the value associated with ADTi (Lines 5-6). To homomorphically add two noisy
counts together, their ﬁrst ciphertexts are multiplied together, and the same is done for their second
ciphertexts (Line 9). The output of procedure compTCount is the encrypted total count 〈r, s〉 (Line
11).
Computing Query Result
Once ciphertext 〈r, s〉 has been computed, the service provider returns the ciphertext to the user
as the ﬁnal result. As per Algorithm 9, when the data miner receives the encrypted result 〈r, s〉,
she uses Exponential ElGamal’s private key G.x to decrypt the ciphertext and determine the exact
noisy count resu such that resu satisﬁes diﬀerential privacy.
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4.4.4 Discussion
SecDM allows data miners to reuse previously generated system queries and eliminates the need to
interact with the data provider to generate the same ones again. However, this comes at the expense
of requiring the user to interact with two parties (the data provider and the service provider), and
to perform public key decryption operations on the results encrypted using Exponential ElGamal.
In some scenarios where query reusability is not required, our framework can be easily modiﬁed
to have all communications go through the data provider, as in the Centralized SecDM (C-SecDM)
framework illustrated in Figure 8. Observe that in C-SecDM, the data miner does not have access
to Exponential ElGamal’s decryption key G.x, as the decryption is performed by the data provider,
and the total count result is then sent in clear text to the data miner via a secure channel.
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Figure 8: Centralized SecDM (C-SecDM) framework.
To analyze the beneﬁt of outsourcing the data to a service provider versus having the data
provider handle the user queries directly, we measured the processing overhead of speciﬁc count
queries on the data provider and the service provider when the number of queries ranges from 200
to 1000. We choose speciﬁc count queries to perform the experiment because they represent the
worst-case scenario, where the number of nodes traversed in the kd-tree index is minimized and the
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number of ADT tokens is maximized. Figure 9 illustrates the results of our experiment, where we
observe that the processing overhead on the proxy server is almost 10 times less than the overhead
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Figure 9: Performance comparison w.r.t. # of queries.
To present a practical framework we choose Exponential ElGamal to encrypt the noisy counts
because this encryption scheme supports eﬃcient homomorphic addition and integer multiplication
operations. These operations are utilized by the cloud to adjust the noisy count of each identiﬁed
leaf node in the kd-tree index tree using ADT tokens and then to compute the total count. However,
in each ADT token, ADT.value must be stored in clear text, which reveals the percentage each noisy
count should be multiplied by, without reveling the actual value of the noisy count or its adjusted
value. Rather than using Exponential ElGamal, we could have used other encryption schemes that
support multiple homomorphic additions and multiplications. However, such schemes are ineﬃcient
and will render our solution impractical.
Shabtai et al. [SER12] and Shmueli et al. [STW+12] indicate that the anonymization approach
should be chosen carefully in a multiple-release outsourcing scenario (or data update) since it nor-
mally diﬀers from the one used in a single-release outsourcing scenario. However, this is out of the
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scope of this chapter.
4.5 Protocol Analysis
4.5.1 Complexity Analysis
Proposition 1 The runtime complexity for constructing a kd-tree index from a diﬀerentially private
data with d equivalent classes and k attributes using Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3 is bounded by
O(k × d × log d) operations.
Proof. Constructing a kd-tree with d points (equivalent classes) requires O(d×log d) [dBCvKO08].
Each node consists of two ciphertexts, each of which requires O(kc+2×kn) = O(k), where kc and kn
are number of categorical attributes and numerical attributes respectively. Therefore, the required
number of operations is O(k × d × log d).
Proposition 2 The runtime complexity for executing a system query SKu over a kd-tree index
with d leaf nodes using Algorithm 7 and Algorithm 8 is bounded by O(√d+ r× k) operations, where
r = |R| and R is the set of reported (reached) leaf nodes.
Proof. Since SKu is an axis-parallel rectangular range query, the time required to traverse a
kd-tree and report the points (equivalent classes) stored in its leaves is O(√d+ r) [dBCvKO08]. For
each reported leaf node, O(2 × kc) = O(k) time is required to compute the total noisy count. As a
result, the number of operations required to traverse the tree and answer SKu is O(
√
d + r × k).
4.5.2 Correctness Analysis
The correctness proof is twofold. First, we prove that Algorithm 7 identiﬁes all the leaf nodes
satisfying the user count query u. Second, we prove that Algorithm 8 produces the exact total count
answer to u, and the answer is diﬀerentially private.
Proposition 3 Given a user count query u = P1∧ ...∧Pm, Algorithm 7 produces a set R containing
all leaf nodes satisfying u.
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Proof. To prove the correctness of Algorithm 7 we prove partial correctness and termination.
1. Partial Correctness. We provide a proof by induction.
Basis. When u includes no predicate for any of the attributes in Dˆ, then each categorical attribute
in SKu is assigned the value 1 (the identiﬁer of the root node of the corresponding taxonomy tree),
whereas for each numerical attribute Aˆi ∈ Dˆ, Aˆmini = 1 (the lowest range identiﬁer) and Aˆmaxi is
assigned the highest range identiﬁer in Ω(Aˆi). When SKu is used to traverse the kd-tree index,
all internal nodes will be traversed until the leaf nodes are reached. That is, if the current node
v is internal, A.Dec(v.CTleft, SKu) and A.Dec(v.CTright, SKu) will always be true because the
attributes in SKu will always satisfy the access structure in v.CTleft and v.CTright, and pointers to
the left child node and right child node will always be obtained.
Induction Step. Assume that traversing the kd-tree index using SKu produces the correct set
of leaf nodes R satisfying u. We show that if a new predicate P = (Aˆi Op si) is added to u such
that u´ = u + P, then traversing the kd-tree index using SKu´ produces the correct set of leaf nodes
R´ satisfying u´. We observe that R´ ⊆ R. To complete the proof in this step, we assume that P
corresponds to a categorical attribute; however, the same analogy can be applied to a numerical
attribute’s predicate. When v is an internal node and v.split dim = Aˆi, if si.ID ≤ v.split value
then A.Dec(v.CTright, SKu) will evaluate to false, and no recursive call of procedure traverseIndex
over node v.rc will be executed. This behaviour is correct because in this case the subtree whose root
is v.rc includes the leaf nodes that do not satisfy P, and hence there is no need to search the subtree
rooted at v.rc. The same logic can be used to reason about the case when si.ID > v.split value.
2. Termination. Each recursive call on a child node partitions the space of the parent node in
half. This shows that the algorithm strictly moves from one level to a lower level in the kd-tree
index while reducing the search space by half until all leaf nodes satisfying u are reached.
Proposition 4 Given a set of leaf nodes R generated by a system count query SKu and a set of
attribute distribution tokens N , the output of Algorithm 8 is the exact noisy count answer corre-
sponding to SKu.
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Proof. To prove the correctness of Algorithm 8, we prove partial correctness and termination.
1. Partial Correctness. We provide a proof by induction.
Basis. When N = φ, the inner loop will never be executed. In this case, procedure compTCount
will go through all the leaf nodes in R and add together all corresponding noisy counts by utilizing
the homomorphic addition property of Exponential ElGamal. This is correct because if no ADT
token was originally generated, then the user query is an exact query, and 100% of the noisy count
of each leaf node in R must be used.
Induction Step. Assume that for N = {ADT1, ..., ADTl}, procedure compTCount computes the
exact noisy count answer to the user count query u. We show that if a new token ADTl+1 for
numerical attribute Aˆi is added such that N´ = N ∪ ADTl+1 = {ADT1, ..., ADTl+1}, where N´
corresponds to the system count query SKu´, then procedure compTCount computes the exact noisy
count answer to the user count query u´. Without loss of generality, we assume that the set of
leaf nodes R remains the same. Since ADTl+1 is for numerical attribute Aˆi, then ADTl+1.value
represents the percentage of the partial intersection between query u´ and attribute Aˆi by deﬁnition.
If u´ is a generic query, then not all leaf nodes in R will contain a tag that corresponds to ADTl+1.tag.
However, the noisy count of each leaf node l containing a tag that matches ADTl+1.tag must be
adjusted by multiplying l.NCount with ADTl+1.value.
2. Termination. We denote by n the initial number of leaf nodes in R. If n > 0 then we enter
the outer loop. We also denote by m the initial number of ADT tokens in N . If m > 0 then we enter
the inner loop such that after each iteration, the variable m is decreased by one, and it keeps strictly
decreasing until m = 0 where the inner loop terminates. Similarly, the outer loop will terminate as
n keeps strictly decreasing until it reaches 0; at that stage the algorithm terminates.
Proposition 5 The noisy count answers satisfy ε-diﬀerential privacy.
Proof. The proposed query processing algorithms operate on a diﬀerentially private data table
and do not have access to the raw data. Because the input table is diﬀerentially private, the
computed noisy count answers based on the input data table is also diﬀerentially private. Note that
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any post-processing does not violate the ε-diﬀerential privacy [KL10].
4.5.3 Security Analysis
The proposed framework is sound since all adversaries are non-colluding and semi-honest, accord-
ing to our adversarial model. In the rest of this section, we focus on proving that the protocol is
conﬁdentiality-preserving. We also illustrate the accessibility of the keys in the framework, and show
that all keys are properly distributed between the parties.
Privacy by Simulation. Goldreich [Gol04] deﬁnes the security of a protocol in the semi-honest
adversarial model as follows.
Deﬁnition 10 (Privacy w.r.t. Semi-honest Behavior) [Gol04]. Let f : ({0, 1}∗)m →
({0, 1}∗)m be an m-ary deterministic polynomial-time functionality, where fi(x1, . . . , xm) is the
ith element of f(x1, . . . , xm). Let Π be an m-party protocol for computing f . The view of the i-th
party during an execution of Π over x = (x1, . . . , xn) is viewΠi (x) = (xi, ri,mi,1, . . . ,mi,t), where ri
equals the contents of the ith party’s internal random tape, and mi,j represents the jth message that
it received. For I = {i1, . . . , il} ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}, viewΠI (x) = (I, viewΠi1(x), . . . , viewΠil (x)). We say that
Π securely computes f in the presence of static semi-honest adversaries if there exist probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm (simulator) S such that for every I ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}:
{S(I, (xi1 , . . . , xil), fI(x))}x∈({0,1}∗)m
c≡ {viewΠI (x)}x∈({0,1}∗)m
where c≡ denotes computational indistinguishability. 
According to Deﬁnition 10, it is suﬃcient to show that we can eﬀectively simulate the view
of each party during the execution of the SecDM protocol given the input, output and acceptable
leaked information of that party, in order to prove that our protocol is secure. We achieve that by
simulating each message received by a party in each algorithm. The algorithm can then be utilized
to simulate the rest of the view.
64
First, we deﬁne the concepts query distribution and query processing threshold.
Deﬁnition 11 (Query Distribution.) The distribution of the data mining queries, denoted by
U , is the set of all possible queries, where each query consists of kc + 2 × kn integers, each of which
maps to a value in the domain of a categorical or numerical attribute. 
Deﬁnition 12 (Query Processing Threshold.) Query processing threshold, denoted by α, is
the maximum number of queries allowed to be processed on a kd-tree before the latter is replaced
by a new shuﬄed and re-encrypted kd-tree submitted by data provider to the service provider. 
Deﬁnition 13 (Privacy-preserving Data Outsourcing Framework). Let F be a framework
that enables a service provider (cloud) to answer queries from data miners on hosted (outsourced)
data. F is a privacy-preserving framework if the following properties hold:
1. Correctness. For any user query u ∈ U , the cloud returns resu to the data miner such resu
is the correct answer to u.
2. Data Conﬁdentiality. A semi-honest adversary E , statically corrupting the service provider,
cannot learn anything more about the hosted data from an accepted transcript of F than she
could given only the total number of numerical and categorical attributes, and the size of each
attribute’s domain.
3. Query Conﬁdentiality. A semi-honest adversary E , statically corrupting the service provider,
cannot learn anything about the query.
4. Diﬀerentially Private Output. For all u ∈ U , resu satisﬁes diﬀerential privacy. 
Deﬁnition 14 (α-Privacy-preserving Data Outsourcing Framework). An outsourcing frame-
work F is α-privacy-preserving if it satisﬁes all properties in Deﬁnition 13 except that the cloud
learns the search pattern of at most α number of queries. 
Theorem 4.5.1 SecDM, as speciﬁed in Protocols 2–8, is an α-privacy-preserving data outsourcing
framework.
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Proof. We proved in Section 4.5.2 Property 1 (correctness) and Property 4 (diﬀerentially private
output).
To prove Property 2 (data Conﬁdentiality) and Property 3 (query Conﬁdentiality), we build a
simulator S that generates a view that is statistically indistinguishable from the view of E in real
execution.
In Algorithm 4 - Line 2, the service provider receives kd-tree index T from the data
provider.
Simulation :
1. Supplied with k, the total number of attributes in Dˆ, and the size of each at-
tribute’s domain |Ω(Aˆi)| : 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the simulator S generates attribute domains
Ω(Aˆ′1),Ω(Aˆ′2), . . . ,Ω(Aˆ′k) such that each domain Ω(Aˆ′i) consists of |Ω(Aˆi)| distinct val-
ues, e.g., 1, 2, . . . , |Ω(Aˆi)|.
2. S constructs a contingency table Dˆ′ with k columns each of which represents one attribute
Aˆ′i, and n records each of which represents one possible combination of attribute values
such that n =
∏k
i=1 |Ω(Aˆ′i)|.
3. Supplied with the total number of numerical attributes kn and categorical attributes kc in
Dˆ such that kn+kc = k, the size of each attribute’s domain, and the security parameter of
ACP-ABE, S runs A.Setup(1λ) to generate public key PK ′ and master secret key MSK ′.
Similarly, given the security parameter of ElGamal, S runs G.KeyGen() to generate public
key y′ and secret key x′.
4. Given Dˆ′, split dimension i = 1, PK ′ and y′, S runs Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3 to
construct a balanced kd-tree T ′ over Dˆ′:
(a) In Line 12 of Algorithm 2, n random group elements are generated for each ciphertext
CTleft or CTright of each internal node v.
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(b) In Line 2 of Algorithm 3, a random ElGamal ciphertext, e.g., encryption of ‘0’, is
assigned to the encrypted NCount of each leaf node l.
Indistinguishability Argument : T ′ is computationally indistinguishable from T .
First, we construct a hybrid tree called T ′′, and then show the relation between T ′′ and real the
kd-tree T , and between T ′′ and the simulated kd-tree T ′.
1. Let T ′′ be a kd-tree index over Dˆ′′ = Dˆ constructed using Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3,
where:
(a) The ACP-ABE ciphertexts CTleft and CTright of each internal node are random
group elements, as per Step 4a above.
(b) The noisy count NCount in each leaf node is a random ElGamal ciphertext, as per
Step 4b above.
2. T ′′ is computationally indistinguishable from T , denoted by T ′′ c≡ T , because:
(a) The ACP-ABE ciphertexts in the internal nodes of the kd-tree are IND-CPA-secure
under the decisional bilinear diﬃe-hellman (DBDH) assumption [Jou00] and the de-
cision linear (D-Linear) assumption [BBS04].
(b) Since ElGamal is IND-CPA-secure, the distribution of the ciphertext (output) space
is independent of the key/message. Therefore, encrypting any message with a random
factor is suﬃcient to generate a computationally indistinguishable NCount.
3. T ′′ is statistically indistinguishable from T ′, denoted by T ′′ s≡ T ′, because:
(a) Dˆ′′ s≡ Dˆ′, where there is one-to-one correspondence between the equivalent classes in
Dˆ′′ and the records in Dˆ′.
(b) The random coins used in ACP-ABE encryption in Algorithm 2 are drawn from the
same distribution.
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(c) The random coins used in ElGamal encryption in Algorithm 3 are drawn from the
same distribution.
4. From Steps (2) and (3), we conclude that T ′ c≡ T .
In Algorithm 6 - Line 4, the service provider receives system count query SKu and
a set of attribute distribution tokens N .
Simulation :
1. S obtains α sample queries U¯ = {u′1, u′2, . . . , u′α} from U .
2. For each query u′i ∈ U¯ , S constructs a query pair (SKu′i ,N ′i ) as follows:
• S runs A.KeyGen(MSK ′, u′i) to construct system count query SKu′i .
• S constructs a set N ′i containing 2 × kn ADT tokens, where ADT.value for each
token is a randomly generated ElGamal ciphertext, e.g., encryption of ‘0’.
3. Up to α times, each time a data miner in the real world submits a query, S submits to
the service in the simulation world a diﬀerent query pair from the set of pairs generated
in Step 2.
Indistinguishability Argument :






c≡ SKu since |SKu′ | = |SKu| = kc + 2 × kn group element tuples, and the
ACP-ABE scheme is IND-CPA-secure.
2. Given any real ADT set N , N ′i
c≡ N because:
• |N ′i | = |N | = 2 × kn.
• The ADT.value of each token in N ′i is computationally indistinguishable from the
ADT.value of any real token due to the IND-CPA-secure property of ElGamal.
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Discussion. The threshold parameter α can range between 1 and ∞. To better understand the
impact of revealing α queries to S, we analyze the security when α = 1 and α > 1.
Case 1 : α = 1. This represents the highest security level of our protocol, where one system
query is executed per one kd-tree. Since the kd-tree index is constructed by Algorithm 2 as a balanced
tree and since each path contains all attributes, then no correlation can be established between any
two attributes and the attributes are protected when evaluated for splitting the k-dimensional space.
As for the data mining query, the service provider cannot determine what attributes are included
in the query, nor know what values or ranges the data miner is interested in. Since Algorithm 7
yields how many leaf nodes (equivalent classes) identiﬁed, this reveals how general the query is. In
general, the more leaf nodes identiﬁed by a query, the more general the query is. The revealing of
the number of identiﬁed leaf nodes, however, won’t help the service provider better guess the ﬁnal
result of the query since it cannot access the encrypted noisy counts.
Although setting α to 1 provides the highest security w.r.t. query search pattern, it is impractical
due to the cost of reconstructing the kd-tree. We refer the reader to solution construction scalability
in Section 4.6.2 for more details about the cost of reconstructing the kd-tree.
CASE 2 : α > 1. While our proposed framework supports conﬁdential access to the data,
executing multiple queries on the same kd-tree index reveals the search pattern of the queries,
where the service provider is able to determine the number of leaf nodes that overlap between the
queries. Let u and u′ be two user queries that satisfy the same set of leaf nodes l = {l1, . . . , lr}, and
let collision set denote the set of all unique queries that could satisfy l. The size of the collision set






|li.Range(Aˆj)| : Aˆj is numerical,
where |li.Range(Aˆj)| denotes the size of the range of attribute Aˆj in the equivalent class repre-
sented by leaf node li. Note that since the noisy counts are encrypted using ElGamal, the position
of the attributes in the tree is hidden and is shuﬄed every time the kd-tree is constructed, disclosing
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the search pattern on the diﬀerentially private data reveals nothing about the ﬁnal (noisy) result
of each query, nor about the attributes/values in each query. The smaller the value of α is, the
less overlap between queries is revealed. Several techniques have been proposed in the literature to
address the problem of private search pattern, such as [WSC08]; however, it is out of the scope of
this chapter.
Note that each time the data provider generates a shuﬄed and re-encrypted kd-tree, a diﬀerent
ACP-ABE master secret key MSK should be used to prevent the service provider from processing
new queries on the old tree.
In our model, we assume the data miner can have access to the entire diﬀerentially-private
dataset. The data privacy is guaranteed by diﬀerential privacy. Therefore, there is no need to
simulate the view of the data miner.
Key Accessibility. Protecting the data distributed between diﬀerent parties from unauthorized
access is an essential part of securing the SecDM framework. We must ensure that all keys are
properly distributed such that no party can decrypt any data it is not supposed to have access to
in plaintext. Table 5 illustrates the accessibility of each key by each party in SecDM.
Observe that the data provider is the generator of all encryption keys in the system and maintains
full control over them. The service provider, on the other hand, has no access to Exponential
ElGamal’s private key, G.x, that would have allowed her to fully decrypt the contents of each leaf
node in the kd-tree index. Moreover, not having access to the ACP-ABE master secret key A.MSK
prevents the service provider from being able to determine the access structures of the ciphertexts in
each internal node of the kd-tree index. As for the user (data miner), not having access to A.MSK
prevents her from bypassing authentication and creating her own system count queries.
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Table 5: Key accessibility w.r.t. all parties in SecDM framework
Encryption
Scheme




G private key x generator, full
Control
no access read access
G public key y generator, full
Control
read access read access




no access no access
A public key PK generator, full
Control
read access read access
A user secret key SKu generator, full
Control
read access read access
4.6 Performance Evaluation
In this section we evaluate the performance of the SecDM framework. First, we discuss the imple-
mentation details, and then we present the experimental results that include solution construction
scalability, the scalability of query processing with respect to the number of records, and the eﬃ-
ciency with respect to the size of the queries.
4.6.1 Implementation and Setup
The SecDM framework is implemented in C++. Experiments were conducted on a machine equipped
with an Intel Core i7 3.8GHz CPU and 16GB RAM, running 64-bit Windows 7. The index tree
is implemented according to the kd-tree description in [dBCvKO08]. Both of the cryptographic
primitives, ACP-ABE and Exponential ElGamal, were implemented using MIRACL3, an open source
library for big number and elliptic curve cryptography. To implement ACP-ABE, we chose Boneh-





m = {−1,−2}, and w = {0, 1, 2}. The chosen elliptic curve has a pairing embedding degree of 24
and a AES security level of 256. The pairing e : G1 × G2 → GT is a type 3 pairing where G1 is
a point over the base ﬁeld, G2 is a point over an extension ﬁeld of degree 3, and GT is a ﬁnite
ﬁeld point over the k-th extension, where k = 24 is the embedding degree for the BLS curve. To
3 MIRACL: https://certivox.org/display/EXT/MIRACL
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implement Exponential ElGamal we randomly choose the message space and calculation modulus p
to be a large 2048-bit prime for which q = (p− 1)/α is a 256-bit prime. Since Exponential ElGamal
depends on the multiplicative order of g and having a large collection of ciphertexts, we choose g to
be a generator of the multiplicative subgroup Gq such that order(g) = q − 1.
We utilize a real-life adult data set [BL13] in our experiments to illustrate the performance of
SecDM framework. The adult data set consists of 45,222 census records containing six numerical
attributes, eight categorical attributes, and a class attribute with two levels: “ ≤ 50K” and “ >
50K”. A further description of the attributes can be found in [FWY07a]. Since the maximum
number of attributes is 14, we assume that the number of attributes in a query can range from 2 to
14, and the average number of attributes in a query is 8. We generate ε-diﬀerentially private records
using the DiﬀGen algorithm, where the privacy budget ε = 1, the number of specializations is set
to 8, 10, or 12, and choose the utility function Max(D, v) to determine the score of each candidate
v during the specialization process.
4.6.2 Experimental Results
Scalability
Solution Construction Scalability There are three major phases involved in constructing the
SecDM framework: data anonymization using the DiﬀGen algorithm, data preprocessing, and kd-
tree index construction; the latter can be further divided into two subphases: internal nodes construc-
tion and leaf nodes construction. According to procedure buildIndex in Algorithm 2, the complexity
for constructing SecDM is dominated by the number of ε-diﬀerentially private records, which in turn
is impacted by the number of raw data records and the setting of the number of specializations for
the DiﬀGen algorithm. The objective is to measure the runtime of each construction phase to ensure
its capability to scale up in terms of records size.
Figure 10 depicts the runtime of each of the construction phases, where the number of data








































# OF RAW DATA  RECORDS
DiffGen Data Preprocessing Internal Nodes
Leaf Nodes Total
# of attributes = 14
# of specializations = 8
ElGamal Key = 2048 bits
Figure 10: Scalability of framework construction w.r.t. # of records.
observe that the runtime of each phase grows linearly as the number of records increases. We also
observe that the overall construction runtime scales up linearly as well, as it takes 47 sec to construct
the framework for a data set with 20,000 records, 72 sec for 40,000 records, 96 sec for 60,000 records,
106 sec for 80,000 records, and 121 sec for 100,000 records. Since each phase of the algorithm, as
well as the overall construction time, grow linearly with respect to the total number of records, this
suggests the construction of SecDM is scalable with regard to the data size.
Query Processing Scalability One major contribution of our work is the development of a
scalable framework for query processing on anonymized data in the cloud. Since the number of
specializations during the anonymization process impacts the total number of anonymized records,
we study the runtime for answering diﬀerent types of user count queries under a diﬀerent number
of specializations, while the number of raw data records ranges from 20,000 to 100,000. Given the
three user count query types, Exact, Speciﬁc, and Generic, we randomly create 500 queries of each
type, and report the average runtime, where the average number of attributes in each query is 8.
Figures 11a, 11b, and 5b depict the processing runtime of each type of user count queries when
the number of specializations is set to 8, 10, and 12, respectively. In Figure 11a, we observe that the
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# OF RAW DATA  RECORDS
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# OF RAW DATA  RECORDS
Exact Query Specific Query Generic Query
# of specializations = 12
# of attributes = 8
(c) # of specializations = 12
Figure 11: Scalability of query processing w.r.t. the number of raw data records and the number of
specializations.
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increase at the same rate. That is, the processing runtime grows from 4.8 sec for 20,000 records to
6 sec for 100,000 records when the query type is exact; from 6.5 sec for 20,000 records to 8.5 sec for
100,000 records when the query type is speciﬁc; and from 12.4 sec for 20,000 records to 31.2 sec for
100,000 records when the query type is generic. Similarly, in Figures 11b and 5b we observe that the
processing runtime of each query type is linear with regard to the number of raw data records for all
three types. The increase in the number of specializations leads to a higher number of anonymized
records, thus explaining the increase in the average query processing runtime for each query type in
Figures 11a, 11b, and 5b.
Note that performance is aﬀected by the total number of attributes (dimensions) in the data.
For the purpose of this work, the kd-tree index is suﬃcient for the Adult dataset with 14 attributes.
However, for higher dimensionality, another data structure, such as x-tree, might be needed to
preserve practicality in high dimensional data.
Eﬃciency
To demonstrate the eﬃciency of our SecDM framework we measure the impact of the number of
attributes in a query on the processing time needed by the cloud to process the query and by the
user to decrypt the result. We split the query processing phase into two subphases: tree traversal
and compute NCount. We assume the number of specializations is 8, while the number of raw data
records is 100,000. We create 500 queries of each query type, and report the average runtime.
Figures 12a, 12b, and 12c depict the processing runtime of exact, speciﬁc, and generic queries,
respectively, when the average number of attributes in a query ranges from 2 to 14. We observe
that the most dominant phase with regard to the processing runtime is the tree traversal phase,
whereas the resulting decryption phase is the least dominant. The total processing runtime of each
query type decreases linearly as the number of attributes per query increases. That is, the total
runtime decreases from 31.8 sec to 0.9 sec when the number of attributes per query increases from
2 to 14 for exact queries, decreases from 37.2 sec to 1 sec when the number of attributes per query
increases from 2 to 14 for speciﬁc queries, and decreases from 78.8 sec to 10.4 sec when the number
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of attributes per query increases from 2 to 14 for generic queries. The total processing runtime
improves as the number of attributes increases because adding more attributes to a query makes
it more restrictive and, consequently, requires fewer nodes to be traversed in the kd-tree index.
Assuming the average noisy count value for each anonymized record is 10,000, we observe that the
decryption phase, which involves decrypting Exponential ElGamal ciphertexts, is very small (less
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# OF ATTRIBUTES PER QUERY
Tree Traversal Compute NCount
Decryption Total
# of records = 100,000 
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Avg. NCount = 10,000
(c) Generic query
Figure 12: Eﬃciency w.r.t. the number of attributes per a query for exact, speciﬁc, and generic
queries.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter, we propose a privacy-preserving framework for conﬁdential count query processing
in a cloud computing environment. Our framework maintains the privacy of the outsourced data
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while providing data conﬁdentiality, conﬁdential query processing, and privacy-preserving results.
Users (data miners) of the system are not required to have prior knowledge about the data, and
incur lightweight computation overhead. The framework also allows for query reusability, which
reduces the communication and processing time. We perform several experimental evaluations on
real-life data, and we show that the framework can eﬃciently answer diﬀerent types of queries and




Set-Valued Data Integration with
Public Veriﬁability
5.1 Introduction
Set-valued data, a set of items selected from a pre-deﬁned domain, is commonly associated with
stored objects (e.g. persons, products) in databases such as web search logs, market basket, and
passengers’ transit records [TMK08][HN09]. Integrating related data from diﬀerent sources enables
businesses and government agencies to perform better data analysis and make better decisions.
The vast majority of the literature about distributed data integration and publishing deals with
semi-honest adversaries [MAFD14][JC06][GLM+13b][NH12], where each participant is assumed not
to deviate from the protocol, while trying to infer information from the other parties, even if deviating
enables them to infer more information. Although this assumption may be suitable in some cases,
it is often unrealistic. By contrast, designing protocols that are secure against malicious adversaries
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provides assurance that the protocol will execute correctly and that secret inputs will stay secret
regardless of the behaviour of the other participants. However, it generally comes at a cost in
performance. As just one example, Kantarcioglu and Kardes [KK07] show that the secure dot
product protocol is 700 times slower in the malicious model than it is in the semi-honest.
To ensure that a distributed protocol executes correctly, participants must prove they are follow-
ing the protocol at each step. Such proofs may only convince the other participants in the protocol
by being contingent on their interactions or individual secrets. A publicly (or universally) veriﬁable
protocol produces a transcript proving correct execution that is veriﬁable by anyone at any time.
In the database community, veriﬁability has been mainly studied in the areas of data authentica-
tion [Tam03, DBP07], data streams [CCM09, CKLR11], and public auditing [WCW+13, WLL12].
In veriﬁable computation, a single data owner delegates a computationally heavy task to the cloud
while being able to verify the results [BGV11, CKV10, GGP10, GKR08]. Outside of databases,
public veriﬁability is an important property for a number of cryptographic protocols (e.g., voting
schemes [Ben87, CGS97]). Public veriﬁability also adds an additional performance cost. As one
example, the publicly veriﬁable voting protocol for complex scoring rules in [TRN08] is estimated
to take 10 000 hours to produce a veriﬁable tally.
For data integration, public veriﬁability enables any third party to verify the data is properly
protected (auditors, data holders, individuals in the data set) and properly integrated (data miner)
in a non-interactive fashion, oﬄine and at any time. We are the ﬁrst to study public veriﬁability for
this application. We answer open questions surrounding the achievability of public veriﬁability for a
complex, full-featured integration protocol. We present a ﬂexible protocol that supports horizontally
and vertically partitioned data, two and multiples parties, and diﬀerentially private outputs. The
result is a feasible but expensive protocol: we estimate 389 hours (single-threaded) to integrate
datasets of 600 records and 10000 distinct items. We show public veriﬁability is achievable and
believe improving its performance is a promising research direction.
Let us consider the following scenario to illustrate the threat model. An Australian government
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agency uses a set of principles to govern the process of Commonwealth person-speciﬁc data inte-
gration for statistical and research purposes1. Data custodians (agencies) collect, store and manage
datasets on behalf of data providers. For each integration project, an integrating authority – a single
trusted organisation specialized in data privacy and security – is appointed to handle the reception
of the related and de-identiﬁed datasets from data custodians, and the running of the integration
process to generate a dataset that prevents disclosure attacks against individuals. The integrating
authority might outsource part of the integration process to a third-party, while adhering to the
data integration principles and maintaining full responsibility for complying with the conﬁdentiality
requirements speciﬁed by the data custodians. To ensure transparency in each integration project,
the government conducts scheduled audits and periodically publishes detailed information about the
project. Similar agencies can be found in other countries, e.g., Population Data BC (PopData) 2 in
Canada.
A major concern in this scenario is data privacy, where for each integration project, data custo-
dians (on behalf of data providers) must fully trust the appointed integrating authority with their
data, and must trust that the involved third-parties will not collude together trying to learn sensitive
information about individuals from the data. Although the data is de-identiﬁed, attacks such as
record/attribute linkage and re-identiﬁcation of individuals can still be achieved (e.g., GIC [Swe02b],
AOL [BZ06], Netﬂix [NS08]). The following example illustrates this privacy threats when straight-
forwardly integrating distributed set-valued data.
Example 7 Let Alice, Bob, and Carol represent three data custodians owning person-speciﬁc
datasets DS1, DS2, and DS3, respectively. Each transaction corresponds to an individual, and has a
unique identiﬁer (TID) and a set of distinct items from the item universe Univ = 〈I1, I2, I3, I4〉, as
shown in Table 6. These parties are interested in integrating DS1, DS2, and DS3 to build a classiﬁer.
Straightforward integration is achieved by grouping items together by TID, and then removing du-
plicate items. Integrating transactions DS1.T2, DS2.T2, and DS3.T2 together results in a transaction
1Statistical Data Integration Involving Commonwealth Data: http://statistical-data-integration.govspace.gov.au/
2PopData: https://www.popdata.bc.ca/
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T5 {I1, I2, I3, I4}
T6 {I1}
with the set of items {I2, I3, I4} after removing the duplicates of I2 and I4. However, since I2 exists
only once in DS1 (in transaction T2), Alice can use her knowledge of the duplicates to conclude that
the integrated transaction corresponds to T2, and to determine with 100% certainty that I4 exists
in both DS2.T2 and DS3.T2. 
Another concern in this scenario is high-dimensionality. Set-valued data is high dimensional by
nature, and therefore, any approach on set-valued data must ensure scalability with respect to the
number of distinct items in the data. That is why existing approaches designed for relational data,
e.g. Mohammed et al. [MAFD14], are not suitable to handle set-valued data. Our proposed protocol
grows at a logarithmic rate with respect to the number of dimensions. For example, increasing the
number of dimensions by 20,000 (from 20,000 to 100,000 distinct items) increases the overall runtime
on average by only 8 hours.
Another concern in the motivating scenario is audit malfeasance. Although the government
performs periodic auditing to protect against errors and corruptions by individuals and ensure
the correctness of the integration process, such administrative veriﬁability does not protect against
wrongdoing by government oﬃcials or entities responsible for conducting the audit.
In this chapter, we address the aforementioned concerns by proposing a privacy-preserving multi-
party protocol for integrating person-speciﬁc set-valued data in a malicious environment with dis-
honest majority. Our protocol supports public veriﬁability — a stronger version of administrative
veriﬁability — where any internal or external party at any time can independently verify the cor-
rectness of the performed integration. We take the single-party algorithm for diﬀerential privacy
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recently proposed by Chen et al. [CMF+11] as a basis to our approach and extend it to the multi-
party setting. We adopt diﬀerential privacy [DMNS06], a rigorous privacy model that provides a
provable privacy guarantee while making no assumption about the background knowledge of the
adversary. Our contributions are summarized as follows:
Contribution 1. We propose a distributed protocol, named SecSVD, for integrating high-
dimensional set-valued data and releasing integrated diﬀerentially private data with an eﬀective
utility for data mining. The complexity of our approach is logarithmic with respect to the number
of distinct items (dimensions) in the item universe.
Contribution 2. Our proposed approach supports public veriﬁability, where any interested
party can fully verify the integrity of an execution of the protocol, independently ensuring that the
output satisﬁes diﬀerential privacy. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst work to construct a publicly
veriﬁable protocol for data integration.
Contribution 3. While most data integration protocols only provide security against semi-
honest (passive) adversaries, we show that our proposed protocol is secure against fully malicious
active adversaries. Further, we do not require an honest majority; this enables both two-party and
multi-party settings, where the data is distributed among n parties such that n ≥ 2.
Contribution 4. Unlike most of the existing works in the literature that assume the data
is partitioned either horizontally [JX09, AMFD12, KC04, ZRZ+13] or vertically [JC06, MAFD14,
DKM+06], our proposed solution supports a more general data model where the data can be parti-
tioned horizontally or vertically, or both. In the case of vertical partitioning, our solution supports
items overlap between transactions corresponding to the same individual but belong to diﬀerent
data owners.
In Table 7, we summarize the main features of the representative approaches in the areas related
to our work, including our proposed protocol.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.2.1 Centralized Protocol for Publishing Set-Valued Data via Diﬀeren-
tial Privacy
Chen et al. [CMF+11] proposed a single-party top-down partitioning approach using context-free
taxonomy tree to produce anonymized set-valued data in a centralized environment. We present a
secure multi-party version in Section 5.3.
Next, we summarize the approach in [CMF+11]. The algorithm ﬁrst constructs a context-
free taxonomy tree that will be utilized during the anonymization process to ensure utility of the
anonymized set-valued data. The tree is constructed from a universe of items, where each internal
node is a set of its leaf nodes (items). Figure 13 presents an example of a context-free taxonomy
tree.
Figure 13: A context-free taxonomy tree for item universe {I1, I2, I3, I4}.
Next, all data records are generalized into one partition, and the root node of the taxonomy
tree is assigned to the partition as a common representation called hierarchy cut. A hierarchy cut
typically consists of one or more taxonomy tree nodes.
Deﬁnition 15 Record Generalization [CMF+11]. A set-valued record R can be generalized to
a hierarchy cut HCut if:
1. Every item in R can be generalized to a node in HCut.
2. Every node in HCut generalizes some items in R. 
For example, according to the context-free taxonomy tree in Figure 13, if R = {I1, I2} then R
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can be generalized to HCut1 = {I1,2} and HCut2 = {I1,2,3,4}, but not to HCut3 = {I{1,2}, I{3,4}}.
Next, a top-down partitioning process based on the taxonomy tree is applied in order to generate
disjoint sub-partitions with more speciﬁc hierarchy cuts. For each sub-partition p, a Laplace noise
is generated based on its allocated privacy budget. If the noisy count of p is smaller that threshold
thres1 =
√
2C ×height(p.HCut)/p.α, where C is a given constant and α is the partitioning budget,
then p is considered “empty” and not further partitioned. Otherwise, the p is considered “non-empty”
and it is further split into sub-partitions with more speciﬁc hierarchy cuts. The splitting stops when
no further sub-partitions can be generated. Each partition whose hierarchy cut is a single leaf node
from the taxonomy tree is called a leaf partition. To reduce the impact of noise, a leaf partition p′
is considered non-empty if its noisy count is greater or equal threshold thres2 =
√
2C ′/(ε/2+ p′.B˜),
where C ′ is a constant ∈ [1, C], ε is the total privacy budget and B˜ is the allocated budget.
Privacy Budget Allocation. Half of the total privacy budget, ε/2, is used to guide the parti-
tioning process, whereas the other half is added to the leaf partitions to obtain their noisy counts. For
each partition, the privacy budget assigned to its partitioning operation depends on the maximum
number of partitioning operations needed to reach leaf partitions.
Theorem 5.2.1 [CMF+11] Given taxonomy tree T , the maximum number of partitioning operations
of a partition p with hierarchy cut HCut is:
|InternalNodes(HCut)| = Σui∈HCut|InternalNodes(ui, T )|,
where |InternalNodes(ui, T )| is the number of internal nodes of the sub-tree of T rooted at ui. 
Since sub-partitions are disjoint, the privacy budget of a partitioning operation is further assigned
in full to each resulting sub-partitions, due to the parallel composition property [McS09].
5.2.2 Encryption Scheme
Our protocol requires an additively homomorphic encryption scheme that allows ciphertexts to be
re-randomized without private information. It must also admit distributed key generation (DKG)
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and distributed decryption, enabling participants to use key shares to perform a decryption oper-
ation. Finally it must allow the key holders to transfer a ciphertext from their key to any other
key without decrypting the ciphertext (proxy re-encryption). The best candidate is exponential
ElGamal [CGS97]: it is fast when implemented over elliptic curves, distributed key generation is
straightforward (unlike Paillier) [Bra06], and decryption is feasible for our plaintext space. In the
rest of the thesis, we denote the encryption of message m as m for brevity.
5.2.3 Mix and Match Protocol
Mix and Match Protocol could alone realize our entire protocol given that lookup tables are suﬃcient
for implementing general computing. However, such approach will be expensive, i.e., the complexity
will be exponential in the number of input variables. Our protocol is designed to use small single-
input lookup tables sparingly. Like our overall protocol, Mix and Match itself is publicly veriﬁable,
secure against malicious adversaries, and secure with a dishonest majority.3
5.3 Solution: SecSVD Protocol
In this section, we ﬁrst present an overview of our diﬀerentially private set-valued data release
protocol, and then elaborate on the key components of our protocol.
5.3.1 Solution Overview
Given p ≥ 2 data owners P1, P1, . . . , Pp respectively owning set-valued datasets DS1, DS2, . . . ,
DSp, where items in all datasets are drawn from an item universe Univ = 〈I1, I2, . . . , In〉, and given a
privacy budget ε agreed upon by the data owners, the objective of our proposed solution is to securely
generate an integrated and sanitized set-valued dataset OutDS for data mining purposes such that
(1) no unnecessary information is disclosed about the individual datasets during the integration
3Note that security against a dishonest majority is not explored by the authors themselves [JJ00] but the bound
follows solely from the bound on the DKG. As in any case of a dishonest majority, causing the protocol to terminate
early without a result becomes possible.
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process, (2) communications between all parties are secure under the malicious adversarial model,
(3) OutDS satisﬁes ε-diﬀerential privacy, and (4) OutDS is encrypted such that only the data miner
receiving the dataset can decrypt it. Our solution consists of two main protocols:
Protocol 5.1 - Data Preparation. The data owners jointly run this protocol to construct
a context-free taxonomy tree TaxTree which will be later utilized to construct the anonymized set-
valued data. Moreover, this protocol enables the data owners to securely merge their datasets
into one encrypted dataset MixDS such that all items and records in the dataset are shuﬄed and
randomized.
Protocol 5.2 - Secure Distributed Diﬀerentially Private Set-Valued Data Release.
This protocol represents our distributed diﬀerentially private set-valued data anonymization ap-
proach based on generalization. Using the context-free taxonomy tree TaxTree generated by Sub-
Protocol 1.1, the data owners jointly run this protocol to partition MixDS using a top-down par-
titioning algorithm, where Laplace noise is used on each partition to non-deterministically decide
whether child partitions should be created. The result is OutDS, a set-valued diﬀerentially private
dataset encrypted under the data miner’s public key.
5.3.2 Adversarial Model
Our protocol protects against computationally-bounded malicious adversaries who are are not trusted
to execute the steps of the protocol correctly. Adversaries are static (i.e., parties are corrupted be-
fore the start of the protocol). Privacy and integrity can be realized while up to (p − 1) out of
p data owners are corrupted and colluding together. The protocol guarantees completeness as it
always produce the desired result (diﬀerentially private data); however, fairness is not guaranteed
since malicious parties can stop participating and cause the protocol to halt. Data miners may also
be corrupted; however, we assume that data owners and miners cannot be simultaneously corrupt.
While this assumption is not ideal and can be removed with an exponentially-expensive solution, we
utilize it in our protocol as a trade-oﬀ for eﬃciency. (We do not prove that eﬃciency requires such
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a non-collusion assumption—this is an interesting open problem).
5.3.3 Data Model
Most approaches concerning the problem of privacy-preserving data integration and publishing
assume that the distributed data is partitioned either horizontally [Tas14, AMFD12] or verti-
cally [JC06, AMFD12]. In this chapter, we adopt a broader and more realistic view by assuming
that the data can be a mix of horizontal and vertical partitioning. That is, multiple data owners
might own data about the same set individuals, with a possibility of item overlap between records
referencing the same individual.
5.3.4 Auxiliary Functions
To simplify the presentation of our cryptographic protocols, we deﬁne a set of general auxiliary
functions that will be used throughout the remainder of the chapter. Construction 5.1 illustrates
how the auxiliary functions can be constructed.
Auxiliary Functions
Given a vector of binary ciphertexts V = 〈v1, v2, . . . , vn〉, all participants use Mix and




0 : 0 ≤∑ni=1 vi < n
1 :
∑n






i=1 vi = 0




0 : v = 1
1 : v = 0
4.
n-NOT(V ) := 〈v¯1, v¯2, . . . , v¯n〉 : v¯i := NOT(vi)
Construction 5.1: Auxiliary functions we construct for the protocol
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5.3.5 Data Preparation
As a precursor to our protocol, we assume the p data owners generate a public key and p shares of
the decryption key such that all p data owners must participate in any decryption operation.
Data preparation is an initial step that involves constructing an encrypted context-free taxonomy
tree TaxTree to help generate a sanitized set-valued data while guaranteeing utility for data mining
tasks such as counting queries and frequent itemsets mining [CMF+11]. It also involves securely
merging all datasets into one encrypted dataset MixDS where values are blinded and columns and
rows are randomly shuﬄed to prevent possible record linkage by the data owners. Protocol 5.1 is
evaluated to construct TaxTree and MixDS as follows:
TaxTree Construction (Steps 1-2). The data owners jointly apply the Veriﬁable Mix Network
protocol on Univ and generate a universe of mixed item names MixUniv such that the items are
shuﬄed and randomized. Given MixUniv, and a fan-out value f that is agreed upon by the data
owners, TaxTree is then constructed by evaluating Sub-Protocol 1.1, where each leaf node is a single
item from MixUniv, and each non-leaf node represents a set of items from MixUniv.
Example 8 Given item universe Univ = 〈I1, I2, I3, I4〉 for the datasets presented in Table 6, let
MixUniv = 〈A1,A2,A3,A4〉 be the universe of the shuﬄed and randomized items under random
permutation π, where A1 = Iπ(1) = I4, A2 = Iπ(2) = I1, A3 = Iπ(3) = I2, and A4 =
Iπ(4) = I3. Given fan-out value f = 2, Figure 14 illustrates a context-free taxonomy tree TaxTree
constructed according to Sub-Protocol 1.1, where A{1,2,3,4}= {A1,A2,A3,A4}, A{1,2} = {A1,A2},
and A{3,4} = {A3,A4}. 
Generating a shuﬄed and randomized context-free taxonomy tree MixUniv hides the hierarchy cut
and the complementary cut of each partition from the data owners (as we will see in Section 5.3.6).
MixDS Construction (Steps 3-6). Given DS1, DS2, . . . , DSp, Sub-Protocol 1.2 is ﬁrst evaluated
to merge all datasets into one encrypted dataset EncDS. Speciﬁcally, each data owner transforms
each person-speciﬁc record in his dataset into a vector of |Univ| = n binary ciphertexts, each of
which indicates whether or not the corresponding item from Univ exists in the record. That is, the
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A{1, 2, 3, 4}
A{1, 2} A{3, 4}
A1 A2 A3 A4
π
Iͳ Iʹ I͵ IͶ
Figure 14: A context-free taxonomy tree TaxTree for the datasets presented in Table 6.
ﬁrst ciphertext in the vector corresponds to the ﬁrst item in Univ, the second ciphertext corresponds
to the second item, etc. For each item in Univ, if the item exists in a record, then its corresponding
ciphertext is set to 1; otherwise, it is set to 0. Next, the data owners jointly merge their encrypted
datasets, where the merging process is dependent on how the distributed datasets are partitioned. If
the datasets are vertically partitioned, then |DSk| = d : 1 ≤ k ≤ p and each dataset contains records
about the same set of individuals, with possible item overlaps. In this case, for each individual, the
corresponding ciphertext vectors from all encrypted datasets are homomorphically merged together
to output a vector of n binary ciphertexts, each of which corresponds to an item from Univ. For
each item in Univ, if the item exists in at least one of the individual’s ciphertext vectors, then its
corresponding ciphertext in the output vector is set to 1; otherwise, it is set to 0. On the other
hand, if the datasets are horizontally partitioned, i.e., each dataset DSk : 1 ≤ k ≤ p contains records
about diﬀerent set of individuals, then the encrypted datasets are simply appended together to
construct EncDS.
Finally, the data owners jointly apply the Veriﬁable Mix Network protocol on the columns and
rows in EncDS to generate a shuﬄed and randomized dataset MixDS. The columns are shuﬄed
using the same random permutation applied on the items in TaxTree to maintain the correspondence
between the items in TaxTree and the columns in MixDS.
Example 9 Table 8.a illustrates the output dataset EncDS of Sub-Protocol 1.2 when evaluated on
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Data Preparation
Prior to the generation of the diﬀerentially private set-valued data, the following steps are
performed:
1. All participants (data owners) jointly apply the Veriﬁable Mix Network protocol on all
items I1, I2, . . . , In in Univ, and generate shuﬄed and randomized item names MixUniv =
Iπ(1), Iπ(2), . . . , Iπ(n), where π is a random permutation on n elements such that no
single participant knows the permutation. For ease of reference, we refer to the ﬁrst item
Iπ(1) as A1, second item Iπ(2) as A2, etc.
2. Build a context-free taxonomy tree TaxTree according to Sub-Protocol 1.1.
3. Generate EncDS according to Sub-Protocol 1.2.
4. All participants jointly apply the Veriﬁable Mix Network protocol on all columns
I1, I2, . . . , In in EncDS, and generate shuﬄed and re-randomized columns corresponding to
Iπ(1), Iπ(2), . . . , Iπ(n), where π is the same random permutation used in Step 1 above.
5. All participants jointly apply the Veriﬁable Mix Network protocol on all rows
EncT1,EncT2, . . . ,EncTd in EncDS, and generate shuﬄed and re-randomized rows
EncTπ′(1),EncTπ′(2), . . . ,EncTπ′(d), where π′ is a random permutation on d elements such
that no single participant knows the permutation. For ease of reference, we refer to the ﬁrst
row EncTπ′(1) as R1, the second EncTπ′(2) as R2, etc.
6. Output a shuﬄed and re-randomized dataset MixDS.
Protocol 5.1: Data Preparation
Context-Free Taxonomy Tree
To construct a context-free taxonomy tree TaxTree from item universe MixUniv =
〈A1,A2, . . . ,An〉 given fan-out f :
1. Partition MixUniv into n/f partitions, each of which contains f items. If n is not divisible
by f , smaller groups can be created.
2. Group the items from each partition into one node.
3. Group each f adjacent nodes into an upper level node.
4. Step (c) is repeated from one level to an upper level until a single root is reached.
Sub-Protocol 1. 1: Context-Free Taxonomy Tree, adapted from [CMF+11]
the datasets in Table 6. Table 8.b illustrates dataset MixDS generated by permuting columns and




An initial partition Part is created, where HCut is set to the root of TaxTree, CCut = φ, and ABudget = ε/2,
where ε is the global privacy budget. The partitioning tree PartTree is constructed as follows:
1. Securely assign to Part the records in MixDS as follows:
(a) If Part is the initial partition, then all records in MixDS are assigned to Part by default, and all
ciphertexts in Recs are set to 1:
Recs := 〈r1, r2, . . . , rd〉 = 〈1, 1, . . . , 1〉
(b) Otherwise, Part is either an internal partition or a leaf partition:
i. Determine the set of TaxTree nodes DifNodes that exists in Part.HCut but not in
Parent(Part).HCut.
ii. For each record Rj ∈ MixDS for 1 ≤ j ≤ d, the participants securely determine whether R can be
assigned to Part according to Deﬁnition 17 by utilizing the functions from Construction 5.1. If all
conditions in Deﬁnition 17 are satisﬁed, then ciphertext Recs〈j〉 is set to 1; otherwise, it is set
to 0:
◦ A := Parent(Part).Recs〈j〉,
◦ B := n-OR(CV(α1)), n-OR(CV(α2)), . . . , n-OR(CV(α|DifNodes|),
◦ C := n-NOT(n-OR(CV(β1)), n-OR(CV(β2)), . . . , n-OR(CV(β|CCut|))
Recs〈j〉 = rj := n-AND(A,B,C) (4)
where DifNodes = {α1, α2, . . . , α|DifNodes|}, CCut = {β1, β2, . . . , β|CCut|}, and CV(N) is a function
that returns the ciphertexts from record Rj corresponding to the items represented by the leaf
nodes from the subtree of TaxTree rooted at node N .





Recs〈j〉 = r1 + r2, . . . , rd
3. All participants evaluate the function LapNoise from Sub-Protocol 2.2 to generate an encrypted random noise
LNoise satisfying Laplace distribution, and then homomorphically add the result to TCount × 10D to
determine the encrypted noisy count NCount:
NCount := TCount×10D+LapNoise(Budget) : Budget :=
{
Part.PBudget : Part is internal partition
Part.ABudget : Part is leaf partition
4. All participants jointly decrypt NCount, and then compute NCount ×
10−D to determine the decimal and diﬀerentially private noisy count.
5. If Part is an internal partition and NCount is greater than or equal to the noise size threshold thres1 =√
2C × height(HCut)/PBudget, where C is a constant used for pruning empty partitions as early as possi-
ble [CMF+11]:
(a) Randomly select a partitioning node PNode from the set of non-leave nodes in HCut with the largest
height in TaxTree. Let l ≤ f be the number of child nodes of PNode in TaxTree, then there are 2l
possible combinations of child nodes: Combs = {comb1, comb2, . . . , comb2l}.
(b) Expand Part over PNode by generating 2l − 1 non-overlapping child partitions such that for any child
partition CParti : 1 ≤ i ≤ 2l:
◦ HCut := {Parent(CParti).HCut \ PNode} ∪ combi
◦ CCut := Combs \ combi
◦ ABudget := Parent(CParti).ABudget + L : L :={
−Parent(CParti).PBudget : CParti is internal partition
ε/2 : CParti is leaf partition
(c) Recursively apply Sub-Protocol 2.1 starting from Step 1 on each generated child partition CParti = Part.
6. Otherwise, if Part is an internal partition but NCount < thres1, then Part is considered empty partition,
NCount := 0, and no further partitioning on it is performed.
7. Terminate the partitioning process once no further partitioning is possible on any partition.
Sub-Protocol 2. 1: PartTree Construction
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Secure Data Integration
The purpose of this protocol is to securely integrate the datasets from all participants into one
encrypted dataset:
1. Each participant Pk : 1 ≤ k ≤ p encrypts his dataset DSk under the data owners’ distributed
public key by representing each transaction Tkj as a binary vector of n ciphertexts:
EncTkj = 〈xkj,1, xkj,2, . . . , xkj,n〉 : xkj,i =
{
0 : Ii /∈ Tkj
1 : Ii ∈ Tkj
for 1  i  n and 1  j  |DSk|. The outputs are encrypted datasets
{EncDS1,EncDS2, . . . ,EncDSp}, each of which represents a binary matrix of ciphertexts with
size |DSk| × n. Pk also proves knowledge of each ciphertext using Non-Interactive Zero-
Knowledge Proofs [FS87].
2. The procedure for merging together the encrypted datasets depends on the partitioning
nature of the underlying data:
(a) Vertically Partitioned Data. The function Merge is applied to merge EncDS1,
EncDS2, . . . , EncDSp together into one encrypted dataset EncDS by applying the func-
tion n-OR on the corresponding ciphertexts from the input datasets:
Merge(EncDS1,EncDS2, . . . ,EncDSp) = EncDS =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
x1,1 x1,2 . . . x1,n
x2,1 x2,2 . . . x2,n
...
... . . .
...
xd,1 xd,2 . . . xd,n
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦
where xj,i = n-OR(x1j,i, x2j,i, . . . , x
p
j,i) for 1  j  d and 1  i  n.
(b) Horizontally Partitioned Data. The encrypted datasets EncDS1, EncDS2, . . . ,
EncDSp are appended together to construct EncDS such that |EncDS| =
∑p
k=1 |EncDSk|.
3. Output EncDS, which has the same structure regardless of whether the underlying data is
horizontally or vertically partitioned.
Sub-Protocol 1. 2: Secure Data Integration
5.3.6 Secure Distributed Diﬀerentially-private Set-valued Data Release
Protocol
Given the integrated dataset MixDS, the context-free taxonomy tree TaxTree, and a privacy budget
ε, the goal is to securely generate an encrypted and sanitized set-valued data OutDS from MixDS
that satisﬁes ε-diﬀerential privacy.
The general idea of our solution is to initially assign all records in MixDS to a data structure
called partition, and then apply a top-down partitioning process using TaxTree to recursively assign
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Table 8: Integrated dataset of the sample datasets in Table 6
 
 
TID I1 I2 I3 I4
(QF7 ۤͳۥ ۤͳۥ ۤͳۥ ۤͳۥ 
(QF7 ۤͲۥ ۤͳۥ ۤͳۥ ۤͳۥ
(QF7 ۤͳۥ ۤͳۥ ۤͲۥ ۤͲۥ
(QF7 ۤͳۥ ۤͲۥ ۤͳۥ ۤͳۥ
(QF7 ۤͳۥ ۤͳۥ ۤͳۥ ۤͳۥ
(QF7 ۤͳۥ ۤͲۥ ۤͲۥ ۤͲۥ
 
TID A1 A2 A3 A4
5 ۤͳۥ ۤͳۥ ۤͳۥ ۤͳۥ 
5 ۤͲۥ ۤͳۥ ۤͳۥ ۤͳۥ
5 ۤͳۥ ۤͳۥ ۤͲۥ ۤͲۥ
5 ۤͳۥ ۤͲۥ ۤͳۥ ۤͳۥ
5 ۤͳۥ ۤͳۥ ۤͳۥ ۤͳۥ
5 ۤͳۥ ۤͲۥ ۤͲۥ ۤͲۥ
π' 
(a)  (QF'6: the output 
of Sub-Protocol 1.2  
(b)  0L['6: the output after 
Step 6 of Protocol 1 
Note: all ciphertexts in 0L['6 have been re-randomized.  
π 
Secure Distributed Diﬀerentially Private Set-Valued Data Release
1. Construct PartTree according to Sub-Protocol 2.1.
2. For each leaf partition Part in PartTree:
(a) If NCount is greater than or equal to the noise size threshold thres2 =
√
2C ′/ABudget,
where C ′ is a constant for minimizing the eﬀect of noise agreed upon by all participants:
i. All participants jointly run the Distributed Proxy Re-encryption protocol (it doesn’t
use a proxy despite the name) to re-encrypt each item Ai = Iπ(i) ∈ HCut and
the noisy count NCount under the data miner’s public key without revealing the
underlying values to any of the participants.
ii. Add the pair of re-encrypted HCut and NCount to the output dataset OutDS.
(b) Otherwise, if NCount < thres2, then Part is considered empty partition such that
NCount := 0.
3. Release the sanitized dataset OutDS to the data miner over a secure channel.
Protocol 5.2: Secure Distributed Diﬀerentially Private Set-Valued Data Release
the records into disjoint partitions in a noisy way until no further partitions can be created. The
output of the partitioning process is a partitioning tree PartTree, where the root partition is called
the initial partition, the partitions with at least one child partition are called internal partitions,
and the partitions with no child partitions are called leaf partitions. Next, we formally deﬁne the
structure of a partition.








r2 r3 r4 r5 r6
[1] [1] [1] [1] [1]
Assigned Records (Recs)
{A{3, 4}}[0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] ε/3{¬A{3, 4}}[0] [0] [1] [0] [0] [1] ε/3 {A{1, 2}, A{3, 4}}[1] [1] [0] [1] [1] [0] ε/3
{A1}[0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [1] 0 0 {¬A1}[0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] 0 1 {A1, A2}[0] [0] [1] [0] [0] [0] 0 4
{A2, A{3,4}}[0] [1] [0] [0] [0] [0] ε/6{A1, A{3,4}}[0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] ε/6 {A1, A2, A{3,4}}[1] [0] [0] [1] [1] [0] ε/6
{A2, A3}[0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] 0 2 {A2, A4}[0] [0] [0] [0] [0] [0] 0 1 {A2, A3, A4}[0] [1] [0] [0] [0] [0] 0 0























x The partitioning noisy counts are not shown. Only the noisy counts of the leaf nodes are displayed.
x The complementary cut (CCut) is shown in negative form indicating that any record assigned to the partition should not satisfy the negative cut.
x The gray fields HCut and NCount, in the leaf nodes, indicate the differentially private data (OutDS) to be returned to the data miner.
Empty 
Partitions
Figure 15: PartTree: ε-diﬀerentially private partitioning tree of MixDS.
[HCut,CCut,Recs,ABudget, PBudget,NCount], where:
• Hierarchy cut (HCut) and complementary cut (CCut) are two set of nodes from TaxTree.
• Recs = 〈r1, r2, . . . , rd〉 is a binary vector of d ciphertexts, where d = |MixDS|. If a record
Rj ∈ MixDS for 1 ≤ j ≤ d is assigned to Part, then rj is set to 1. All ciphertexts in Recs
are initially set to 0.
• ABudget is the available privacy budget.
• PBudget = ABudget/|InterNodes(HCut)| is the partitioning privacy budget, where |InterNodes(HCut)|
is the total number of all non-leaf nodes from each subtree of TaxTree rooted at each node in
HCut.
• NCount is the noisy count generated using Laplace mechanism. 
Jointly executed by all data owners, Sub-Protocol 2.1 illustrates how the partitioning tree
PartTree is constructed in a diﬀerentially private manner. When the initial partition is created,
only half of the global privacy budget ε is allocated to it to guide the partitioning process. The
other half of the privacy budget will be assigned to each leaf partition to generate its noisy count.
When a partition is expanded over a node from its hierarchy cut HCut, 2l − 1 child partitions are
created, where l < f is the number of child nodes of the partitioning node from TaxTree. The same
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available privacy budget is allocated to each child partition, which is possible due to the parallel
composition property [McS09] since the child partitions will be assigned disjoint set of records from
MixDS.
Example 10 Figure 15 illustrates the partitioning tree PartTree of dataset MixDS from Table 8.b.
Let Part be the partition where HCut = {A{1,2}, A{3,4}}, Recs = 〈1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0〉,
ABudget = ε/3, and PBudget = (ε/3)/2 = ε/6, where |InterNodes({ A{1,2}, A{3,4} })| = 2.
Since internal nodes {A{1,2} and A{3,4}} are at the same height in TaxTree, either node can be
used for partitioning (expanding) Part. Assume that we randomly select A{1,2} which has l = 2
children in TaxTree, then a maximum of 2l − 1 = 3 partitions can be created. As illustrated in
Figure 15, Part1.HCut = {A1, A{3,4}}, Part2.HCut = {A2, A{3,4}}, Part3.HCut = {A1, A2, A{3,4}},
and Part1.ABudget = Part2.ABudget = Part3.ABudget = Part.ABudget − Part.PBudget = ε/3 −
ε/6 = ε/6. 
The data owners utilizes the functions from Construction 5.1 on each record from MixDS to
securely determine which record should be assign to a partition. The following deﬁnition speciﬁes
the conditions for successful record assignments.
Deﬁnition 17 Record-Partition Assignment. A record R can be assigned to a non-initial par-
tition Part if the following conditions hold:
1. Every item in DifNodes exists in R, where DifNodes is the set of nodes from TaxTree that exist in
Part.HCut but not in the hierarchy cut of its parent Parent(Part).HCut.
2. Every item in Part.CCut does not exist in R.
3. R has already been assigned to Parent(Part). 
Note that HCut could have been used instead of DifNodes in the ﬁrst condition of Deﬁnition 17.
However, verifying the nodes in DifNodes is suﬃcient since the remaining nodes that exist in HCut
but not in DifNodes will be automatically veriﬁed by the third condition of the deﬁnition. This
optimization eliminates the need to verify each bit in R, where |R| = |Univ| = n, against Part in
order to determine if R should be assigned to Part.
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Distributed Laplace Noise Generation
LNoise ← LapNoise(Budget):
1. Determine the partial noise Xk from each participant Pk : 1 ≤ k ≤ p:
(a) All participants run the Multiparty Coin Toss protocol to generate a uniformly random
bitstring s.
(b) Pk generates l independent and identically gamma-distributed random variables deter-
ministically derived from s:
γi,k = Gamma(p, 1/Budget) for 1 ≤ i ≤ l
(c) Pk convert each gamma variable γi,k into integer value γ¯i,k:
γ¯i,k = γi,k × 10D, where D is the number of decimal places (precision) agreed upon by
all parties.
(d) Pk encrypts each integer value and broadcasts the set of ciphertexts:
Γk = {γ¯1,k, γ¯2,k, . . . , γ¯l,k}
(e) The rest of the participants use a random beacon to randomly choose (l−2) ciphertexts
from Γk.
(f) All participants jointly decrypt all chosen ciphertexts, and verify that Steps 1b-d are
correct.
(g) If the test is successful, then the partial random noise from Pk is homomorphically
computed as follows:
Xk = γ¯i′,k − γ¯i′′,k, where γ¯i′,k and γ¯i′′,k are the two ciphertexts that were not
chosen in Step 1e.





Sub-Protocol 2. 2: Laplace Noise Generation
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x        = homomorphic addition. 
x All ciphertexts have been re-randomized. 
Figure 16: Using Mix and Match to verify whether record R1 should be assigned to partition Part.
Example 11 Let Part be the partition from Figure 15, where:
Part.HCut = {A1, A{3,4}} and Part.CCut = {A2}. Consequently, DifNodes := {A1, A{3,4}}\{A{1,2}, A{3,4}} =
{A1}.
Giving record R1 from Table 8.b, Figure 16 illustrates how to use the Veriﬁable Mix and Match
protocol to securely verify whether record R1 should be assigned to partition Part. 
Since the rows in MixDS and items in TaxTree are both encrypted (randomized) and shuﬄed, data
owners cannot use Part.HCut or Part.CCut to infer which records is assign to which partition in each
level of PartTree. Recall that A1 corresponds to ciphertext Iπ(1), A2 corresponds to ciphertext
Iπ(2), etc.
Distributed Laplace Noise Generation. To verify in a non-deterministic way whether or not a
partition is empty, a count query is issued for its noisy count by homomorphically adding a Laplace
noise to the true number of records assigned to the partition. To securely generate Laplace noise in
a distributed fashion, the data owners run Sub-Protocol 2.2, which is based on the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 Laplace Distribution [KKP01]. Let Lap(λ) be a random variable satisfying a Laplace
distribution with probability distribution function Pr(x|λ) = 12λe
|x|
λ . Then:
1. The distribution of Lap(λ) is inﬁnitely divisible.
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2. ∀r ≥ 1, Lap(λ) = ∑ri=1[γ1,i − γ2,i], where γ1,i = Gamma(r, λ) and γ2,i = Gamma(r, λ) are inde-
pendent and identically distributed random variables satisfying gamma distribution with probability




λ , where x ≥ 0 and Γ(1/k) is the gamma function
evaluated at 1/k. 
The general idea is to take advantage of the inﬁnite divisibility of Laplace distribution, and
have each data owner generate a random partial noise based on two gamma-distribution random
variables. According to Lemma 1, the shape parameter r = p (number of parties), and the inverse
scale parameter λ = 1privacy budget . Several algorithms exist in the literature for generating random
gamma variables, e.g. [MT00] and [AD74], where at least two variables must be drawn from the
uniform distribution in order to generate one gamma variable. Cut-and-Choose is used to ensure
that each data owner has used the bitstring (randomness) generated by the Multiparty Coin Tossing
protocol to construct its gamma variables. All partial noises are converted to integers according to
the decimal precision value D agreed upon by all parties, before they are encrypted using Exponential
ElGamal. The encrypted noises are then homomorphically added together to construct a random
variable satisfying Laplace distribution that is multiplied by 10D.
5.4 Protocol Analysis
5.4.1 Complexity Analysis
Proposition 6 Complexity. The average runtime complexity of our proposed protocol is bounded
by O(logf n × d2) operations, where d is the number of records and n is the number of columns in
EncDS.
Proof. The generation of EncDS from Sub-Protocol 1.2 requires O(n×d). The shuﬄing of EncDS
also requires O(n × d) [SHKS12]. As a result, Protocol 5.1 takes O(n × d) operations to generate
MixDS. The shuﬄing of n items in Univ and the construction of TaxTree with fan-out f requires
O(n) operations. In Sub-Protocol 2.1, 2n distinct partitions might be created in the worst-case
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scenario. However, since it is impossible in practice to have |MixDS| = d = 2n records to ﬁll out all
the partitions, we argue that the average-case complexity reﬂects a more accurate measure of our
protocol’s performance. Given that the mean of Laplace distribution is 0, the noise in the average
case is cancelled out, while assuming that the records are assign evenly between all partitions at the
same level in PartTree (worst case). The number of levels in PartTree is (log2 d/f), and the total
number of partitions in all levels is
∑log2 d/f
i=0 2i×f = O(d), where O(logf n) operations are applied
on each partition. Since all records in MixDS are validated against each partition in PartTree for
assignment, then the required number of operations is O(logf n × d2).
Discussion. The analysis shows that our approach is suitable for high-dimensional data since the
complexity is logarithmic with regard to the number of dimensions. On the other hand, it is quadratic
with respect to the number of records. This is due to the security protections of our protocol, where
no information can be inferred by malicious adversaries either during data integration or during the
partitioning process. Lowering record complexity while maintaining the same level of security is a
non-trivial open problem.
5.4.2 Security Analysis
Proposition 7 Integrity. The overall protocol is sound under the malicious adversarial model.
Proof. All steps in our solution are publicly veriﬁable, which prevents a compromised data owner
from deviating from the correct computation without detection. If detected, honest data owners will
not proceed, preventing the completion of the protocol (as the decryption operations throughout the
protocol, including the last step, require all participants). Table 9 illustrates the publicly veriﬁable
primitive of each security-sensitive step in each proposed protocol and sub-protocol. We inherit
integrity against a dishonest majority from our building blocks (and we can provide robustness
against dishonest minority by adjusting the threshold of the decryption operation).
We must also ensure that all inputs to the protocol are correctly formed. In the setup phase, where
the data owners interact together to construct the public key, the distributed key generation (DKG)
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Table 9: The publicly veriﬁable primitives involved in each security-sensitive step of the proposed
protocol















Mix and Match 1 − 4 1.b
NIZKP 1






Cleartext Operation∗ 2,3,6 3 1 − 4 1,2.a.ii,2.b,3 5 − 7
† The shuﬄing in Step 2 and 5 is performed at the same time to ensure that the same random permutation π is used.
‡ All participants agree on one randomness value for encryption so that anyone can verify the ciphertexts by regenerating
them.
∗ Cleartext operations involve steps that do not require a secret, such as sub-protocol calls and broadcasting an output.
protocol ensures that the output is uniformly distributed at random [GJKR07]. In the case of data
encryption, each ciphertext must be from 〈Gq × Gq〉 such that the data owners are able to check
the independency of the ciphertexts. When operations of mixing (shuﬄing & re-randomization),
distributed proxy re-encryption, and plaintext equality test are performed, each data owner inputs
a random exponent from Z∗q for blinding. As long as there is at least one exponent that is uniformly
distributed at random, the addition of all exponents is also random. Finally, during the generation
of a uniformly random bitstring using the Coin Toss protocol, the same property holds: as long as
there is at least one honest data owner, then the result is uniformly random.
Proposition 8 Privacy-preserving. The overall protocol is privacy-preserving.
Proof. To prove that our protocol is privacy-preserving, we show that the data is protected
throughout the protocol execution.
Input Data. Each data owner Pi encrypts his data, proves knowledge of it, and then inputs it to
the protocol. The proof is zero-knowledge, where Pi proves that he knows the underlying plaintexts
of the encrypted data without revealing any information about the plaintexts.
Encrypted Data. While encrypted, the data is protected under the CPA-security of the en-
cryption scheme (e.g., DDH for ElGamal) and the proof is zero-knowledge. The adversary cannot
decrypt items arbitrarily, as the decryption key is (n, n)-shared between all data owners, requiring
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the adversary to corrupt every data owner to be successful (in which case, all the inputs are al-
ready known). Moreover, applying veriﬁable mixing on the columns and rows of the encrypted data
removes any correspondence between ciphertexts and the original items/records.
Decrypted Data. The underlying data remains encrypted throughout the protocol except in
two areas: within Mix and Match (during plaintext equality tests) and within proxy re-encryption.
However, both subprotocols are veriﬁable and already provide protection against a malicious adver-
sary.
5.4.3 Correctness and Utility Analysis
Proposition 9 Correctness. Given p ≥ 2 set-valued datasets with record and item overlaps, the
proposed protocol generates ε-diﬀerentially private set-valued data.
Proof. We ﬁrst show that our protocol can handle record and item overlaps, and then show that
the released data is ε-diﬀerentially private.
Data Overlap. If data about the same individual exists in more than one dataset (record over-
lap), then Step 2.a of Sub-Protocol 1.2 is applied to generate one integrated record for that individual.
Function n-OR is used to set the total number of occurrences of an item to one if the item exists in
more than one record for the same individual (item overlap).
ε-Diﬀerentially Private Data Generation. Sub-Protocol 2.1 performs the same sequence of
partitioning operations as the algorithm in [CMF+11], except that our protocol is in a distributed
setting. Since [CMF+11] generates ε-diﬀerentially private set-valued data, we prove the correctness
of Sub-Protocol 2.1 by only proving the correctness of the diﬀerent steps:
• Record-Partition Assignment. Verifying that every item in DifNodes exists in R, and R has
already been assigned to Parent(Part), is equivalent to verifying that every item in HCut
exists in R. Moreover, verifying that every item in Part.CCut does not exist in R ensures that
the same record is not assigned to more than one sibling partition.
102
• Noise Generation. In Sub-Protocol 2.2, even though LNnoise is diﬀerentially private, the par-
tial noise Xk from Pk is not; hence the use of Cut-and-Choose protocol to allow for encrypted
partial noises while ensuring they are random variables satisfying gamma distribution. More-
over, since the total noise LNnoise of a leaf partition is equal to LapNoise(ε/2), the output is
guaranteed to be ε/2-diﬀerentially private.
5.5 Performance Evaluation
5.5.1 Experimental Results
In this section, we verify the utility loss of the anonymized dataset OutDS based on frequent itemset
mining, a common data mining technique for extracting knowledge from set-valued data.
We utilize the publicly available dataset MSNBC 4, a real-life web log dataset that have been
used for testing several data mining approaches [LQSC12] [EVK05]. It consists of 989, 818 records
and 17 distinct items, where the average number of items per record is 1.72 items. We also utilize
STM5, a real-life dataset that lists the subway and bus stations visited by passengers in Montre´al
city within a week. It consists of 1, 210, 096 records and 1, 012 distinct items, where the average
number of items per record is 64 items.
Let ω be the number of top frequent itemsets. Our goal is to compute the sets Fω(EncDS) and
Fω(OutDS) that contains the ω top frequent itemsets from EncDS and OutDS, respectively. We
measure the similarity between the two sets in order to determine the utility loss (UL) in OutDS























































Figure 17: Utility loss for frequent itemset mining with respect to privacy budget and top frequent
itemsets.
where Sup(Ii,Fω(OutDS)) and Sup(Ii,Fω(EncDS)) represent the support of frequent itemset
Ii ∈ Fω(OutDS) in Fω(OutDS) and Fω(EncDS), respectively.
Figure 22 illustrates the utility loss for frequent itemset mining with respect to diﬀerent privacy
budgets and diﬀerent number of top frequent itemsets ω. We observe that for both datasets: MSNBC
in Figure 17a and STM in Figure 17b, the utility loss is directly aﬀected by the the privacy budget.
That is, the more privacy budget is allocated, the less the utility loss is. This is because a higher
privacy budget leads to a more accurate partitioning, and less noise is added to the count of each
partition at the leaf level. On the other hand, with regard to ω, we observe that the more top
frequent itemsets we consider, the more the utility loss is. This due to the fact that considering
more top frequent itemsets leads to more false positives in OutDS, as well as to more false negatives
in the itemsets being dropped. However, even when ω = 100, the utility of our approach is over 60%
in both datasets, and over 70% except in STM dataset when ε = 0.5.
5.5.2 Cost Estimation
We assume all ciphertexts are generated using exponential ElGamal. We count the modular ex-
ponentiation operations to estimate the cost of the protocol. We only report our cost analysis of
Protocol 2.1 as it dominates the analysis. Modular exponentiations are mainly required when a
partition is being constructed and when a record is validated against a partition.
• Partition Construction. The total number of modular exponentiations required for generating one
104
ciphertext is 5, where 2 exponentiations are required to perform the operation, 1 to generate the
proof, and 2 to verify the proof. Given that each partition consists of d binary ciphertexts, where
d = |MixDS|, the total cost of constructing a partition is 5 × d.
• Record-Partition Assignment. To determine the cost of assigning a record to a partition, we
calculate the modular exponentiations required by Equation 4 in Protocol 1. More specially, we
calculate the modular exponentiations required by the plaintext equality test (PET) on the Mix
and Match truth tables, assuming that all tables were created oﬄine. Given p data owners, one
PET requires 15 × p exponentiations, where 3 × p are required to perform the operation, 4 × p
to generate the proof, and 8 × p to verify the proof [SHKS12]. Table 10 illustrates the average
number of modular exponentiations for the Mix and Match truth tables, where each table contains
two columns, and PET is performed on the ciphertexts in the ﬁrst column.
Table 10: Average cost of PET on Mix and Match truth tables
Table # of Rows Modular Exponentiations
n-AND(V ) |V | + 1 |V |+1
2 × 15 × p
n-OR(V ) |V | + 1 |V |+1
2 × 15 × p
NOT(v) 2 22 × 15 × p = 15 × p
n-NOT(V ) 2 × |V | 2×|V |
2 × 15 × p = 15 × |V | × p
The average number of n-OR(V ) operations in part B or C of Equation 4 is f/2. Since the number
of items in DifNodes decreases by f times at every partitioning step, the function CV(N) returns
on average logf n ciphertexts. So the cost of Equation 4 in terms of modular exponentiations is
(f × ( (logf n)+12 × 15 × p) + 15 × f2 × p + (f+1)+12 × 15 × p)  (8 × logf n + 24) × f × p.
Given that all records will be evaluated against each partition, and 2d partitions are expected to
be created on average, the total cost for constructing PartTree is (16 × logf n + 58) × f × p × d2.
Assuming that the cost for one exponential operation is 2 ms, Table 11 and Table 12 illustrate the
estimated runtime of our protocol w.r.t. the number of records and the number of distinct items
(universe size), respectively.
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Table 11: Estimated Performance of Protocol 2.1 (Hours) w.r.t. # of records, where # of parties is
3 and fan-out is 2.
Dataset 200 400 600 800 1000
MSNBC 16 66 148 263 411
STM 29 116 261 464 726
Table 12: Estimated Scalability of Protocol 2.1 (Hours) w.r.t. # distinct items, where # of records
is 600, # of parties is 3 and fan-out is 2.
20K 40K 60K 80K 100K
344 363 374 382 389
We observe from Table 11 that our protocol can be practical when the number of records is
relatively small, while the number of dimensions is high. It shows, for instance, that integrating
3 datasets with up to 400 records and 1012 distinct items takes less than 5 days (116 hours) to
complete. One example where our protocol can be utilized is in medical research labs that perform
tests on new drugs and need to integrate their data in a privacy-preserving manner. In such case,
the number of participants is typically small, whereas the number of symptoms to be tracked is
large. We also observe from Table 12 that our proposed protocol grows at a logarithmic rate with
respect to the number of dimensions. It shows that when the number of dimensions is 20,000, and
then gradually increases by 20,000 distinct items at each step, up to 100,000 dimensions, the average
increase of runtime per step is only 8.25 hours. Recall that the costs are expensive due to the support
of public veriﬁability. We hope that this work inspires researchers to further study the problem of
data integration with public veriﬁability and propose more eﬃcient and practical solutions.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we propose a protocol for secure set-valued data integration, where the output is
a ε-diﬀerentially private data with an eﬀective level of data utility for data mining. Our proposed
protocol is the ﬁrst in the literature to support public veriﬁability in the context of data integration.
The protocol also supports a more general distributed data model, and is eﬃcient for handling








As the amount of data available from wide range of domains has increased tremendously in recent
years, the demand for data sharing and integration has also risen. The integration of related data
from diﬀerent sources enables businesses, organizations and government agencies to perform better
data analysis and make better decisions. In this chapter, we present Fusion, a protocol that en-
ables multiple data providers to engage in a privacy-preserving integration process to generate a
anonymous mashup data with high information utility for data mining tasks such as classiﬁcation
analysis. Throughout the integration process, a score function needs to be computed between the
parties to guide the process. Therefore, we propose a secure protocol for evaluating the score function
in a distributed setting. Figure 18 presents an example of a distributed environment for privacy-
preserving data integration. The challenges of mashing-up data from diﬀerent data providers in a
privacy-preserving manner are summarized as follows.

















































Figure 18: Privacy-preserving distributed data integration.
due to privacy concerns. We distinguish between two types of concerns. The ﬁrst is to allow data
providers to evaluate functions on the collective data while ensuring that no party learns more
information about other parties’ data, other than what is revealed in the ﬁnal mashup data.
Example 12 Consider the data in Table 13, where three data providers: P1, P2 and P3, owns
diﬀerent set of attributes about the same individuals, and P2 owns the Class attribute. Assume
that the parties are building a classiﬁer and need to compute information gain [Qui93] for each
attribute. P2 can directly compute the information for attribute Sex since it knows the class values.
However, P1 and P3 should be able to compute the information for each of their attributes while
the class values remain private (only known to P2). 
The second concern is to ensure the ﬁnal mashup data is anonymized such that potential linkage
attacks are thwarted. The adversary can perform two types of linkage attacks: record linkage, where
an individual can be linked to a record if the record is very speciﬁc, and attribute linkage, where a
frequent sensitive value can be inferred about an individual.
Example 13 In Table 13, if the adversary knows 〈44, 12th, Female〉 about an individual, then the
adversary can link the individual to record #7 and sensitive value s2. On the other hand, if the
adversary knows 〈Bachelor,Male〉, then he infers sensitive value s2 about the individual with 67%
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Table 13: Raw data owned by providers P1, P2 and P3
UID
Data Provider P1 Data Provider P2 Data Provider P3
Age Education Class Sex Sen Salary
1 54 11th Yes Male s2 65K
2 26 Bachelor No Male s1 37K
3 39 7th No Female s2 51K
4 67 Master Yes Female s2 55K
5 32 Bachelor Yes Male s2 87K
6 59 Doctorate No Female s1 107K
7 44 12th No Female s2 26K
8 29 Bachelor Yes Male s2 77K
9 53 9th No Female s2 29K
10 46 Master Yes Female s1 72K
probability. 
Another major challenge is data utility. The anonymous mashup data should preserve as much
information as possible for the targeted data mining tasks such as classiﬁcation or cluster analysis.
However, since each data provider can own several attributes, each of which is considered a dimen-
sion, the resulting mashup data is usually high-dimensional. Many anonymization approaches, such
as k-anonymity [Sam01a], generate useless anonymous data when applied on high-dimensional data
due to the curse of high dimensionality [Don00]. Therefore, choosing the appropriate anonymization
approach is critical for maintaining high data quality.
The contributions of this chapter can be summarized as follows:
Contribution #1. We present a secure protocol for the distributed evaluation of an information
gain-based score function, and show that the protocol is privacy-preserving.
Contribution #2. We present a multi-party protocol that applies a hierarchal approach to
anonymize high-dimensional data and generate mashup data satisfying LKC-privacy [MFHL09].
Contribution #3. We performed experimental evaluation on real-life data in diﬀerent dis-
tributed settings. Extensive experimental results suggest that the mashup data provides better data
utility, and our approach is scalable w.r.t. the number of records as well as the number of attributes.




In recent years, several privacy models [Swe02a][Sam01b] have been proposed to prevent linkage
attacks against published data. In the problem studied in this chapter, each data provider can own
many attributes and the result is often a high-dimensional mashup table. Therefore, we choose LKC-
privacy [MFHL09], a privacy model that was originally designed for preventing linkage attacks on
high-dimensional data, i.e., data with a large number of attributes. The authors in [MFHL09] have
shown that LKC-privacy yields better utility for data mining in the anonymized data in comparison
to the traditional privacy models.
Let T be an attribute table in the form of T = (A1, . . . , Am, Sen), where each record contains
information about a unique individual. QID = {A1, . . . , Am} is a set of quasi-identiﬁer attributes,
such as sex and age, that may identify an individual if some combinations of QID values are speciﬁc
enough. Sen is a sensitive attribute that contains some sensitive information about the individuals
in the table, such as salaries or diseases. We assume that the an adversary looking to identify the
record or sensitive value about an individual in T has a limited prior knowledge qid. More specif-
ically, the adversary knows values from at most L attributes in QID, where |qid| ≤ L. Given qid,
the adversary can identify the set of records in T that satisfy qid, denoted by T [qid], and launch
two privacy attacks:
Record Linkage Attack. If the number of records |T [qid]| is small, the adversary can dis-
tinguish the individual’s record, and consequently, the sensitive value. For example, if qid =
〈44, 12th, Female〉 in Table 13, then T [qid] = {UID#7}, |T [qid]| = 1 and Sen = s2.
Attribute Linkage Attack. If the number of records |T [qid]| is large, the adversary can still infer
the sensitive value s with conﬁdence Pr(s|qid) = |T [qid∧s]||T [qid]| , where T [qid∧s] denotes the set of records
containing both qid and s. For example, if qid = 〈Bachelor,Male〉, then T [qid∧ s2] = {UID#5, 8}
and T [qid] = {UID#2, 5, 8}. Accordingly, Pr(s2|qid) = 23 = 67%.
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Figure 19: Taxonomy trees: TAge, TEducation, TSex and TSalary for ∪QID attributes in Table 13,
and the union cut ∪Cut of the LKC anonymous Table 14.
qid : |qid| ≤ L, qid is shard by at least K records, and the percentage of each sensitive value in every
group cannot exceed a certain value C. LKC-privacy guarantees that the probability of a successful
record linkage to be ≤ 1/K and the probability of a successful attribute linkage to be ≤ C.
6.2.2 Encryption Scheme
The requirements of the encryption scheme is to: 1) support homomorphic addition, 2) allow for
re-randomization of ciphertexts without the need for private information, 3) admit distributed key
generation (DKG), and 4) allow for distributed decryption where participants use key shares to
perform a decryption operation. We choose Exponential ElGamal [CGS97] as it is fast when imple-
mented over elliptic curves, distributed key generation is straightforward, and decryption is feasible
for our plaintext space. For the purpose of this chapter, we assume that the secret key x of Elgamal
scheme is shared according to (2, n)-threshold between the participants, where any two participants
can jointly decrypt Elgamal encrypted messages.
6.2.3 Taxonomy Tree [FWY07b]
A taxonomy tree of an attribute A, denoted by TA, is a context-speciﬁc hierarchical structure that
classiﬁes the items in the attribute’s domain. In a taxonomy tree for a categorical attribute, the leaf
nodes are the domain items, and the non-leaf nodes represent more generalized concepts of their
children. On the other hand, in a taxonomy tree for a numerical attribute, the root node represents
the full numerical range of the attribute, and the children nodes represent an optimal split of the
parent range. We assume for each attribute A ∈ ∪QID, a context-speciﬁc taxonomy tree is deﬁned.
Figure 19 presents taxonomy trees for the ∪QID attributes in Table 13.
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6.3 Problem Formulation
In this section we formally deﬁne the research problem. First, we present an overview of the problem
of privacy-preserving data integration with privacy guarantees on output data in Section 6.3.1.
Next, we describe the utility measures in Section 6.3.2. We then describe the adversarial model in
Section 6.3.3. Finally, we present the problem statement in Section 6.3.4.
6.3.1 Problem Overview
This chapter addresses the problem of integrating distributed person-speciﬁc data while preserving
both privacy and information utility on the ﬁnal mashup data. Each party involved in the protocol
represents a data provider who is interested in integrating its data with other providers’ data without
leaking any unnecessary information. The mashup data is then released to the public for data mining.
We assume that the data being integrated is in the form of a relational table that is vertically
partitioned into sub-tables, each of which is owned by one data provider. Let P1, P1, . . . , Pp be
the group of data providers participating in the protocol. Each party Pi : 1 ≤ i ≤ p owns a table
in the form of Ti = (UID,EIDi, QIDi, Seni, Class). UID is a system-generated unique identiﬁer
of an individual, and is shared by all data providers. EIDi is a set of explicit identiﬁers containing
information that can explicitly identify an individual, and should be removed before the protocol is
executed. QIDi is a set of quasi-identiﬁer attributes, each of which is either categorical or numerical.
QIDi attributes cannot be removed as they are useful for the data mining task, and each attribute
can be shared by any number of data providers. We denote by ∪QID = ⋃pi=1 QIDi the union of all
quasi-identiﬁer attributes owned by the parties. Seni is a set of sensitive attributes containing some
sensitive information about the individuals, and it is shared between all data providers. Class is a
categorical target class attribute for classiﬁcation analysis. We assume that only one data provider
owns (have knowledge to) this attribute. The result of the integration is an anonymous mashup data
that satisﬁes an LKC-privacy requirements agreed upon by all the parties. Note that increasing the
anonymity threshold K, increasing the prior knowledge threshold L, or decreasing the conﬁdence
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Table 14: LKC anonymous mashup data, for L = 2, K = 2 and C = 50%, w.r.t. sensitive value s1
UID Age Education Class Sex Sen Salary
1 [1-99) Secondary Yes Any Sex s2 [10K-70K)
2 [1-99) University No Any Sex s1 [10K-70K)
3 [1-99) Secondary No Any Sex s2 [10K-70K)
4 [1-99) University Yes Any Sex s2 [10K-70K)
5 [1-99) University Yes Any Sex s2 [70K-125K)
6 [1-99) University No Any Sex s1 [70K-125K)
7 [1-99) Secondary No Any Sex s2 [10K-70K)
8 [1-99) University Yes Any Sex s2 [70K-125K)
9 [1-99) Secondary No Any Sex s2 [10K-70K)
10 [1-99) University Yes Any Sex s1 [70K-125K)
threshold C imposes a higher level of privacy protection, which in general would result in a lower
information utility (data quality) of the anonymized data.
6.3.2 Data Utility Measures
Our idea for generating anonymous mashup data is to anonymize the raw data by performing a
sequence of specializations, starting from the topmost general state. To specialize a value v, denoted
by v → child(v), we replace v by its children values child(v). The specialization process can be
viewed as pushing the cut of each taxonomy tree downwards. A CutA of a taxonomy tree TA
contains exactly one value on each root-to-leaf path. We denote by ∪Cut = ⋃A∈∪QID CutA the
union of all cuts. In Figure 19, the dashed curve represents ∪Cut (also referred to as solution cut) of
the LKC anonymous Table 14. The specialization starts from the topmost cut and pushes down the
cut iteratively by specializing a value in the current cut until no further specialization that satisﬁes
the LKC-privacy requirements is possible. We deﬁne two utility measures to help us determine at
each level the best value v for specialization.
UM1: Classiﬁcation Analysis
We utilize information gain [Qui93] to measure the quality of specialization on a value v for the
purpose of classiﬁcation analysis. Construction 6.1 illustrates how the score function Score(v) can
be computed.
At any level during the specialization process, the score of every valid attribute for specialization
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Classiﬁcation Analysis
Let T [v] be the set of records in T that are generalized to v. The score for a specialization on
a value v can be determined as follows:
1. Compute the entropy of T [v]:
E(T [v]) = −
∑
cls∈Class
|T [v ∧ cls]|
|T [v]| × log2(
|T [v ∧ cls]|
|T [v]| ) (5)
where |T [v ∧ cls]| denotes the records in T [v] with class value cls.
2. Given that |T [v]| = Σc|T [c]|, where c ∈ child(v), compute the entropy of T [c] for each
c ∈ child(v):
E(T [c]) = −
∑
cls∈Class
|T [c ∧ cls]|
|T [c]| × log2(
|T [c ∧ cls]|
|T [c]| ) (6)
3. Compute the score of specializing T [v] on value v:




|T [v]|E(T [c]) (7)
Construction 6.1: Utility Measure for Classiﬁcation Analysis
can be computed according to Construction 6.1, and then the value with the highest score is chosen
to perform the actual specialization.
UM2: General Analysis
We utilize discernibility cost [SR92] to measure the quality of specialization on a value v when the
data mining task is unknown. The discernibility cost penalizes each record that is indistinguishable
from the rest of the records in a group, and the penalty cost equals the size of the group. That is,
each record in an equivalence class qid is penalized by |T [qid]|, and the total penalty cost of the class




|T [qid]|2 : v ∈ qid (8)




Fusion is secure in the semi-honest adversarial model [KMR], where each party is trusted to follow
the protocol, but during the execution, tries to infer information from other parties. All parties are
assumed to be non-colluding and their computational powers are polynomially bounded.
6.3.4 Problem Statement
Let P1, . . . ,Pp, where p > 2, be a group of data providers respectively owning vertically-partitioned
data tables T1, . . . , Tp, where any quasi-identiﬁer attribute can be shared by any number of data
providers, all sensitive attributes are shared between all data providers and the Class attribute is
only owned by one provider. Let L, K and C be the prior knowledge threshold, the anonymity
threshold and the conﬁdence threshold values agreed upon by all parties. The objective of our work
is to propose a protocol for generating an anonymous mashup data table Tˆ such that (1) Tˆ satisﬁes
LKC-privacy requirements, (2) no party learns unnecessary information about other parties’ data
than what is in Tˆ (which is LKC-private), (3) Tˆ preserves an eﬀective level of information utility
for data mining purposes, and (4) the protocol is scalable with respect to high-dimensional data.
6.4 Solution: Fusion Protocol
6.4.1 Solution Overview
This section introduces a multi-party protocol, named Fusion, for integrating distributed person-
speciﬁc data while preserving both privacy and information utility on the ﬁnal mashup data. The
main idea is to anonymize the raw data by generalizing all raw data records to a topmost general
state, and then perform a sequence of specializations such that in each specialization step we choose
the specialization with the highest score to maintain the highest possible information utility. The
specialization process continues until there is no more specialization that satisﬁes the LKC-privacy
requirements. Our solution consists of two main protocols:
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Distributed Specialization Score (DSS)
Let Pcls be the party that owns the Class attribute. We assume that each party already received
from Pcls the class values encrypted under the data providers’s distributed public key, as shown
in Table 15.
1. Following Construction 6.1, Pcls directly computes the score for each valid specialization
of every attribute in ∪QID it owns.
2. For each valid specialization v → child(v) of every attribute in ∪QID owned by Pk : 1 ≤
k ≤ p (except Pcls), Pk does the following:
(a) Choose a party randomly and then together execute Sub-Protocol 1.3 to compute
E(T [v]).
(b) For each c ∈ child(v), it randomly chooses another party and then together execute
Sub-Protocol 1.3 to compute E(T [c]).
(c) Homomorphically compute the score of specialization over v as follows:




|T [v]| × E(T [c]))
= 10d × E(T [v]) −
∑
c∈child(v)




where d is the number of decimal places (precision) agreed upon by all parties.
(d) Request one of the parties to partially decrypt Score(v), and then uses its own share
of the secret key to fully decrypt the ciphertext and obtain Score(v).
3. All parties engage in a secure circuit evaluation process using Yao’s Protocol [Yao82] to
determine which party has the specialization value with the highest score.
Protocol 6.1: Distributed Specialization Score
Protocol 6.1 - Distributed Specialization Score (DSS). Since Class attribute is only
owned by one party, this protocol enables all parties to securely determine at each specialization
step the best value for specialization.
Protocol 6.2 - Hierarchal High-dimensional Data Integration (HHDI). This protocol
presents a distributed hierarchical approach for integrating high dimensional data from multiple data
providers, while preserving the data quality for the data mining tasks. The output of this protocol
is an LKC-anonymous mashup data.
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Input: Principle party Pi, assisting party Pj , potential specialization value x
Output: Encrypted entropy of T (x)
1. Pi chooses random integer r from Z∗q , and then for each ciphertext cls ∈ T [x].Class,
where T [v].Class denotes the set of ciphertexts from the encrypted Class attribute
that corresponds to the group of records generalized to v, it performs the following:
(a) Blind cls by exponentiating in r: clsr = clsr.
(b) Partially decrypt clsr using its own share of the secret key.
2. Pi sends the set of partially decrypted ciphertexts to Pj through a secure channel.
3. Using its own share of the secret key, Pj decrypts the set of ciphertexts and obtains a set
of blinded class values.
4. Pj computes the entropy E(T [x]) according to Equation 5 from Construction 6.1.
5. Pj computes the integer value E(T [x]) × 10d, encrypts it using the distributed public
key, and then sends the ciphertext E(T [x]) × 10d to Pi through a secure channel.
Sub-Protocol 1. 3: Compute Encrypted Entropy
6.4.2 Multi-Party Protocol for Computing Specialization Score
In this section, we present a multi-party protocol for securely determining the best value for spe-
cialization. As we discussed in Section 6.3.2, Construction 6.1 can be used to compute the score
of each valid specialization, and then the specialization that yields the highest score is selected. In
distributed settings, however, diﬀerent QID attributes are owned by diﬀerent parties and the Class
attribute is owned by only one party. Therefore, a secure protocol is required to compute the scores
and determine the best specialisation while ensuring no extra information is leaked to the parties.
Protocol 6.1 explains how the data providers can securely determine the winner candidate for
specialization. As we will see in Section 6.4.3, the table T is constructed from the leaf partitions of
the specialization tree. Pcls, the party that owns the Class attribute, can independently compute
the score of its own valid specialization values. On the other hand, any other party that has a valid
specialization value must utilize the other parties to achieve that. The intuition is to ask diﬀerent
parties to compute diﬀerent parts of the each score, and then the party owning the specialization
118
value puts things together by homomorphically computing the total score. Sub-Protocol 1.3 illus-
trates how Pi (the party owning the specialization value v) and Pj (assisting party) compute the
entropy of T [x]. The idea is for Pi to blind the class ciphertexts corresponding to T [x] using a
random number, decrypt them using its secret decryption share, and then send them to Pj who
in turn decrypts, counts the equivalent classes, and then computes the entropy. Using the same
random number to blind each class ciphertext (Step 1 of Sub-Protocol 1.3) ensures the decrypted
data is protected but the other party can still count and compute the entropy. We assume that at
the beginning of the protocol, all parties agreed on a parameter d for converting decimal values to
integers to be able to encrypt them. Observe that in Equation 9, we needed to multiply by 10d to
convert |T [c]||T [v]| to an integer while maintaining the scale between all computed scores. Pk can then
perform the multiplication: |T [c]||T [v]| × E(T [c]). The following example illustrates how to compute
the score of a specialization according to Protocol 6.1.
Example 14 Assume that all records in Table 15 are generalized to Any Education. Data provider
P1, who owns the attribute Education, wants to securely compute the score for the specialization
Any Education → {Elementary, Secondary, University} according to TEducation from Figure 19.
Step 1. To compute E(T [Any Education]), P1 blinds all ciphertexts in T [Any Education].Class
with a random number r1: Y esr1, Nor1, Nor1, Y esr1, Y esr1, Nor1, Nor1, Y esr1,
Nor1, Y esr1, partially decrypts them using its private key share, and the send them to P3
(randomly selected). P3 then decrypts the ciphertexts using its private key share to obtain the
blinded values: Y esr1 , Nor1 , Nor1 , Y esr1 , Y esr1 , Nor1 , Nor1 , Y esr1 , Nor1 , Y esr1 , and computes
− 510 × log2( 510 ) − 510 × log2( 510 ) = 1. It then computes the integer 1 × 10d = 1 × 102 = 100, and
then sends the ciphertext 100 to P1.
Step 2. Since the minimum education value in any records T [Any Education] is 7th grade, then
no record can be specialized to Elementary. As a result, |T [Elementary]| = 0 and E(T [Elementary]) =
0. On the other hand, T [Secondary] = {UID#1, 3, 7, 9} (4 records can be specialized to Secondary).
Therefore, P1 blinds all ciphertexts in T [Secondary].Class with a random number r2: Y esr2,
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Table 15: Data owned by P1, P2 and P3 after P2 sends encrypted Class attribute to P1 and P3
UID
P1 P2 P3
Age Education Class Class Sex Sen Salary Class
1 54 11th Y es Yes Male s2 65K Y es
2 26 Bachelor No No Male s1 37K No
3 39 7th No No Female s2 51K No
4 67 Master Y es Yes Female s2 55K Y es
5 32 Bachelor Y es Yes Male s2 87K Y es
6 59 Doctorate No No Female s1 107K No
7 44 12th No No Female s2 26K No
8 29 Bachelor Y es Yes Male s2 77K Y es
9 53 9th No No Female s2 29K No
10 46 Master Y es Yes Female s1 72K Y es
Nor2, Nor2, Nor2, partially decrypts them, and then sends them to P2. P2 decrypts the ci-
phertexts and computes − 14 × log2( 14 )− 34 × log2( 34 ) = 0.8112. It then computes 0.8112×102 = 81
and sends 81 to P1. Similarly, T [University] = {UID#2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10} (6 records can be special-
ized to University). Therefore, P1 blinds all ciphertexts in T [University].Class with a random
number r3: Nor3, Y esr3, Y esr3, Nor3, Y esr3, Y esr3, partially decrypts them, and then
sends them to P3. P3 decrypts the ciphertexts and computes − 46 × log2( 46 ) − 26 × log2( 26 ) = 0.9183.
It then computes 0.9183 × 102 = 92 and sends 92 to P1.
Step 3. Since |T [Any Education]| = 10, |T [Secondary]| = 4 and |T [University]| = 6, P1
homomorphically computes the score for specializing on value Any Education as follows:
Score(Any Education) = 102 × 100 −  102×410  × 81 −  10
2×6
10  × 92 = 1240. 
Proposition 10 Privacy. Protocol 6.1 is privacy-preserving.
Proof.To prove that Protocol 6.1 is privacy-preserving, we show that the data is protected
throughout the protocol execution.
Encrypted Data. While encrypted, all ciphertexts exchanged between the parties (encrypted
class attributes, entropies and scores) are protected under the CPA-security (Decisional Diﬃe-
Hellmen (DDH)) of ElGamal [EG85] encryption scheme. The adversary cannot decrypt items
arbitrarily, as the decryption key is (2, n)-shared between all data owners, requiring a collusion
with another party, which contradicts our non-colluding semi-honest adversarial model.
Decrypted Data. In Step 2 of Sub-Protocol 1.3, Pj receives a set of class attribute ciphertexts
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Hierarchal High-dimensional Data Integration (HHDI)
1. Pcls, the party that owns the Class attribute, encrypts the class values under the data
providers’ distributed public key, and then broadcasts the ciphertexts to the remaining
parties.
2. Create an initial partition such that:
• The hierarchy cut value HCut.A of every attribute A ∈ ∪QID is set to the root of
TA.
• All records are assigned to the partition.
3. Set the union cut ∪Cut to the hierarchy cut HCut of the initial partition.
4. For each value v ∈ ∪Cut from a taxonomy tree TA, PA determines whether v is valid for
specialization.
5. While there is at least one value v ∈ ∪Cut such that v is valid for specialization:
(a) All parties jointly run Protocol 6.1 to compute the specialization score for each valid
value in ∪Cut, and determine the party that owns the winning value w with the
highest score.
(b) The party owning w runs Sub-Protocol 2.3 to perform the specialization w →
child(w).
(c) For each value v ∈ ∪Cut from a taxonomy tree TA, PA veriﬁes whether v is valid
for specialization.
6. The hierarchy cut HCut and the record count of each leaf partition constitute the anony-
mous data for release satisfying the LKC-private requirements.
Protocol 6.2: Hierarchal High-dimensional Data Integration
from Pi in order to decrypt and compute the entropy. Decrypting the ciphertexts enables Pj to
count the equivalent class values. However, since the decrypted data is blinded (exponentiated
with a random number), Pj cannot determine the actual class values due to the the hardness of
computing discrete logarithms. Moreover, using diﬀerent random numbers for blinding diﬀerent set
of class values prevents Pj from comparing two diﬀerent set of blinded class values it has received
from two separate requests. Our protocol, however, leaks partial information about a score to each
assisting party, since entropies are computed by assisting parties in clear text. We argue that this
leakage is tolerable since assisting party Pj can determine neither to which attribute the computed
entropy belongs, nor what the underlying class values are.
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Perform Specialization
1. For each partition Part where w ∈ Part.HCut:
(a) For each child value v ∈ child(w), create a child partition CPart such that CPart.HCut
is the same as Part.HCut except that in the former, w is replaced by v.
2. Assign the records in Part to the child partitions according to Deﬁnition 18.
3. Update ∪Cut by replacing w by its children child(w).
Sub-Protocol 2. 3: Perform Specialization
6.4.3 Multi-Party Protocol for LKC-private Data Integration Release
Given the distributed data tables T1, . . . , Tp, the taxonomy trees for ∪QID, thresholds L, K and C,
the goal is to generate an integrated and anonymous data for data mining while satisfying LKC-
privacy. To ensure that no party learns unnecessary information about other parties’ data during
the integration process, we propose a hierarchal approach for specializing the data called Hierarchal
High-dimensional Data Integration (HHDI).
The general idea of our solution is to initially generalize and assign all records to a partition,
and then apply a top-down specialization process guided by the taxonomy trees to specialize the
records and assign then to disjoint child partitions until no further partitions can be created without
violating LKC-privacy. A partition is a data structure that consists of two components: HCut and
Recs. Hierarchy cut HCut is an ordered set of values 〈v1, . . . , v|∪QID|〉, where each value is from
a taxonomy tree TA of an attribute A ∈ ∪QID. Recs contains the unique identiﬁers UIDs of the
records assigned to the partition.
Deﬁnition 18 Record Generalization. A record R can be assigned to a partition Part if for each
attribute A ∈ ∪QID, R.A can be generalized to Part.HCut.A, where R.A and Part.HCut.A are the
values in R and Part.HCut that correspond to attribute A, respectively. 
Jointly executed by all data providers, Protocol 6.2 illustrates how the specialization process is
performed in order to generate the LKC-anonymous table. The parties coordinate their actions
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[1-99) Any_Education Any_Sex [10K-125K)
Age Education Sex Salary
Any_Education        {Elementary, Secondary, University}
P1 P2 P3
3 10
# of s1 # of Records
[1-99) University Any_Sex [10K-125K) 3 6[1-99) Secondary Any_Sex [10K-125K) 0 4
[1-99) University Any_Sex [70K-125K) 2 4[1-99) University Any_Sex [10K-70K) 1 2[1-99) Secondary Any_Sex [10K-70K) 0 4
[10K-125K)         {[10K-70K}, [70K-125K)}
Figure 20: Hierarchal high-dimensional data integration (HHDI) on the data in Table 13.
using a private broadcast channel called a bulletin board. Initially, all records are assigned to the
initial partition. This assignment satisﬁes Deﬁnition 18 since The HCut of the initial partition
contains the most general values (roots) of the taxonomy trees.
Example 15 Figure 20 illustrates the specialization process on Table 13 in order to generate an
LKC-anonymous table that satisﬁes L = 2, K = 2 and C = 50%. The root partition represents
the initial partition such that HCut = 〈[1 − 99), Any Education,Any Sex, [10K − 125K)〉 and
Recs = {UID#1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10}. The union cut is also set to the most general values ∪Cut =
〈[1 − 99), Any Education,Any Sex, [10K − 125K)〉. 
To determine which valid value to specialize on, all parties jointly run Protocol 6.1. In general, a
specialization v → child(v) involves generating a child partition for each child value in child(v). The
cut of a taxonomy tree to which v belongs is pushed downwards, and v is replaced in the hierarchy
cuts of the newly generated partitions by its children values child(v). The party that owns the
winner value preforms the actual specialization according to Sub-Protocol 2.3.
Example 16 In Figure 20, the winner value for the ﬁrst specialization is Any Education. There-
fore, part P1, which owns attribute Education, creates two partitions Part1 and Part2, Part1.HCut =
〈[1−99), Secondary,Any Sex, [10K−125K)〉 and Part1.Recs = {UID#1, 3, 7, 9}, and Part2.HCut =
〈[1−99), University, Any Sex, [10K−125K)〉 and Part2.Recs = {UID#2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10}. P1 updates
the union cut: ∪Cut = 〈[1 − 99), Secondary, University, Any Sex, [10K − 125K)〉. 
A specialization is valid if after the child partitions are created, the leaf partitions as a whole
in the partitioning tree still satisﬁes LKC-privacy. The specialization process terminates when no
more valid specialization is available. The mashup data for the ﬁnal release can be constructed from
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Table 16: Adult dataset, and the distribution of attributes among parties in each multiparty setting
Attribute Type Distributed Settings
3 parties 4 parties 5 parties
Age Numerical P2 P2 P2
Work-class Categorical P2 P3 P1
Final-weight Numerical P1 P1 P3
Education Categorical P2 P4 P3
Education-num Numerical P1 P4 P4
Marital-status Categorical P3 P3 P3
Occupation Categorical P3 P1 P4
Relationship Categorical P2 P1 P5
Race Categorical P2 P2 P4
Sex Categorical P1 P3 P2
Capital-gain Numerical P1 P1 P1
Capital-loss Numerical P1 P2 P5
Hours-per-week Numerical P3 P2 P1
Native-country Categorical P3 P4 P2
the hierarchy cut of the leaf partitions, where each hierarchy cut is duplicated |Recs| times (the
number of records assigned to the partition).
Example 17 The output of the specialization process in Figure 20 is: 〈[1 − 99), Secondary,
Any Sex, [10K − 705K)〉 ×4, 〈[1 − 99), University, Any Sex, [10K − 70K)〉 ×2, and 〈[1 − 99),
University, Any Sex, [70K −125K)〉 ×4, which is equivalent to the records presented in the LKC-
anonymous Table 14. 
Based on LKC’s anti-monotonic property [FWCY10], once a specialization on a value becomes
invalid, further specializations on child(v) will always be invalid. This property signiﬁcantly reduces
the partitioning space, while guaranteeing that the output is suboptimal.
6.5 Performance Evaluation
In this section we evaluate the performance of Fusion. First, we discuss the implementation details,
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Figure 21: Utility of mashup w.r.t. anonymity threshold K.
6.5.1 Implementation and Setup
Fusion is implemented using SCAPI1, an open-source Java library for implementing secure multiparty
computation protocols. We utilize queue-based channels in the communication layer to allow for
asynchronous transfer of ciphertexts between parties, where ActiveMQ2 is used as the messaging
broker. The experiments were conducted on a machine equipped with an Intel Core i7 3.8GHz CPU
and 16GB RAM, running 64-bit Windows 7.
We utilize a real-life adult data set [BL13] in our experiments to illustrate the performance of
Fusion. The adult data set consists of 45,222 census records containing six numerical attributes,
eight categorical attributes, and a class attribute. Table 16 lists all the attributes and their types.
In our experiments, we model three diﬀerent distributed settings: 3 parties, 4 parties and 5 parties.
We consider attribute Marital-status as the sensitive attribute, while we consider the remaining
attributes as quasi-identiﬁers. Table 16 illustrates the distribution of each attribute between parties
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Figure 22: Scalability with respect to (a) the number of attributes and (b) the number of records.
6.5.2 Mashup Utility
Rather than releasing an anonymous mashup data for classiﬁcation analysis, each data provider
could release a classiﬁer of its data. To determine the usefulness of our approach with respect
to classiﬁcation analysis, we utilize C4.5 classiﬁer [Sal94] to compare the classiﬁcation error of the
mashup data with the classiﬁcation error of the classiﬁer of each party. We use 30,160 records (2/3)
to build (train) the classiﬁers, and 15,062 records (1/3) for testing.
Figure 21 depicts the classiﬁcation error for each individual party, as well as for the mashup data.
The classiﬁcation error is measured w.r.t. the anonymity threshold K, where K linearly increases
from 40 and 200. Our approach is robust w.r.t. L, since we found out that increasing the prior
knowledge of the adversary does not impact the data quality. The classiﬁcation error for P1 is 17%,
P2 is 17.5% and P3 is 18.4%. On the other hand, the mashup classiﬁcation error decreases from
18.8% to 16.3% as K increases from 40 to 200. Except when K = 40, we observe that all data
providers beneﬁts from participating in integration process, where the maximum beneﬁt is as much
as 2.1% and the minimum beneﬁt is as low as 0.6%.
6.5.3 Scalability
We measure the scalability of Fusion with respect to the number of attributes (Attribute Scalability)




Figure 22a depicts the runtime from 3 to 13 attributes, for L = 3, K = 40, C = 100% and 45,222
records. We observe that the runtime grows sub-linearly when the number of attributes linearly
increases, regardless of the number of parties in the setting. We also observe that runtime decreases
as the number of parties increases. This is because adding more parties reduces the load on each
individual party.
Record Scalability
Figure 22b depicts the runtime from 200,000 to 1,000,000, for L = 3, K = 40, C = 100% and 13
attributes. We observe that it takes up to 195 minutes to run Fusion on a dataset with 1,000,000
records in a 3-party setting. This is mainly due to the fact that we perform a modular exponentiation
operation every time a ciphertext is blinded in Sub-Protocol 1.3. However, we also observe that the
runtime is still scalable w.r.t. the linear increase in the number of records, regardless of the number
of parties in the setting. Similar to Section 6.5.3, we observe that runtime decreases as the number
of parties increases.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, we present a secure protocol for data integration in a distributed setting. The
protocol is privacy-preserving, while the output is a mashup data for data mining that satisfy LKC-
privacy. We empirically show that the mashup data contains higher information utility, and that the





Data Auditing in Bitcoin
7.1 Introduction
Digital currencies enable transactions that are electronically authorized, cleared and settled. After
decades of research [Cha82, CHL05, Bel11, Par11] and failed business ventures attempting to estab-
lish a digital currency, Bitcoin [Nak08] was proposed and deployed in 2009. While still in its infancy,
Bitcoin has achieved unprecedented success, enjoying a multi-billion dollar market capitalization
and deployment by large retailers. Bitcoin transactions can be executed at any time by any device
in the world with low (sometimes zero) fees.
Users can maintain security of their assets by managing the private keys used to control them.
However, managing cryptographic keys is diﬃcult for many users [EBSC15]. Equipment failure,
lost or stolen devices, or Bitcoin-speciﬁc malware [LS14] could all result in the loss of one’s hold-
ings. Many users prefer to keep their holdings with online exchanges for a simple user experience
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similar to online banking—e.g., with passwords, account recovery, velocity limits and customer sup-
port. Exchanges, as their name suggest, also provide conversion services between bitcoin1 and other
currencies. Customers can ‘withdraw’ by instructing the exchange to send the stored bitcoin to a
Bitcoin address for which they manage the private key.
Unfortunately, storing assets with an exchange leaves users vulnerable to the exchange being
hacked and losing its assets. One of the most notorious events in Bitcoin’s short but storied history
is the collapse and ongoing bankruptcy of the oldest and largest exchange, Mt. Gox, which lost
over US$450M in customer assets. A number of other exchanges have lost their customers’ Bitcoin
holdings and declared bankruptcy due to external theft, internal theft, or technical mistakes [MC13].
While the vulnerability of an exchange to catastrophic loss can never be fully mitigated, a
sensible safeguard is periodic demonstrations that an exchange controls enough bitcoins to settle all
of its customers’ accounts. Otherwise, an exchange which has (secretly) suﬀered losses can continue
operating until the net withdrawal of Bitcoin exceeds their holdings. Note that while conventional
banks typically implement fractional reserve banking in which they only retain enough assets to cover
a fraction of their liabilities, the Bitcoin community is skeptical of this approach and exchanges are
generally expected to be fully solvent at all times.
A rudimentary approach to demonstrating assets is simply to transfer them to a fresh public key.
Mt. Gox did so once in 2011 in the face of customer skepticism, moving over B420k (then worth over
US$7 M) in a single large transaction. However, this demonstration undermined Mt. Gox’s privacy
by revealing which Bitcoin addresses they controlled. It was never repeated.
More importantly, a proof of reserves without a corresponding proof of liabilities is not suﬃcient
to prove solvency. A proof of liabilities might consist of an audit by a trusted accountant, as done for
example by Coinbase2 and Bitstamp3. This might be improved by allowing users to independently
verify they are in the dataset seen by the auditor, a step taken by Kraken4 and OKCoin5.
1Following convention, we refer to the protocol as ‘Bitcoin’ and the units of currency as ‘bitcoin’ or B.
2A. Antonopoulos, “Coinbase Review,” antonopoulos.com (Blog), 25 Feb 2014.
3E. Spaven, “Bitstamp Passes Audit Overseen by Bitcoin Developer Mike Hearn,” CoinDesk, 27 May 2014.
4N. Hajdarbegovic. “Kraken Bitcoin Exchange Passes ‘Proof of Reserves’ Cryptographic Audit,” CoinDesk, 24
Mar 2014.
5J. Southurst, “OKCoin Reveals BTC Reserves of 104% as China’s Exchanges Undergo Audits,” CoinDesk, 22
129
The notion of a cryptographic proof of liabilities, veriﬁable by any party with no trusted auditor,
was ﬁrst proposed by Maxwell [Wil14], although this initial proposal leaks information about the
number and size of customer accounts (see Section 7.2.2). These privacy issues (as well as those
inherent to a simple public proof of assets) have been cited by some exchanges (e.g., Kraken6) as a
reason to use a trusted auditor instead.
In this chapter we propose Provisions, a cryptographic proof of solvency scheme with the following
properties:
• no information is revealed about customer holdings
• the value of the exchange’s total total holdings is kept secret
• the exchange maintains unlinkability from its Bitcoin address(es) through an anonymity set
of arbitrary size
• multiple exchanges performing Provisions contemporaneously can prove they are not colluding
While the Maxwell proof of reserves is a straightforward use of a Merkle tree, a data structure
well known by Bitcoin community, Provisions employs somewhat heavier cryptography not found in
Bitcoin itself—e.g., homomorphic commitments and zero knowledge proofs. However, we demon-
strate that Provisions is eﬃcient enough in practice even for the largest of today’s exchanges to
conduct a daily proof of solvency, being computable by a single server in a few hours and requiring
proofs which are less than 20 GB in size. Given this practicality and the strong privacy guarantees,
we hope it will become the norm for exchanges to regularly compute a Provisions proof of solvency
which might go a long way to restoring conﬁdence in the Bitcoin ecosystem.
Limitations It is important to recognize that no proof of solvency (or any other type of audit) is
future proof, as exchanges can still be hacked at any time. Likewise, proving control of a quantity
of bitcoin does not guarantee the exchange itself will behave honestly in the future. It may simply
abscond with all of its customers funds after completing a Provisions proof. The best we can hope
Aug 2014.
6“Kraken Proof-of-Reserves Audit Process,” https://www.kraken.com/security/audit
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for is eﬃcient enough proofs to enable frequent and continual monitoring of the ﬁnancial health of
exchanges to quickly detect the loss of funds, which Provisions enables.
Provisions also requires customers to check individually that their balance has been included in
the proof of liabilities. This appears to be a fundamental limitation given our privacy goals that
a user’s account balance is not revealed to any other party. On the positive side, as long as some
users check and the exchange cannot predict conﬁdently which users will check, it runs a high risk
of detection if it cheats (see Section 7.5.3).
Provisions is also limited to proving ownership of accounts with a full public key on the blockchain
(not unused pay-to-pub-key-hash or pay-to-script-hash addresses which haven’t yet be been used or
multi-sig addresses). Removing this limitation is an interesting challenge for future work.
The work in this chapter is a collaborative eﬀort with a team from the computer science depart-
ment at Stanford University. The results of this chapter have been published in [DBB+15b].
7.2 Background
We assume the reader is familiar with Bitcoin [Nak08]. Bonneau et al. [BMC+15] provide an exten-
sive survey of Bitcoin, although a deep understanding is not needed for understanding Provisions.
The pertinent features are that each unit of bitcoin is usually redeemable by a speciﬁed public key7
and this information is maintained in a public data structure called the blockchain.
Note that the blockchain is an ever-growing log of transactions. Any proof of solvency will be
inherent to a single block, representing one snapshot of the state of the system. In the remainder of
the chapter we leave implicit the proof will be valid for a speciﬁc block number t. It is also possible
for the blockchain to fork (or “re-org”) in which case an apparently-valid proof at block t may not be
valid in the ﬁnal block number t. As is standard with Bitcoin transactions, the defense against this
is to wait until a block is conﬁrmed with high probability, typically after observing that 6 followup
7Technically, bitcoins are redeemable by a speciﬁc transaction script which can encode various spending conditions,
though in the vast majority of cases this is simply a public key signature and we will discuss Bitcoin as if this is the
only method.
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blocks have been published.
Bitcoin public keys which hold funds are interchangeably called accounts or addresses. We note
here that while we designed Provisions with Bitcoin in mind as it is the dominant cryptocurrency
today, it could easily be ported to similar cryptocurrencies which have the above properties.
A proof of solvency consists of two components. In the ﬁrst, the proof of liabilities, the exchange
proves the total value of bitcoin it owes to each of its users. In the second, the proof of assets,
the exchange proves the total value of bitcoin it has signing authority over. If the latter amount is
greater than or equal to the former, the exchange is considered solvent.
7.2.1 Exchange Structure and Holdings
Nearly all large Bitcoin exchanges operate by pooling customers’ funds into a small number of
large accounts. Typically for security reasons the keys for some of these accounts are kept on
oﬄine computers or in hardware security modules, requiring human action to authorize transactions
(commonly called cold storage).
One might ask why an exchange does not simply maintain a separate Bitcoin address for each
customer, enabling direct monitoring by each user of their funds on the public blockchain; a simple
mechanism that eschews the need for a more complicated cryptographic proof of solvency. By
itself, this scheme is not secure, as a malicious exchange might attempt to convince two users with
the same balance that a single address is holding funds for both of them (a variation of the clash
attack [VTK12] discussed later).
This model also has several key practical shortcomings. First, it prevents simple division of
money into hot and cold storage. Current exchanges can exist with a limited amount of money in
more vulnerable hot storage because, on aggregate, the number of withdrawals in a given day is
typically only a small amount of total holdings. This is similar to a large oﬄine bank which does
not carry enough cash in ATMs to cover all customer accounts, keeping substantial assets in secure
(but less accessible) storage.8
8Executing Provisions will require computation using all of an exchange’s private keys, including those for assets in
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Figure 23: The Merkle tree from the Maxwell protocol [Wil14] for proof of solvency. When a
customer desires to verify their account (e.g. dashed line node), only two nodes need to be sent to
the customer (bold line nodes).
Second, pooling assets means that transfers between customers can be eﬃciently settled by
changing each customers’ account balance without executing a transaction on the Bitcoin blockchain
(incurring a transaction fee and a wait of around an hour for conﬁrmation). Similarly, two exchanges
can aggregate multiple transactions between pairs of their customers into a single settlement payment
(referred to as netting). Minimizing reliance on the blockchain (especially for small transfers) is a
key beneﬁt of exchanges. By contrast, maintaining a separate Bitcoin account for each customer
requires “hitting the blockchain” with every transaction.
Finally, although it is not typically advertised, exchanges oﬀer a signiﬁcant privacy beneﬁt to
users as as pooling funds ensures that it is not easy for outside observers to link deposits and
withdrawals to the same individual [MPJ+13].
Thus, we consider the pooled assets model likely to persist and we have designed Provisions to
work in this model. If we combine these factors with maintaining the privacy of an exchange’s
addresses—proving that one owns (i.e., knows) a private key without disclosing which—zero knowl-
edge proofs appear inescapable.
cold storage. However, this can be done with human intervention at a predictable time and does not require network
access to the cold storage.
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7.2.2 Maxwell’s Proof of Liabilities
Maxwell proposed a protocol (summarized by Wilcox [Wil14]) that enables an exchange to prove
its total liabilities while allowing users to verify that their accounts are included in this total. The
exchange constructs a binary Merkle hash tree [Mer79] where each leaf node contains a customer’s
balance, as well as the hash of the balance concatenated with the customer id and a fresh nonce (i.e.,
a hash-based commitment). Each internal node stores the aggregate balance of its left child (lc) and
right child (rc), as well as the hash of its aggregate balance concatenated with the hash of its left
and right children. The root node stores the aggregate of all customers’ balances, representing the
total liabilities, and the exchange broadcasts the root node. This is illustrated in Figure 23.
When a customer wants to verify that their balance is included in the total liabilities declared by
the exchange, it is suﬃcient to send to the customer only part of the hash tree in order to perform
the veriﬁcation. Speciﬁcally, the exchange sends to the customer her nonce and the sibling node of
each node on the unique path from the customer’s leaf node to the root node. The other nodes on
the path, including the leaf node itself, do not need to be sent to the customer because they will
have suﬃcient information to reconstruct them. The customer eventually accepts that their balance
is included iﬀ their path terminates with the same root broadcast by the exchange.
While elegant, this protocol does not hide the value of the exchange’s total liabilities which is
published in the root node. While a rough sense of this value may be public knowledge, the exact
value may be sensitive commercial data. Furthermore, regular proofs will reveal precise changes in
the exchange’s holdings.
This protocol also leaks partial information about other customers’ balances. For example, if
a simple balanced tree is used then each customer’s proof reveals the exact balance of the sibling
account in the tree (although the account holder remains anonymous). More generally, each sibling
node revealed in a given users’ path to the root node reveals the total holdings of each customer in
that neighboring subtree. This could be mitigated somewhat by using an unbalanced tree so it is not
immediately clear how many customers are in any neighboring subtree, but the protocol inherently
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leaks some information. Provisions removes this problem entirely, revealing no information about
any users’ assets beyond the fact that the total is less than the exchange’s proven reserves.
7.2.3 Proof of Assets
Once an exchange establishes its total liabilities, it must prove it owns suﬃcient bitcoin to match
(or exceed) its liabilities. This proof of assets together with the proof of liabilities forms a proof
of solvency. Maxwell’s proof of assets does not preserve privacy. Instead, the exchange publicly
demonstrates control of a set of addresses holding at least as much bitcoin as the exchange’s total
liabilities. This demonstration of control might involve moving a challenge amount of bitcoin from
each account or signing a challenge message with the private key associated with each address.
Exchanges may be reluctant to do so for privacy and security concerns (revealing their internal
division of funds between accounts).
In Provisions, we enable the exchange to prove ownership of an anonymous subset of addresses
pulled from the blockchain. The total quantity of bitcoin across these addresses can then be deter-
mined, without being revealed, and proved to be equal or greater than the exchange’s total liabilities.
Control vs. Ownership
Any proof of assets, including Provisions, faces the inherent problem that the ability to use the
signing key of an address does not necessarily imply ownership of it. A malicious exchange may
collude with one or more bitcoin holders who agree to use their accounts to cover the exchange’s
liabilities. However, these partners may have no intention of ever making their holdings available to
the exchange’s customers.
An exchange might try consolidating its holdings into a single address to demonstrate that either
exchange or the colluder is risking their bitcoin by placing it under the other’s control. However,
there is no guarantee that the single address does not implement a shared access structure by a
threshold signature scheme [Gol14].
This problem is fundamental, as no system can cryptographically prove its intentions to return
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something of value to a given user if requested. This customer request will be made without cryp-
tographic authentication (e.g., password-authenticated) because by assumption exchange customers
are unwilling or unable to manage cryptographic keys. Otherwise, assets could be proved by sending
each customer’s bitcoins to a 1-out-of-2 multisig address redeemable by either the exchange or the
user [Wil14], providing a window for each customer to redeem their coins if desired. Again, we
assume this is impractical for most exchange customers.
Collusion Attacks
Another potential vulnerability is that a cabal of two or more malicious exchanges might collude by
using their own assets to participate in each other’s proof of assets, making each exchange appear
to control the total amount controlled by the cabal. With a public proof of assets, this would be
detected if done simultaneously (because the same addresses would appear in multiple exchanges’
proofs) while the transaction graph might reveal if assets are simply being moved around in a shell
game.
In Provisions, because the exchange’s addresses are kept conﬁdential, detection of this attack
becomes more challenging. However, in Section 7.4.6 we show an extension to the basic Provisions
protocol which enables exchanges to prove that they are not using the same assets as other exchanges
running the protocol. To do so, they publish an additional value which is unlinkable to their real
Bitcoin address, yet is a deterministic function of (and requires knowledge of) their private key. Thus,
if any two exchanges attempt to use the same bitcoin address in separate executions of Provisions,
they can be detected.
This extension imposes a small performance cost (see Section 7.6.4) and a small impact on the
exchange’s privacy as it reveals the number of addresses to which the exchange knows the private
key (see Section 7.5.2). Thus we leave it as an extension for now, as it will only become beneﬁcial




We let g and h be ﬁxed public generators of a group G of prime order q. Our implementation
uses the elliptic curve secp256k1 [Cer00] as the group G; this is the group used for Bitcoin ECDSA
signatures. Note that this allows us to work with existing Bitcoin public and private keys, although
we do not actually perform any ECDSA signatures. While implemented over elliptic curves, we use
the more conventional multiplicative notation (e.g., y = gx instead of Y = xG).
7.3.2 Bitcoin Balance Lookups
We assume that the Bitcoin blockchain is universally agreed upon and all parties can use it to
compute the quantity of bitcoin owned by each address. More precisely, for a Bitcoin public key
y ∈ G we use bal(y) to denote the balance associated with y. We assume bal(y) is an integer between
0 and MaxBTC for all y. We can represent any bitcoin account with MaxBTC = 251—the rules of
Bitcoin limit the total currency supply to 21M B, each divisible into a maximum of 10−8 atomic
units called satoshis. Note that satoshis are the true units of currency in Bitcoin, with B1 = 108
satoshis simply a convention to provide more human-friendly accounting units. In the remainder of
this chapter when we speak of account balances we will always be working with satoshis.
7.3.3 Commitments
Provisions makes heavy use of Pedersen commitments [Ped92]. Recall that the commitment to
a message m ∈ Zq is deﬁned as com = gm · hr where g and h are ﬁxed public elements of G
and the quantity r is chosen at random in Zq. We use the standard g from secp256k1 and derive h
deterministically by hashing the string Provisions. Recall that Pedersen commitments are perfectly
hiding so that com reveals no information about m.
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7.4 Solution: Provisions Protocol
7.4.1 Protocol Overview
The objective of Provisions is to enable an exchange E to publicly prove that it owns enough bitcoin
to cover all its customers’ balances such that (1) all customer accounts remain fully conﬁdential, (2)
no account contains a negative balance, (3) the exchange does not reveal its total liabilities or total
assets, and (4) the exchange does not reveal its Bitcoin addresses. Provisions consists of three main
protocols:
Protocol 7.1 - Proof of assets. In this protocol, the exchange selects a large set of public
keys PK from the blockchain that hold bitcoin to serve as an anonymity set for its own keys. The
exchange possesses the private keys to a subset of the public keys in PK. Next, the exchange creates
a commitment to its total assets and proves in zero-knowledge that the sum of balances held by the
public keys it owns (i.e. public keys for which it knows the secret key) is equal to the committed
value. This is done without revealing which public keys it owns.
Protocol 7.2 - Proof of liabilities. In this protocol, the exchange publishes a commitment to
each user’s account balance, revealing to each user individually the random factors used to commit
to the balance for their veriﬁcation. For each committed balance, it also proves it is a small positive
integer. These committed values are summed homomorphically to produce a commitment to the
exchange’s total liabilities.
Protocol 7.3 - Proof of solvency. Using the commitments to its total assets and liabilities
produced by the above two protocols, the exchange will homomorphically compute a commitment
to their diﬀerence and prove in zero-knowledge that this ﬁnal commitment is a commitment to
zero. This will prove that the total liabilities is exactly equal to the total assets (or, via a minor
modiﬁcation, that it is strictly less than the total assets).
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7.4.2 Proof of Assets
We begin with Protocol 7.1 which lets the exchange E generate a commitment to its total assets
along with a zero-knowledge proof that the exchange knows the private keys for a set of Bitcoin
addresses whose total value is equal to the committed value.
The exchange E chooses a set of Bitcoin public keys
PK = {y1, . . . , yn} ⊆ G
that will serve as an anonymity set (we will discuss choosing this in Section 7.6). We let x1, . . . , xn ∈
Zq be the corresponding secret keys so that yi = gxi for i = 1, . . . , n.
Let S be the exchange’s own set of Bitcoin addresses for which it knows the private keys. The
anonymity set PK must of course be a superset of the exchange’s own Bitcoin addresses so that
S ⊆ PK.
We use the booleans si ∈ {0, 1} to indicate which accounts the exchange controls in PK. We
set si = 1 whenever the exchange knows the private key xi for Bitcoin public key yi ∈ PK. The





Finally, it will be convenient to deﬁne
bi = gbal(yi) for i = 1, . . . , n.
Given the set PK, a veriﬁer can easily compute all the bi for itself using information in the Bitcoin
blockchain.
Proof of Assets Σ-Protocol
The exchange constructs Pedersen commitments to each si · bal(yi) for i ∈ [1, n] by choosing a
random vi ∈ Zq and computing
pi = hvi · bsii . (10)
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It remains to prove in zero-knowledge that ZAssets is valid. To do so the exchange publishes a few
additional auxiliary values. For each i ∈ [1, n] the exchange chooses a random ti ∈ Zq and publishes
li = ysii hti ∈ G (12)
which is a Pedersen commitment for si. Equivalently, these li can be written as
li = gxi·sihti
which is a Pedersen commitment to the quantity xi · si ∈ Zq. By setting xˆi = xi · si the equation
can be written as
li = gxˆihti (13)
Now, to prove that ZAssets is a commitment to the exchange’s assets the exchange needs to prove
that for every i ∈ [1, n] it knows si ∈ {0, 1}, vi, ti, xˆi ∈ Zq satisfying conditions (10), (12), and (13).
ZAssets can then be computed according to (11).
The exchange proves knowledge of the required values using the Σ-protocol presented in Proto-
col 7.1 along with a Σ-protocol to prove that each si is binary and known to the exchange. Proving
in zero-knowledge that a Pedersen commitment li is a commitment to a binary value is a standard
zero-knowledge proof.
The protocol can be made non-interactive using the standard Fiat-Shamir heuristic. It therefore
suﬃces to prove that the protocol is honest-veriﬁer zero knowledge. This is captured in the following
theorem:
Theorem 1 The Σ-protocol in Protocol 7.1 is a honest-veriﬁer zero knowledge proof of knowledge
of quantities
Assets and (si ∈ {0, 1}, vi, ti, xˆi ∈ Zq) for i ∈ [1, n]
that satisfy conditions (10),(11), (12) and (13) for all i ∈ [1, n].
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1. For i ∈ [1, n]
(a) E chooses u(1)i , u(2)i , u(3)i , u(4)i $←− Zq.


























(c) The veriﬁer replies with a challenge ci
$←− Zq
(d) E replies with:
rsi = u
(1)
i + ci · si, Response for si
rti = u
(2)
i + ci · ti, Response for ti
rxˆi = u
(3)
i + ci · xˆi, Response for xˆi
rvi = u
(4)
i + ci · vi, Response for vi






















i Verify statement (13)
(f) Run a zero knowledge proof on li to prove knowledge of si ∈ {0, 1}
2. The veriﬁer computes ZAssets =
∏n
i=1 pi Statement (11)
Protocol 7.1: Privacy-preserving proof of assets
(The proof of Theorem 1 is presented in the technical report [DBB+15a]).
The proof of knowledge convinces the veriﬁer that ZAssets is a commitment to the exchange’s
total assets. More precisely, the veriﬁer is convinced that
• ZAssets is a commitment to
∑n
i=1 si · bal(yi) ∈ Zq (by equation (11)), where si ∈ {0, 1}, and
• whenever si = 1 the exchange knows the corresponding private key xi ∈ Zq. To see why
observe that dividing equation (12) by (13) proves that when si = 1 the exchange knows
xˆi ∈ Zq such that gxˆi = yi, as required.
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That the proof is honest-veriﬁer zero knowledge implies that nothing is revealed about the total
assets, the si, or the xi, as required.
Proof length. The proof is linear in the anonymity set size n, requiring about 13n elements in Zq.
This is feasible even for large anonymity sets. We will discuss practical parameters in Section 7.6.
7.4.3 Proof of Liabilities
Protocol 7.2 enables the exchange E to veriﬁably commit to its total liabilities and convince all
clients that their balances were included in the commitment.
To provide some intuition behind the design of Protocol 7.2, consider the mapping of real cus-
tomers to entries on LiabList. Each real customer should have an entry in LiabList (i.e., the mapping
is a function) and no distinct customers should be given the same entry (i.e., the mapping should be
injective). Perhaps it would be ideal if all entries would correspond to customers (i.e., the mapping
were surjective) however this property cannot be enforced—E can always add fake users to the list,
but we ensure that doing so can only increase E ’s apparent liabilities.9
If two users have the same balance, a malicious E might try to point both users to the same
entry—in the voting literature, this is called a clash attack [VTK12]. To ensure an injective map-
ping, customers are provided an ID in line 1e which commits10 to unique information about the
customer usernamei (which may include their username, email address, and/or account number).
The commitment is binding, preventing the exchange from opening a CID to distinct data for dif-
ferent users. It is also hiding, preventing an adversary who knows the email address of a potential
customer from determining if that customer is in LiabList (or if a user is known to be a customer,
which CID they correspond to).
The exchange can add arbitrary accounts to the list. However, as long as accounts can only
add to the total liabilities (e.g., E cannot commit to a negative balance and assign it to a fake
9It might be in E’s interest to include fake users with a zero (or tiny) balance to obscure the total number of
customers it truly has.
10Unlike the other commitments used in Provisions, the commitment scheme used to produce CIDi need only
be binding and hiding, not additively homomorphic. We use a simpler hash-based commitment scheme instead of
Pedersen commitments.
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To veriﬁably compute its liabilities, E does:
1. For each customer Ci : 1 ≤ i ≤ c:
(a) Represent each Ci’s balance Balancei as an m-bit binary number (where m =
lg2 MaxBTC):
BinBalancei = 〈xi,0, xi,1, . . . , xi,m−1〉 , (then Balancei =
∑m−1
k=0 xi,k · 2k)
(b) Compute and publish a Pedersen commitment to each xi,k in the group G using
generators g and h:
yi,k = gxi,khri,k , ri,k
$←− Zq
(c) Compute a non-interactive proof of knowledge Πi of all ri,k and xi,k, and that every
xi,k is binary.




Then yi is a Pedersen commitment to Balancei because yi = gbalanceihri where ri =∑m−1
k=0 ri,k · 2k.
(e) Compute a fresh customer identiﬁer CIDi by picking a random nonce ni and commit-
ting Ci’s username: CIDi $← commit (usernamei, ni)
2. Homomorphically add the commitments to all customers balance into a single commitment





3. Publish the commitment to total liabilities ZLiabilities and the list LiabList of all customers’
tuples:
LiabList = 〈CIDi, yi,0, . . . , yi,m−1,Πi〉 for i = 1, . . . , c.
4. Every client Ci, upon login, is privately given usernamei, ri and a string n′i to open the
commitment CIDi. The client veriﬁes that usernamei = open (CIDi, n′i) and locates it in
LiabList. The client then veriﬁes that its balance is included as follows:
(a) compute yi =
∏m−1
k=0 (yi,k)(2
k) and verify that yi = gbalanceihri ,
(b) verify that ZLiabilities =
∏c
i=1 yi, and
(c) verify the proof Πi for i = 1, . . . , c.
Note that steps (b) and (c) can be carried out by any public auditor and need not be done
by every client.
Protocol 7.2: Privacy-preserving proof of liabilities
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user account), adding accounts is detrimental to a malicious E ’s goal as it could only increase its
apparent liabilities. Since negative numbers do not technically exist in modular arithmetic, the
precise requirement is that when added together, the sum will never cause a reduction mod q where
q ≈ 2256 for our group G =secp256k1.
To enforce this, E provides a range proof (adapted from [Mao98]) for each committed balance
showing it is from a ‘small’ interval between 0 and MaxBTC = 251. This makes it easy to ensure a
modular reduction will never occur, as long as the exchange has fewer than 2205 accounts.
The range proof works by providing a bit-by-bit commitment of the account balance in binary
representation, proving each bit is a 0 or 1 (using the proof of knowledge, mentioned above, twice
with conjunctive logic [CDS94]), and showing how many bits the number contains (an upper-bound
on its maximum value). This committed binary representation is homomorphically converted into
an integer and homomorphically summed.
Theorem 2 Protocol 7.2 is a honest-veriﬁer zero knowledge proof of knowledge of quantities
Liabilities and
(xi,k ∈ {0, 1}, ri,k ∈ Zq) for i ∈ [1, c] and k ∈ [0,m − 1]

















for all i ∈ [1, c] and k ∈ [0,m − 1].
(The proof of Theorem 2 is presented in the technical report [DBB+15a]).
This step leads to the bulk of the proof size (see Section 7.6). Zero-knowledge succinct non-
interactive arguments of knowledge (zk-SNARKs) [BSCG+13] can be used as an alternate version of
this protocol. The proof generated by this protocol, however, is signiﬁcantly shorter (constant in the
number of users) at the expense of a large common reference string, the use of heavier cryptographic
tools and a trusted setup step.
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7.4.4 Customer Veriﬁcation
We assume that customers each verify LiabList to conﬁrm the existence of their accounts and the cor-
rectness of their balances yi and ID commitments CIDi. A malicious E which omits some customers
will only be detected if at least one of those customers checks, although this is an inherent limitation
given our privacy goals which require that only customers themselves can tell if their balance has
been included or not. This limit applies equally, for example, to Maxwell’s protocol.
The required checks from individual customers are fortunately quite lightweight. Each customer
Ci receives from E their usernamei, ri and ni. They then locate in LiabList, with a hint from E , their
tuple:
〈CIDi, yi,0, . . . , yi,m−1,Πi〉
Using ni, they can open their commitment CIDi and verify that it commits to usernamei. Next,
using ri the customer checks that yi is indeed a commitment to their true account balance Balancei.
This is shown in Step (4a) and is a simple calculation.
The other two veriﬁcation steps, (4b) and (4c), can be carried out by any party—we assume a
public auditor will do so on behalf of most customers, so that individuals will typically not verify
the entire proof (though they are free do to so). We discuss the cost of verifying the entire proof
further in Section 7.6.
7.4.5 Proof of Solvency
1. E runs Protocol 7.1 to veriﬁably generate a commitment ZAssets to its total assets.
2. E runs Run Protocol 7.2 to veriﬁably generate a commitment ZLiabilities to its total assets
and a list LiabList of its liabilities.
3. E computes ZAssets · ZLiabilities−1 = ZAssets−Liabilities.
4. E proves in zero-knowledge that ZAssets−Liabilities is a commitment to the value 0.
Protocol 7.3: Complete privacy-preserving proof of solvency
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Protocol 7.3 speciﬁes how E can complete the proof of solvency given commitments to total
assets and liabilities from Protocols 7.1 and 7.2. The proof that ZAssets−Liabilities is a commitment
to 0 (line 4) is a simple Schnorr ZK proof of knowledge of the discrete log of ZAssets−Liabilities to the
base h, since ZAssets−Liabilities = g0hk for a value k known to the exchange and if ZAssets−Liabilities were
a commitment to any other value then computing its discrete log to the base h would reveal the
discrete log of h relative to g.
Variation for exchanges with a surplus If the exchange is actually running a surplus (total
assets are greater than total liabilities), this can easily be handled with a simple modiﬁcation—the
exchange can create a commitment to its surplus, ZSurplus, and apply the same range proof used for
customer balances to prove that this is a small positive number. It then replaces line 3 in Protocol 7.3
with:
ZAssets · ZLiabilities−1 · ZSurplus−1
This approach reveals that a surplus exists. The exchange can also prove the magnitude of its
surplus if desired by opening the commitment ZSurplus. Alternatively, to hide even the existence of
any surplus, the exchange could simply move its surplus into a separate address which is not included
in the addresses S used in its proof of assets, or include the value of the surplus in a number of fake
customers’ accounts which will add to its apparent liabilities.
Variation for fractional-reserve exchanges Fractional reserve banking, in which an exchange
promises to keep assets equal to only a fraction ρ of its total liabilities instead of all of them, has been
frowned upon by many in the Bitcoin community and not seen signiﬁcant deployment. However if
this approach becomes more popular in the future, it is easy to modify Provisions to handle this case
by modifying Protocol 7.3 to commit to a modiﬁed balance fi(Balancei) instead of the customer’s
true balance Balancei. Each user can then check during veriﬁcation that fi was computed correctly
on their true balance. Simple fractional reserves could be implemented by deﬁning fi(x) = ρ · x for
all users. It would also be straightforward to deﬁne fi(x) = ρi · x with a diﬀerent ρi for each user if,
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for example, some users’ accounts are fully-guaranteed (ρi = 1) while others are only fractionally-
guaranteed (ρi < 1). Arbitrary other functions are possible, with a natural example from traditional
ﬁnance being guaranteeing a user’s assets up to some maximum value.
Finally, an exchange can also prove that it is running a surplus of proportion ρ by setting
fi(x) = (1 + ρ) · x, with a “fractional surplus” eﬀectively being the inverse of a fractional reserve.
7.4.6 Proof of Non-Collusion
Recall from Section 7.2.3 that the privacy guarantees of Provisions introduce the risk that a cabal of
insolvent exchanges colluding by covering each exchanges’ individual liabilities with their collective
assets. In eﬀect, the assets of a single Bitcoin address can be used in the proof of solvency for
multiple exchanges. This can be done by having the exchanges contribute to a set of joint NIZKPs
of their keys (e.g., using divertable ZK [BFP+01]).
The simplest defense is for each exchange to choose an anonymity set PK which is smaller than
the set of all public keys and where each exchange’s set is disjoint from the anonymity set of all other
exchanges. This ensures that each exchange is proving solvency using assets it owns and without
the help of other exchanges. The diﬃculty with this approach is that there may not be suﬃciently
many addresses on the Bitcoin blockchain to accommodate strong privacy for all the exchanges. In
the long run, if exchanges come to collectively control the majority of all bitcoins, we would like
them to be able to use each other as an anonymity set.
Extension to Proof of Assets We can obtain a stronger defense by extending Protocol 7.1 with a
few additional steps. Our goal is to ensure that the assets of every Bitcoin address is used in at most
one proof of solvency. Recall that the exchange has a set of Bitcoin signing keys PK = {y1, . . . , yn}
where yi = gxi for i ∈ [1, n] . The exchange knows the secret keys xi for some subset of these public
keys. We use indicator variables s1, . . . , sn ∈ {0, 1} such that si = 1 when the exchange knows the
secret key xi and si = 0 otherwise.
We extend Protocol 7.1 to force every exchange to also compute the list L = {hxˆi =
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hxi·si for i ∈ [1, n]} which is randomly permuted and published. Note that when si = 1 the cor-
responding element in L is hxi and when si = 0 the corresponding element is simply 1 ∈ G, the
identity element. Thus L is a random permutation of the exchange’s Bitcoin public keys, but using
the base h instead of g.
We require the exchange to prove that L is correctly constructed (i.e., a permutation of
hxˆ1 , . . . , hxˆn) using a zero knowledge proof used as a component of the Neﬀ mix net [Nef01]. That
zero-knowledge proof is used to prove that a given list 2 = {hz1 , . . . , hzn} is a permutation and base
change of another given list 1 = {gz1 , . . . , gzn}. This Neﬀ proof thus proves that the published list
L is constructed correctly. It is a simple and eﬃcient proof, requiring 8n group elements (8 for each
account) and 4n additional exponentiations during construction and veriﬁcation.
We show below that the list L reveals no information about the E ’s Bitcoin addresses beyond
the number of addresses ν controlled by E . Note that ν is not revealed by the basic protocol
(Protocol 7.1). We’ll return to the implications of making this information public in Section 7.5.2
but this is one reason (in addition to added complexity) why we present this as an optional protocol
extension.
Now, suppose two exchanges collude and use the same Bitcoin address y = gx in their proof of
solvency. Then hx will appear in the L list of both exchanges. In other words, the L lists of these
two exchanges will have a non-trivial intersection.
Since every exchange is required to publish its list L, an auditor can simply check that these lists
are mutually disjoint (ignoring the elements 1 ∈ G). If so, then the auditor is assured that every
Bitcoin address is used in at most one proof of solvency and this holds even if all the exchanges use
the same anonymity set PK.
An important security requirement is that all exchanges run the extension at the same time—
barring this, a simple attack is for exchanges to move bitcoins from one address to another in between
runs of the protocol so that the same funds can be used but with a diﬀerent value for hxˆi = hxi·si in
each L (since xi will have changed). Fortunately, the blockchain already provides an easy method
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of synchronization. Exchanges simply need to agree on a common block number (say, every 240th
block to run the protocol daily) and all run the protocol based on the state of the blockchain up to
that block. No further synchronization is required; all exchanges can run the protocol and publish
their proofs independently and any assets used by more than one exchange will be detectable.
It remains to argue that the list L reveals no information about the exchange’s Bitcoin addresses
beyond the number of addresses. This follows directly from the Decision Diﬃe-Hellman (DDH)
assumption which is believed to hold in the secp256k1 group. DDH states that given the tuple
〈g, h, hx〉, the quantity gx is computationally indistinguishable from a random element of G. There-
fore, given the list L it is not possible to distinguish the n-bit string (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ {0, 1}n from a
random bit string of the same length.
7.5 Security Discussion
7.5.1 Security Deﬁnition
We now present a general deﬁnition of a privacy-preserving proof of solvency. We say a function ν(k)
is negligible if for all positive polynomials p(·), there is a suﬃciently large k such that ν(k) < 1/p(k).
Let A and A′ denote mappings (y = gx) → bal(y) where A ⊆ A′, y is the public key corresponding
to a Bitcoin address with private key x and bal(y) is the amount of currency, or assets, observably
spendable by this key on the blockchain.
Let L denote a mapping ID →  where  is the amount of currency, or liabilities, owed by the
exchange to each user identiﬁed by the unique identity ID.
Deﬁnition 19 (Valid Pair) We say that A and L are a valid pair with respect to a positive integer





ID∈L L[ID] ≥ 0 and
2. 0 ≤ L[ID] ≤ MaxBTC. 
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Consider an interactive protocol ProveSolvency run between an exchange E and user U such that
1. outputProveSolvencyE (1k,MaxBTC,A,L,A′) = ø
2. outputProveSolvencyU (1k,MaxBTC,A′, ID, ) ∈ {Accept,Reject}
For brevity, we refer to these as outE and outU respectively.
Deﬁnition 20 (Privacy-Preserving Proof of Solvency) A privacy-preserving proof of sol-
vency is a probabilistic polynomial-time interactive protocol ProveSolvency, with inputs/outputs
as above, such that the following properties hold:
1. Correctness. If A and L are a valid pair and L[ID] = , then Pr[outU = Accept] = 1.
2. Soundness. If A and L are instead not a valid pair, or if L[ID] = , then Pr[outU =
Reject] ≥ 1 − ν(k).
3. Ownership. For all valid pairs A and L, if Pr[outU = Accept] = 1, then the exchange
must have ‘known’ the private keys associated with the public keys in A; i.e., there exists an
extractor that, given A, L, and rewindable black-box access to E , can produce x for all y ∈ A.
4. Privacy. A potentially dishonest user interacting with an honest exchange cannot learn
anything about a valid pair A and L beyond its validity and L[ID] (and possibly |A| and
|L|); i.e., even a cheating user cannot distinguish between an interaction using the real pair A
and L and any other (equally sized) valid pair Aˆ and Lˆ such that Lˆ[ID] = L[ID]. 
Theorem 3 Provisions, as speciﬁed in Protocol 7.3, is a privacy-preserving proof of solvency.
(The proof of Theorem 3 is presented in the technical report [DBB+15a]).
7.5.2 Anonymity Sets
Although Theorem 3 is true, in the case that the protocol extension of Section 7.4.6 is used, the
number of Bitcoin addresses ν controlled by the exchange is revealed as well as the size of the
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anonymity set n = |PK| (which includes the ν addresses). For eﬃciency reasons, exchanges may
opt to use smaller anonymity sets than the set of all public keys on the blockchain; in particular, if
the number of keys grows unexpectedly in the future. In such a case, the exchange must be aware
that this might leak some meaningful information about what E ’s total assets are.
Speciﬁcally, the adversary can determine that E ’s assets consist of one of the (nν) subsets of
the anonymity set PK. We remark that E can easily control n and can also control ν (by splitting






e.g., ν = 25 and n = 250 already yields ≈ 2114 candidates. That said, we have no idea what
types of external information might be useful for eliminating unlikely or impossible totals from
this set (e.g., the adversary’s corruption of customers may provides them with a lower bound on
the total assets), or for whittling n down by eliminating addresses known or suspected not to be
controlled by the exchange. Research on deanonymizing Bitcoin addresses, e.g., through clustering
and reidentiﬁcation [MPJ+13], has demonstrated that Bitcoin’s anonymity is limited (see [BMC+15]
for a survey).
If an exchange conducts proofs of solvency on a regular basis (or more than once), each anonymity
set should be based closely on the anonymity set used previously—choosing independent anonymity
sets could reveal the exchange’s addresses by intersecting the sets. Exchanges can remove addresses
from their anonymity set if the criteria for doing so is independent of whether the exchange owns
the address or not. For example, it might remove addresses once the balance is under a certain
threshold. However, generally, anonymity sets should grow over time with new addresses (some
owned by the exchange and some as cover) being added to the set.
We leave the process of developing and analyzing a heuristic for forming an anonymity set (in
terms of size of n and ν and the distribution of amounts across the ν accounts) as future work. For
the current state of Bitcoin at the time of writing, we show in Section 7.6 that it is reasonable for




Although Theorem 3 is true, it may fall short of an ideal level of user veriﬁcation. Speciﬁcally, a
proof of solvency enables user veriﬁcation, but it does not guarantee that users actually perform the
veriﬁcation. Consider a malicious E that does not correctly include some set of users accounts—by
either omitting them or zeroing their balances. Assume the exchange has U users, F (for fraudulent)
entries, and that a random subset A ⊂ U of users choose to audit the correctness of LiabList. In this










, which is closely bounded
from above by min[(1 − A/U)F , (1 − F/U)A] (cf. the probability of a malicious election authority
being caught modifying ballot receipts in a cryptographic voting system [CCC+08]). This probability
decreases close-to-exponentially in F and A. Due to the approximation, we conservatively conclude
the probability of being caught is high, instead of overwhelming.
Next, one might question the assumption that each customer is equally likely to verify LiabList.
However, it is reasonable that the distribution skews in the direction of customers with high bal-
ances (and thus more at stake) being more likely to check. This is actually beneﬁcial, because the
probability of catching a malicious exchange does not depend on the amount of bitcoin zeroed out.
In other words, zeroing out the largest account is equivalent to zeroing out the smallest in terms of
being caught, yet the former action better beneﬁts the adversary’s goal of lowering its liabilities.
We also note that Provisions as described does not provide dispute resolution. If a user ﬁnds
their account missing or balance incorrect, they do not have suﬃcient cryptographic evidence that
this is the case [KTV10]. The issue appears unsolvable cryptographically. Recall that the primary
motivation for users keeping funds with an exchange is to avoid needing to remember long-term
cryptographic secrets, therefore exchanges must be able to execute user orders and change their bal-
ance without cryptographic authentication from the user (e.g., password authentication). Resolving
this will likely require legal regulation. Users who dislike an exchange may also falsely claim that
veriﬁcation of their accounts failed, and it is not possible to judge if the user or the exchange is
correct in this case based on a Provisions transcript alone.
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Lastly, we note that if a user does verify their account, they should use a veriﬁcation tool other
than one provided by the exchange itself; such a tool could be automated to increase participa-
tion. All of the issues discussed in this remark deserve followup work to ensure that Provisions is
implemented in practice in such a way that users are likely to perform auditing and to do so correctly.
7.6 Performance Evaluation
7.6.1 Asymptotic Performance
Provisions scales linearly in proof size, construction and veriﬁcation time with respect to its inputs:
the proof of assets scales with the size of the anonymity set and the proof of liabilities scales with
the number of customer accounts. The ﬁnal proof of solvency given an encryption of the total assets
and an encryption of the total liabilities is constant and in practice is negligible. All of the linear
parts of the protocol can be run in parallel and require only associative aggregations to compute
homomorphic sums, meaning the protocol is straightforward to parallelize.
Speciﬁcally the proof of assets is linear in n, the number of public keys in the anonymity set,
regardless of the size of S, the total number of accounts actually owned by E , requiring 13n integers
from Zq in total. The proof of liabilities is linear with respect to the number of customers c. It is
dominated by m+1 elements from Zq used to commit to each bit of each customer’s balance, where
m = lg2 MaxBTC = 51. If needed, an exchange could slightly reduce proof sizes by capping the
size of assets below or reducing precision. For example, with m = 32 the exchange could still include
accounts worth up to US$1 billion with precision to the nearest penny. However, we’ll assume full
precision is desired in our implementation.
Full veriﬁcation of the protocol requires approximately equal time to the construction of the
proof. For customers opting to only validate their own balance’s correct inclusion in the proof and
trust a third party to run the full veriﬁcation, veriﬁcation is much simpler, the customer to check
their CID value with a single hash and check that yi is a correct commitment their balance which
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requires only m + 2 group operations.
7.6.2 Incremental Updates
As described in Section 7.1 the protocol is intended to be run often (e.g. daily) to give continued
proof of solvency. A natural question is whether it is possible to update the proof incrementally. We
will consider updates to the anonymity set, to the assets proof and to the liabilities proof separately.
The full set of addresses (anonymity set + owned addresses) used in the proof is public. As such
any newly created addresses by the exchange need to be published. To hide these new addresses
it is important to additionally add addresses to the anonymity set. As with the anonymity set
in general and discussed in Section 7.5.2 it is important to choose in such a way that the actual
addresses are indistinguishable from it. A proper implementation would for example add addresses
deterministically (e.g. all addresses with balances over X bitcoin).
The asset proof is almost perfectly separable, in that there is a separate and independent compo-
nent for each address in the full set of addresses. The components for new addresses and addresses
with changed balance need to be updated. However, it is not necessary to update the components
of all other addresses. This is especially useful for cold addresses, which do not have a private key
easily accessible. The set of addresses which are new or have changed balances is public on the
blockchain anyways and thus no additional information is leaked.
The liabilities proof mainly consists of a commitment to each customer’s balance and a proof that
said balance is within a range. For all new users and users whose balance changed the commitment
the proof needs to be redone. For the other users it is not technically necessary to redo the proof.
However, not changing the proofs for customers whose balance remained unchanged will leak how
many users were actively using their account between the two proofs. If the complete proof were
redone then this information would remain private. If an exchange were to accept this privacy leak
it could drastically reduce the size of the proof updates.
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7.6.3 Implementation and Setup
To test the performance of our protocol in practice we created a prototype implementation of our
protocol in Java 1.8. All cryptographic operations are performed using BouncyCastle,11 a standard
cryptographic library for Java which is also used by the popular bitcoinj implementation of Bitcoin
in Java. We performed tests on a commodity server with 2 E5-2680 v2 Xenon processors and 128GB
RAM. The max heap size of the JVM was set to the default 256MB. Our implementation assumes
a previously downloaded and veriﬁed blockchain, to enable eﬃcient balance lookups and selection
of an appropriate anonymity set.
An exchange could achieve optimum anonymity by choosing the anonymity set PK to be the
entire set of unclaimed transaction outputs (called the UTXO set) which represents all potentially
active Bitcoin accounts. The size of the UTXO set has steadily increased throughout Bitcoin’s
history [BMC+15] and at the time of this writing contains approximately 17M addresses. However,
the vast majority of these are “dust” addresses holding only a tiny value. There are fewer than
500,000 addresses with a balance of more than 0.1 BTC, which collectively control 99.8% of all
bitcoin.12 Some of these addresses are unusable for the protocol because they do not have public
keys available (i.e., they are pay-to-pub-key-hash addresses with only a hash of the public key visible
in the block chain), others have questionable anonymity value as they have never been moved since
being mined and exchanges are not expected to be mining their own bitcoin directly. Thus, we
expect that fewer than a million addresses are available to be used in the anonymity set in practice
We tested our implementation with anonymity sets up to 500,000.
On the proof of liabilities side, Coinbase is thought to be one the largest exchanges and currently
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Figure 25: Performance of Protocol 7.2 (proof of liabilities).
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7.6.4 Experimental Results
Our experiments conﬁrm that Provisions should be practical even for large exchanges desiring strong
anonymity and full precision to represent customer accounts. Figure 24 shows proof sizes and
computation times for Protocol 7.1, the proof of assets, varying the anonymity set size n from 10 to
500,000. Figure 25 shows proof sizes and computation times for Protocol 7.2, the proof of liabilities,
varying the number of customers c from 1,000 to 2,000,000. We tested with m = 51, supporting
full precision of account balances. Reducing m would lead to proportional reductions in proof sizes
and construction times. Note that, given realistic parameters today, it appears that the proof of
liabilities is the more expensive protocol today for a large exchange.
We report numbers without the protocol extension from Section 7.4.6 to ensure assets are not
shared between colluding exchanges executing the protocol contemporaneously. This extensions
would increase the size and construction time of the proof of assets by about 413 ≈ 30%. Because the
proof of liabilities is likely much larger, this extension makes only a minor impact on performance.
We omit performance ﬁgures for Protocol 7.3 as this protocol is constant size and negligible
compared to Protocols 7.1 and 7.2. Similarly, veriﬁcation time for individual clients depends only
m and not the anonymity set or number of other customers. In our implementation it took fewer
than 10 ms.
7.7 Summary
Stu Feldman has outlined a roadmap for technical maturity (as quoted in [Gee01]):
1. You have a good idea;
2. You can make your idea work;
3. You can convince a (gullible) friend to try it;





5. Other people are asked why they are not doing it.
Given the shaky track record of Bitcoin exchanges, the onus upon an exchange to perform some
kind of audit is nearing level 5. However, cryptographic solvency proofs, like the Maxwell protocol,
are lagging behind around level 3. Our belief is that the privacy implications of Maxwell are hindering
it—there are good reasons for an exchange not to reveal which addresses it controls, the scale of
its total holdings, or potentially leak information about large customers’ account sizes. Provisions
removes these barriers. While cryptographic proofs of solvency still have inherent limits, namely
that control of an address’ key at present does not guarantee the future ability to use that key to
refund customers, we believe that with Provisions there are no longer good reasons for an exchange




In this thesis, we address the problem of secure data sharing while protecting the sensitive infor-
mation about the individuals referenced in the data. Inspired by real-life scenarios, we develop
multi-party protocols for sharing, integrating, and auditing relational and set-valued data for diﬀer-
ent application scenarios. The proposed protocols consider security in the semi-honest and malicious
threat models, guarantee two privacy models, namely diﬀerential privacy and LKC -privacy, preserve
data utility for data mining, and support public veriﬁability for set-valued data integration and Bit-
coin exchange solvency.
8.1 Summary
We begin by studying the problem of secure and privacy-preserving data outsourcing. Motivated
by the process followed by Population Data BC (PopData) for sharing patient-speciﬁc health data
received from several hospitals, health organizations and government agencies, we propose a secure
cloud-based data outsourcing and query processing framework that simultaneously preserves the
conﬁdentiality of the data and the query requests, while providing diﬀerential privacy guarantee
on query outputs. The framework is secure in the semi-honest adversarial model (Chapter 4).
Next, we study the problem of secure and privacy-preserving set-valued data integration with public
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veriﬁability. We propose a protocol for integrating person-speciﬁc data from two or more data
owners, while providing diﬀerential privacy guarantee and maintaining an eﬀective level of utility on
the released data for the purpose of data mining. The protocol is secure in the malicious adversarial
model with dishonest majority while supporting public veriﬁability (Chapter 5). Next, we study
the problem of secure and privacy-preserving relational data integration. We propose a protocol for
high-dimensional data integration from three or more data owners, with guaranteed LKC -privacy on
the output mashup data. The protocol is secure in the semi-honest adversarial model (Chapter 6).
Finally, we study the problem of secure and privacy-preserving data auditing in Bitcoin. Motivated
by the collapse and ongoing bankruptcy of the oldest and largest exchange, Mt. Gox, which lost
over US$450M in customer assets, we propose a cryptographic proof of solvency scheme for Bitcoin
exchanges such that no information is revealed about the exchanges customer holdings, the value
of the exchanges total holdings is kept secret, and multiple exchanges performing the same proof of
solvency can contemporaneously prove they are not colluding. The protocol is secure in the malicious
adversarial model with public veriﬁability (Chapter 7).
In a nutshell, the main contribution of this thesis is to develop secure multi-party protocols for
diﬀerent data sharing scenarios while ensuring diﬀerent notions of privacy.
8.2 Looking Ahead
Due to the large size and high complexity of the data being collected everyday, the demand for
secure and privacy-preserving protocols for data sharing will continue to increase. We believe in the
future more researchers will focus on achieving public veriﬁability in the context of data integration
and outsourcing, so processes become more transparent and individuals gain more conﬁdence about
the handling of their personal data. We also believe that technological solutions cannot fully solve
the problem of secure and privacy preserving data sharing, and there is a need for regulations and
policies that deﬁne frameworks and guidelines for data sharing.
Weitzner et al. [WABL+08] advocated that our society should focus on holding parties responsible
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for their data usage to oﬀset the problem of security and privacy:
“Hide-it-or-lose-it perspective dominates technical and public-policy approaches to
fundamental social questions of online privacy, copyright, and surveillance. Yet
it is increasingly inadequate for a connected world where information is easily
copied and aggregated, and automated correlations and inferences across multi-
ple databases uncover information even when it is not revealed explicitly. As an
alternative, accountability must become a primary means through which society
addresses appropriate use.”
Future research in data sharing will also focus on information accountability, not as an alternative,
however, but as a complement to the technical and legislative solutions.
161
Bibliography
[ABC+08] M. Abdalla, M. Bellare, D. Catalano, E. Kiltz, T. Kohno, T. Lange, J. Malone-Lee,
G. Neven, P. Paillier, and H. Shi. Searchable encryption revisited: Consistency proper-
ties, relation to anonymous ibe, and extensions. Journal of Cryptology (JC), 21(3):350–
391, March 2008.
[ABCK09] M. Adjedj, J. Bringer, H. Chabanne, and B. Kindarji. Biometric identiﬁcation over
encrypted data made feasible. In Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on
Information Systems Security (ICISS), pages 86–100, 2009.
[AD74] J. H. Ahrens and U. Dieter. Computer methods for sampling from gamma, beta,
poisson and bionomial distributions. Computing, 12(3):223–246, 1974.
[ADFH14] M. Arafati, G. G. Dagher, B. C. M. Fung, and P. C. K. Hung. D-mash: A framework
for privacy-preserving data-as-a-service mashups. In Proceedings of the 8th IEEE
International Conference on Cloud Computing (CLOUD), page 8, June 2014.
[AKSX04] R. Agrawal, J. Kiernan, R. Srikant, and Y. Xu. Order preserving encryption for
numeric data. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGMOD International Conference on
Management of Data (SIGMOD), pages 563–574, 2004.
[AMFD12] D. Alhadidi, N. Mohammed, B. C. M. Fung, and M. Debbabi. Secure distributed
framework for achieving ε-diﬀerential privacy. In Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing
Technologies (PoPETs), 2012.
162
[BAAD14] S. Barouti, F. Aljumah, D. Alhadidi, and M. Debbabi. Secure and privacy-preserving
querying of personal health records in the cloud. In Data and Applications Security
and Privacy XXVIII (LNCS), volume 8566, pages 82–97. 2014.
[BBO07] M. Bellare, A. Boldyreva, and A. O’Neill. Deterministic and eﬃciently searchable
encryption. In Proceedings of the 27th Annual International Cryptology Conference
on Advances in Cryptology (CRYPTO), pages 535–552, 2007.
[BBS98] M. Blaze, G. Bleumer, and M. Strauss. Divertible protocols and atomic proxy cryp-
tography. In Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT (LNCS), volume 1403, pages
127–144. 1998.
[BBS04] D. Boneh, X. Boyen, and H. Shacham. Short group signatures. In Advances in
Cryptology - CRYPTO (LNCS), volume 3152, pages 41–55. 2004.
[BCK09] J. Bringer, H. Chabanne, and B. Kindarji. Error-tolerant searchable encryption. In
Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC), pages
768–773, 2009.
[BDCOP04] D. Boneh, G. Di Crescenzo, R. Ostrovsky, and G. Persiano. Public key encryption
with keyword search. In Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT (LNCS), volume
3027, pages 506–522. 2004.
[BDDY08] F. Bao, R. H. Deng, X. Ding, and Y. Yang. Private query on encrypted data in
multi-user settings. In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Information
Security Practice and Experience (ISPEC), pages 71–85, 2008.
[BDMN05] A. Blum, C. Dwork, F. McSherry, and K. Nissim. Practical privacy: the SuLQ frame-
work. In Proceedings of the 24th ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART Symposium on
Principles of Database Systems (PODS), pages 128–138, 2005.
163
[Bel11] M. Belenkiy. E-Cash. In Handbook of Financial Cryptography and Security. CRC,
2011.
[Ben75] J. L. Bentley. Multidimensional binary search trees used for associative searching.
Communications of the ACM, 18(9):509–517, 1975.
[Ben87] J. D. C. Benaloh. Veriﬁable Secret-ballot Elections. PhD thesis, Yale University, 1987.
[BF03] D. Boneh and M. Franklin. Identity-based encryption from the Weil pairing. SIAM
Journal of Computing, 32(3):586–615, 2003.
[BFP+01] O. Baudron, P.-A. Fouque, D. Pointcheval, J. Stern, and G. Poupard. Practical multi-
candidate election system. In Proceedings of the 20th Annual ACM Symposium on
Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC), pages 274–283, 2001.
[BGV11] S. Benabbas, R. Gennaro, and Y. Vahlis. Veriﬁable delegation of computation over
large datasets. In Proceedings of the 31st annual conference on Advances in cryptology
(CRYPTO), pages 111–131, 2011.
[BKM05] L. Ballard, S. Kamara, and F. Monrose. Achieving eﬃcient conjunctive keyword
searches over encrypted data. In Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on
Information and Communications Security (ICICS), pages 414–426, 2005.
[BKOSI07] D. Boneh, E. Kushilevitz, R. Ostrovsky, and W. E. Skeith III. Public key encryption
that allows pir queries. In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO (LNCS), volume 4622,
pages 50–67. 2007.
[BL13] K. Bache and M. Lichman. UCI Machine Learning Repository. University of California,
Irvine, School of Information and Computer Sciences, 2013.
[BLL06] J. Byun, D. Lee, and J. Lim. Eﬃcient conjunctive keyword search on encrypted data
storage system. In Public Key Infrastructure (LNCS), volume 4043, pages 184–196.
2006.
164
[Blo70] B. H. Bloom. Space/time trade-oﬀs in hash coding with allowable errors. Communi-
cations of the ACM, 13(7):422–426, July 1970.
[BLS01] D. Boneh, B. Lynn, and H. Shacham. Short signatures from the weil pairing. In
Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on the Theory and Application of
Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology (ASIACRYPT), pages
514–532, 2001.
[BLST10] R. Bhaskar, S. Laxman, A. Smith, and A. Thakurta. Discovering frequent patterns
in sensitive data. In Proceedings of the 16th ACM SIGKDD International Conference
on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (SIGKDD), 2010.
[BM70] R. Bayer and E. McCreight. Organization and maintenance of large ordered indices.
In Proceedings of the ACM SIGFIDET Workshop on Data Description, Access and
Control (DDAC), pages 107–141, 1970.
[BMC+15] J. Bonneau, A. Miller, J. Clark, A. Narayanan, J. A. Kroll, and E. W. Felten. Research
Perspectives and Challenges for Bitcoin and Cryptocurrencies. Proceedings of the IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy (S & P), 2015.
[BNVH12] E.-O. Blass, G. Noubir, and T. D. Vo-Huu. Epic: Eﬃcient privacy-preserving counting
for mapreduce. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2012/452, 2012. http://eprint.
iacr.org/2003/216/.
[BOO10] A. Beimel, E. Omri, and I. Orlov. Protocols for multiparty coin toss with dishonest
majority. In Proceedings of the 30th Annual Conference on Advances in Cryptology
(CRYPTO), pages 538–557, 2010.
[BR11] E. Barker and A. Roginsky. Transitions: Recommendation for transitioning the use of
cryptographic algorithms and key lengths. Technical report, Department of Commerce,
2011.
165
[Bra06] F. Brandt. Eﬃcient cryptographic protocol design based on distributed el gamal
encryption. In Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Information Security
and Cryptology (ICISC), pages 32–47, 2006.
[BSCG+13] E. Ben-Sasson, A. Chiesa, D. Genkin, E. Tromer, and M. Virza. Snarks for c: Verifying
program executions succinctly and in zero knowledge. In Advances in Cryptology -
CRYPTO (LNCS), volume 8043, pages 90–108. 2013.
[BSNS08] J. Baek, R. Safavi-Naini, and W. Susilo. Public key encryption with keyword search
revisited. In Computational Science and Its Applications - ICCSA (LNCS), volume
5072, pages 1249–1259. 2008.
[BSW07] J. Bethencourt, A. Sahai, and B. Waters. Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryp-
tion. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S & P), pages
321–334, 2007.
[BSW11] D. Boneh, A. Sahai, and B. Waters. Functional encryption: Deﬁnitions and challenges.
In Proceedings of the 8th Conference on Theory of Cryptography (CTC), pages 253–
273, 2011.
[BTHJ12] C. Bo¨sch, Q. Tang, P. Hartel, and W. Jonker. Selective document retrieval from en-
crypted database. In Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Information
Security (ISC), pages 224–241, 2012.
[BW07] D. Boneh and B. Waters. Conjunctive, subset, and range queries on encrypted data. In
Proceedings of the 4th Conference on Theory of Cryptography (CTC), pages 535–554,
2007.
[BZ06] M. Barbaro and T. Jr. Zeller. A face is exposed for aol searcher no. 4417749, Aug
2006.
[CCC+08] D. Chaum, R. Carback, J. Clark, A. Essex, S. Popoveniuc, R. L. Rivest, P. Y. A.
166
Ryan, E. Shen, and A. T. Sherman. Scantegrity II: end-to-end veriﬁability for optical
scan election systems using invisible ink conﬁrmation codes. In EVTProceedings of
the Conference on Electronic Voting Technology (EVT), pages 14:1–14:13, 2008.
[CCM09] A. Chakrabarti, G. Cormode, and A. Mcgregor. Annotations in data streams. In
ICALP, 2009.
[CDN01] R. Cramer, I. Damg˚ard, and J. B. Nielsen. Multiparty computation from thresh-
old homomorphic encryption. In Proceedings of the International Conference on the
Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology (EU-
ROCRYPT), pages 280–299, 2001.
[CDS94] R. Cramer, I. Damg˚ard, and B. Schoenmakers. Proofs of partial knowledge and simpli-
ﬁed design of witness hiding protocols. In Proceedings of the 14th Annual International
Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology (CRYPTO), pages 174–187, 1994.
[Cer00] Certicom Research. SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters, Version
1.0., 2000.
[CGKO06] R. Curtmola, J. Garay, S. Kamara, and R. Ostrovsky. Searchable symmetric encryp-
tion: Improved deﬁnitions and eﬃcient constructions. In Proceedings of the 13th ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), pages 79–88, 2006.
[CGS97] R. Cramer, R. Gennaro, and B. Schoenmakers. A secure and optimally eﬃcient multi-
authority election scheme. In Proceedings of the 16th annual International Conference
on Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques (EUROCRYPT), pages 103–
118, 1997.
[CH10] J. Clark and U. Hengartner. On the use of ﬁnancial data as a random beacon. In
EVT/WOTE, 2010.
[Cha82] D. Chaum. Blind signatures for untraceable payments. In CRYPTO, 1982.
167
[CHL05] J. Camenisch, S. Hohenberger, and A. Lysyanskaya. Compact e-cash. In Advances in
Cryptology - EUROCRYPT (LNCS), volume 3494, pages 302–321. 2005.
[CJJ+13] D. Cash, S. Jarecki, C. Jutla, H. Krawczyk, M.-C. Ros¸u, and M. Steiner. Highly-
scalable searchable symmetric encryption with support for boolean queries. In Ad-
vances in Cryptology - CRYPTO (LNCS), volume 8042, pages 353–373. 2013.
[CK10] M. Chase and S. Kamara. Structured encryption and controlled disclosure. In Ad-
vances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT (LNCS), volume 6477 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, pages 577–594. 2010.
[CKLR11] K.-M. Chung, Y. T. Kalai, F.-H. Liu, and R. Raz. Memory delegation. In Proceedings
of the 31st Annual Conference on Advances in Cryptology (CRYPTO), pages 151–165,
2011.
[CKV10] K.-M. Chung, Y. Kalai, and S. Vadhan. Improved delegation of computation us-
ing fully homomorphic encryption. In Proceedings of the 30th annual conference on
Advances in cryptology (CRYPTO), pages 483–501, 2010.
[CM05] Y-C. Chang and M. Mitzenmacher. Privacy preserving keyword searches on remote
encrypted data. In Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Applied Cryp-
tography and Network Security (ACNS), pages 442–455, 2005.
[CMF+11] R. Chen, N. Mohammed, B. C. M. Fung, B. C. Desai, and L. Xiong. Publishing set-
valued data via diﬀerential privacy. Proceedings of the 37th International Conference
on Very Large Data Bases (PVLDB), 4(11), 2011.
[Coc01] C. Cocks. An identity based encryption scheme based on quadratic residues. In
Proceedings of the 8th IMA International Conference on Cryptography and Coding
(IMACC), pages 360–363, 2001.
[Com79] D. Comer. Ubiquitous B-Tree. ACM Computing Surveys, 11(2):121–137, 1979.
168
[CP92] D. Chaum and T. P. Pedersen. Wallet databases with observers. In CRYPTO, 1992.
[CPS+12] G. Cormode, C. Procopiuc, D. Srivastava, E. Shen, and T. Yu. Diﬀerentially private
spatial decompositions. In Proceedings of the IEEE 28th International Conference on
Data Engineering (ICDE), pages 20–31, 2012.
[Dal77] T. Dalenius. Towards a methodology for statistical disclosure control. Statistik Tid-
skrift, 15, 1977.
[DBB+15a] G. G. Dagher, B. Bu¨nz, J. Bonneau, J. Clark, and D. Boneh. Provisions: Privacy-
preserving proofs of solvency for bitcoin exchanges (full version). Technical report,
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2015.
[DBB+15b] G. G. Dagher, B. Bu¨nz, J. Bonneau, J. Clark, and D. Boneh. Provisions: Private
proofs of solvency for bitcoin exchanges. In Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference
on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), October 2015.
[dBCvKO08] M. de Berg, O. Cheong, M. van Kreveld, and M. Overmars. Computational Geometry:
Algorithms and Applications. Springer-Verlag TELOS, 3rd edition, 2008.
[DBP07] G. Di Battista and B. Palazzi. Authenticated relational tables and authenticated skip
lists. In Proceedings of the 21st Annual IFIP WG 11.3 Working Conference on Data
and Applications Security (DBSec), pages 31–46, 2007.
[DCF] G. G. Dagher, J. Clark, and B. C. M. Fung. Publicly veriﬁable protocol for set-
valued data integration with diﬀerential privacy. Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing
Technologies (PoPETs), page 14. Under review.
[DCFG+14] G. Di Crescenzo, J. Feigenbaum, D. Gupta, E. Panagos, J. Perry, and R. Wright.
Practical and privacy-preserving policy compliance for outsourced data. In Financial
Cryptography and Data Security (LNCS), volume 8438, pages 181–194. 2014.
169
[DFMC] G. G. Dagher, B. C. M. Fung, N. Mohammed, and J. Clark. SecDM: A privacy-
preserving framework for conﬁdential query processing on the cloud. IEEE Transac-
tions on Cloud Computing (TCC), page 14. Under review.
[DIAF15] G. G. Dagher, F. Iqbal, M. Arafati, and B. C. M. Fung. Fusion: Privacy-preserving dis-
tributed protocol for high-dimensional data mashup. In Proceedings of the 21st IEEE
International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems (ICPADS), page 10,
2015. Accepted.
[DKM+06] C. Dwork, K. Kenthapadi, F. McSherry, I. Mironov, and M. Naor. Our data, our-
selves: Privacy via distributed noise generation. In Proceedings of the 24th Annual
International Conference on The Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
(EUROCRYPT), pages 486–503, 2006.
[DLL13] J. Dreier, P. Lafourcade, and Y. Lakhnech. Formal veriﬁcation of e-auction protocols.
In Principles of Security and Trust (LNCS), volume 7796, pages 247–266. 2013.
[DMNS06] C. Dwork, F. McSherry, K. Nissim, and A. Smith. Calibrating noise to sensitivity in
private data analysis. In Proceedings of the 3rd conference on Theory of Cryptography
(TCC), 2006.
[Don00] D. L. Donoho. Aide-memoire. high-dimensional data analysis: The curses and blessings
of dimensionality, 2000.
[DRD08] C. Dong, G. Russello, and N. Dulay. Shared and searchable encrypted data for un-
trusted servers. In Proceedings of the 22nd annual IFIP WG 11.3 Conference on Data
and Applications Security and Privacy (DBSec), pages 127–143, 2008.
[DVJ+03] E. Damiani, S. D. C. Vimercati, S. Jajodia, S. Paraboschi, and P. Samarati. Balancing
conﬁdentiality and eﬃciency in untrusted relational dbmss. In Proceedings of the 10th
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), pages 93–102,
2003.
170
[DWC10] T. Dillon, C. Wu, and E. Chang. Cloud computing: issues and challenges. In Proceed-
ings of the 24th IEEE Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applica-
tions (AINA), pages 27–33, 2010.
[Dwo06] C. Dwork. Diﬀerential privacy. In Proceedings of the International Colloquium on
Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP), pages 1–12, 2006.
[EAAG06] F. Emekci, D. Agrawal, A.E. Abbadi, and A. Gulbeden. Privacy preserving query
processing using third parties. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference
on Data Engineering (ICDE), pages 27–36, 2006.
[EBSC15] S. Eskandari, D. Barrera, E. Stobert, and J. Clark. A ﬁrst look at the usability of
bitcoin key management. In Proceedings of the NDSS Workshop on Usable Security
(USEC), 2015.
[EG85] T. El Gamal. A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete
logarithms. In Proceedings of CRYPTO on Advances in Cryptology, pages 10–18, 1985.
[EVK05] M. Eirinaki, M. Vazirgiannis, and D. Kapogiannis. Web path recommendations based
on page ranking and markov models. In Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Web
Information and Data Management (WIDM), pages 2–9, 2005.
[FH94] M. K. Franklin and S. Haber. Joint encryption and message-eﬃcient secure compu-
tation. In Proceedings of the 13th Annual International Cryptology Conference on
Advances in Cryptology (CRYPTO), pages 266–277, 1994.
[FS87] A. Fiat and A. Shamir. How to prove yourself: Practical solutions to identiﬁcation
and signature problems. In Proceedings of the 7th Annual Conference on Advances in
Cryptology (CRYPTO), pages 186–194, 1987.
[FS90] A. Fiat and A. Shamir. Witness indistinguishable and witness hiding protocols. In
171
Proceedings of the 22st annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC),
pages 416–426, 1990.
[FWCY10] B. C. M. Fung, K. Wang, R. Chen, and P. S. Yu. Privacy-preserving data publishing:
A survey of recent developments. ACM Computing Surveys, 42(4):14:1–14:53, 2010.
[FWY07a] B. C. M. Fung, K. Wang, and P. S. Yu. Anonymizing classiﬁcation data for pri-
vacy preservation. IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering (TKDE),
19(5):711–725, 2007.
[FWY07b] B. C. M. Fung, K. Wang, and P. S. Yu. Anonymizing classiﬁcation data for pri-
vacy preservation. IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering (TKDE),
19(5):711–725, May 2007.
[Gee01] D. Geer. Technical maturity, reliability, implicit taxes, and wealth creation. login:
The magazine of Usenix & Sage, 26(8), 2001.
[Gen09] C. Gentry. Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices. In Proceedings of the
41st annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), pages 169–178, 2009.
[GGP10] R. Gennaro, C. Gentry, and B. Parno. Non-interactive veriﬁable computing: Outsourc-
ing computation to untrusted workers. In Proceedings of the 30th annual conference
on Advances in cryptology (CRYPTO), pages 465–482, 2010.
[GJKR07] R. Gennaro, S. Jarecki, H. Krawczyk, and T. Rabin. Secure distributed key generation
for discrete-log based cryptosystems. Journal of Cryptology (JC), 20(1):51–83, 2007.
[GKR08] S. Goldwasser, Y. T. Kalai, and G. N. Rothblum. Delegating computation: Interactive
proofs for muggles. In Proceedings of the 40th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of
Computing (STOC), pages 113–122, 2008.
172
[GLM+13a] F. Giannotti, L.V.S. Lakshmanan, A. Monreale, D. Pedreschi, and H. Wang. Privacy-
preserving mining of association rules from outsourced transaction databases. IEEE
Systems Journal (ISJ), 7(3):385–395, 2013.
[GLM+13b] F. Giannotti, L.V.S. Lakshmanan, A. Monreale, D. Pedreschi, and H. Wang. Privacy-
preserving mining of association rules from outsourced transaction databases. ISJ,
7(3), 2013.
[GMW87] O. Goldreich, S. Micali, and A. Wigderson. How to play any mental game. In Proceed-
ings of the 19th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), pages
218–229, 1987.
[Goh03] E.-J. Goh. Secure indexes. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2003/216, 2003. http:
//eprint.iacr.org/2003/216/.
[Gol04] O. Goldreich. Foundations of Cryptography, volume 2. Cambridge University Press,
2004.
[Gol14] S. Goldfeder. Better wallet security for bitcoin. Technical report, Princeton, March
2014.
[GPSW06] V. Goyal, O. Pandey, A. Sahai, and B. Waters. Attribute-based encryption for ﬁne-
grained access control of encrypted data. In Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference
on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), pages 89–98, 2006.
[GSW04] P. Golle, J. Staddon, and B. Waters. Secure conjunctive keyword search over encrypted
data. In Applied Cryptography and Network Security (LNCS), volume 3089, pages 31–
45. 2004.
[Gut84] A. Guttman. R-trees: a dynamic index structure for spatial searching. In Proceedings
of the ACM SIGMOD International Conference on Management of Data (SIGMOD),
pages 47–57, 1984.
173
[GZ07a] T. Ge and S. Zdonik. Answering aggregation queries in a secure system model. In
Proceedings of the 33rd International Conference on Very Large Data Bases (PVLDB),
pages 519–530, 2007.
[GZ07b] T. Ge and S. Zdonik. Fast, secure encryption for indexing in a column-oriented
DBMS. In Proceedings of the IEEE 23rd International Conference on Data Engi-
neering (ICDE), pages 676–685, 2007.
[HILM02] H. Hacigu¨mu¨s¸, B. Iyer, C. Li, and S. Mehrotra. Executing sql over encrypted data in
the database-service-provider model. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGMOD Interna-
tional Conference on Management of Data (SIGMOD), pages 216–227, 2002.
[HIM04] H. Hacigu¨mu¨s¸, B. Iyer, and S. Mehrotra. Eﬃcient execution of aggregation queries over
encrypted relational databases. In Proceedings of the Database Systems for Advanced
Applications (DASFAA), pages 125–136, 2004.
[HL07] Y. H. Hwang and P. J. Lee. Public key encryption with conjunctive keyword search and
its extension to a multi-user system. In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference
on Pairing-Based Cryptography (Pairing), pages 2–22, 2007.
[HL10] C. Hazay and Y. Lindell. Eﬃcient Secure Two-Party Protocols. Springer, 2010.
[HMT04] B. Hore, S. Mehrotra, and G. Tsudik. A privacy-preserving index for range queries. In
Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Very Large Data Bases (PVLDB),
pages 720–731, 2004.
[HN09] Y. He and J. F. Naughton. Anonymization of set-valued data via top-down, local
generalization. Proceedings of the 35th International Conference on Very Large Data
Bases (PVLDB), 2(1), 2009.
[HSM+14] J. Han, W. Susilo, Y. Mu, J. Zhou, and M. Au. Ppdcp-abe: Privacy-preserving
174
decentralized ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption. In Computer Security -
ESORICS (LNCS), volume 8713, pages 73–90. 2014.
[HXL13] Y. Hua, B. Xiao, and X. Liu. Nest: Locality-aware approximate query service for
cloud computing. In Proceedings of the 32nd IEEE Conference on Computer Commu-
nications (INFOCOM), 2013.
[HXRC11] H. Hu, J. Xu, C. Ren, and B. Choi. Processing private queries over untrusted data
cloud through privacy homomorphism. In Proceedings of the IEEE 27th International
Conference on Data Engineering (ICDE), pages 601–612, 2011.
[JC06] W. Jiang and C. Clifton. A secure distributed framework for achieving k-anonymity.
The International Journal on Very Large Data Bases (VLDBJ), 15(4), 2006.
[JGWY10] X. Jiang, J. Gao, T. Wang, and D. Yang. Multiple sensitive association protection
in the outsourced database. In Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on
Database Systems for Advanced Applications (DASFAA), pages 123–137, 2010.
[JJ00] M. Jakobsson and A. Juels. Mix and match: Secure function evaluation via ciphertexts.
In Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on the Theory and Application of
Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology (ASIACRYPT), pages
162–177, 2000.
[JJK+13] S. Jarecki, C. Jutla, H. Krawczyk, M. Rosu, and M. Steiner. Outsourced symmet-
ric private information retrieval. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGSAC conference on
Computer & Communications Security (CCS), pages 875–888, 2013.
[JJR] M. Jakobsson, A. Juels, and R. L. Rivest. Making mix nets robust for electronic
voting by randomized partial checking. In Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security
Symposium (USENIX), pages 339–353.
[Jou00] A. Joux. A one round protocol for tripartite diﬃe-hellman. In Proceedings of the 4th
175
International Symposium on Algorithmic Number Theory (ANTS), pages 385–394,
2000.
[JX09] P. Jurczyk and L. Xiong. Distributed anonymization: Achieving privacy for both
data subjects and data providers. In Proceedings of the 23rd annual IFIP WG 11.3
Conference on Data and Applications Security and Privacy (DBSec), 2009.
[KC04] M. Kantarcioglu and C. Clifton. Privacy-preserving distributed mining of association
rules on horizontally partitioned data. IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data
Engineering (TKDE), 16(9), 2004.
[KK07] M. Kantarcioglu and O. Kardes. Privacy-preserving data mining applications in
the malicious model. In Proceedings of the IEEE ICDM Workshop on Data Mining
(ICDMW), pages 717–722, Oct 2007.
[KKP01] S. Kotz, T. Kozubowski, and K. Podgorski. The Laplace Distribution and Generaliza-
tions: A Revisit With Applications to Communications, Exonomics, Engineering, and
Finance. Springer, 2001.
[KL10] D. Kifer and B.-R. Lin. Towards an axiomatization of statistical privacy and utility. In
Proceedings of the 29th ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART Symposium on Principles
of Database Systems (PODS), pages 147–158, 2010.
[KMR] S. Kamara, P. Mohassel, and M. Raykova. Outsourcing multi-party computation.
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2011:272.
[KPR12] S. Kamara, C. Papamanthou, and T. Roeder. Dynamic searchable symmetric encryp-
tion. In Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security (CCS), pages 965–976, 2012.
176
[KSW08] J. Katz, A. Sahai, and B. Waters. Predicate encryption supporting disjunctions, poly-
nomial equations, and inner products. In Proceedings of the 27th annual International
Conference on Advances in Cryptology (EUROCRYPT), pages 146–162, 2008.
[KTV10] R. Kusters, T. Truderung, and A. Vogt. Accountability: Deﬁnition and relationship
to veriﬁability. In Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Computer and Com-
munications Security (CCS), 2010.
[LDLW14] J. Lai, R. H. Deng, Y. Li, and J. Weng. Fully secure key-policy attribute-based
encryption with constant-size ciphertexts and fast decryption. In Proceedings of the
9th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security (ASIA
CCS), pages 239–248, 2014.
[LKM01] B. Lee, K. Kim, and J. Ma. Eﬃcient public auction with one-time registration and
public veriﬁability. In Progress in Cryptology - INDOCRYPT (LNCS), volume 2247,
pages 162–174. 2001.
[LQSC12] N. Li, W. Qardaji, D. Su, and J. Cao. Privbasis: Frequent itemset mining with
diﬀerential privacy. Proceedings of the 38th International Conference on Very Large
Data Bases (PVLDB), 5(11):1340–1351, 2012.
[LS08] D. Lubicz and T. Sirvent. Attribute-based broadcast encryption scheme made eﬃ-
cient. In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Progress in Cryptology
(AFRICACRYPT), pages 325–342, 2008.
[LS14] P. Litke and J. Stewart. Cryptocurrency-stealing malware landscape. Technical report,
Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit, 2014.
[LWW+10] J. Li, Q. Wang, C. Wang, N. Cao, K. Ren, and W. Lou. Fuzzy keyword search
over encrypted data in cloud computing. In Proceedings of the 29th Conference on
Information Communications (INFOCOM), pages 441–445, 2010.
177
[MAFD14] N. Mohammed, D. Alhadidi, B. C. M. Fung, and M. Debbabi. Secure two-party
diﬀerentially private data release for vertically-partitioned data. IEEE Transactions
on Dependable and Secure Computing (TDSC), 11(1), 2014.
[Mao98] W. Mao. Guaranteed correct sharing of integer factorization with oﬀ-line shareholders.
In Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public
Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography (PKC), pages 60–71, 1998.
[MC13] T. Moore and N. Christin. Beware the middleman: Empirical analysis of bitcoin-
exchange risk. In Financial Cryptography and Data Security (LNCS), volume 7859,
pages 25–33. 2013.
[MCFY11] N. Mohammed, R. Chen, B. C. M. Fung, and P. S. Yu. Diﬀerentially private data
release for data mining. In Proceedings of the 17th ACM SIGKDD International Con-
ference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (SIGKDD), pages 493–501, 2011.
[McS09] F. D. McSherry. Privacy integrated queries: An extensible platform for privacy-
preserving data analysis. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGMOD International Con-
ference on Management of Data (SIGMOD), 2009.
[Mer79] R. C. Merkle. Secrecy, Authentication, and Public Key Systems. PhD thesis, Stanford,
1979.
[MFD11] N. Mohammed, B. C. M. Fung, and M. Debbabi. Anonymity meets game theory:
secure data integration with malicious participants. The International Journal on
Very Large Data Bases (VLDBJ), 20(4), 2011.
[MFHL09] N. Mohammed, B. C. M. Fung, P. C. K. Hung, and C-k Lee. Anonymizing health-
care data: a case study on the blood transfusion service. In Proceedings of the 17th
ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining
(SIGKDD), pages 1285–1294, 2009.
178
[MKGV07] A. Machanavajjhala, D. Kifer, J. Gehrke, and M. Venkitasubramaniam. L-diversity:
Privacy beyond k-anonymity. ACM Transactions on Knowledge Discovery from Data
(TKDD), 1(1), 2007.
[MPJ+13] S. Meiklejohn, M. Pomarole, G. Jordan, K. Levchenko, D. McCoy, G. M. Voelker, and
S. Savage. A ﬁstful of bitcoins: characterizing payments among men with no names.
In Proceedings of the 2013 Conference on Internet Measurement Conference (IMC),
pages 127–140, 2013.
[MT00] G. Marsaglia and W. W. Tsang. A simple method for generating gamma variables.
ACM Transactions on Mathematical Software (TOMS), 26(3):363–372, 2000.
[Nak08] S. Nakamoto. Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electionic cash system. Unpublished, 2008.
[NC11] A. E. Nergiz and C. Clifton. Query processing in private data outsourcing using
anonymization. In Proceedings of the 25th annual IFIP WG 11.3 Conference on Data
and Applications Security and Privacy (DBSec), pages 138–153, 2011.
[Nef01] C. A. Neﬀ. A veriﬁable secret shuﬄe and its application to e-voting. In Proceedings of
the 8th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), 2001.
[NH12] A. Narayan and A. Haeberlen. Djoin: Diﬀerentially private join queries over dis-
tributed databases. In Proceedings of the 10th USENIX Conference on Operating
Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI), pages 149–162, 2012.
[NS08] A. Narayanan and V. Shmatikov. Robust de-anonymization of large sparse datasets. In
Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S & P), pages 111–125,
2008.
[NYO08] T. Nishide, K. Yoneyama, and K. Ohta. Attribute-based encryption with partially
hidden encryptor-speciﬁed access structures. In Proceedings of the 6th International
179
Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security (ACNS), pages 111–129,
2008.
[OSW07] R. Ostrovsky, A. Sahai, and B. Waters. Attribute-based encryption with non-
monotonic access structures. In Proceedings of the 14th ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security (CCS), pages 195–203, 2007.
[Par11] R. Parhonyi. Micropayment Systems. In Handbook of Financial Cryptography and
Security. CRC, 2011.
[PCL05] D. J. Park, J. Cha, and P. J. Lee. Searchable keyword-based encryption. Cryptology
ePrint Archive, Report, 2005. http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/367.
[Ped91] T. P. Pedersen. A threshold cryptosystem without a trusted party. In Proceedings of
the 10th Annual International Conference on Theory and Application of Cryptographic
Techniques (EUROCRYPT), pages 522–526, 1991.
[Ped92] T. P. Pedersen. Non-interactive and information-theoretic secure veriﬁable secret shar-
ing. In Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Ad-
vances in Cryptology (CRYPTO), pages 129–140, 1992.
[PRZB11] R. A. Popa, C. M. S. Redﬁeld, N. Zeldovich, and H. Balakrishnan. Cryptdb: Protecting
conﬁdentiality with encrypted query processing. In Proceedings of the 23rd ACM
Symposium on Operating Systems Principles (SOSP), pages 85–100, 2011.
[PZ12] K. Peng and Y. Zhang. A secure mix network with an eﬃcient validity veriﬁcation
mechanism. In Internet and Distributed Computing Systems (LNCS), volume 7646,
pages 85–96. 2012.
[Qui93] J. R. Quinlan. C4.5: Programs for Machine Learning. Morgan Kaufmann, 1993.
[Rab79] M. O. Rabin. Digitalized signatures and public-key functions as intractable as factor-
ization. Technical report, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 1979.
180
[RN10] V. Rastogi and S. Nath. Diﬀerentially private aggregation of distributed time-series
with transformation and encryption. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGMOD Interna-
tional Conference on Management of Data (SIGMOD), pages 735–746, 2010.
[RVBM09] M. Raykova, B. Vo, S. M. Bellovin, and T. Malkin. Secure anonymous database search.
In Proceedings of the 2009 ACM Workshop on Cloud Computing Security (CCSW),
pages 115–126, 2009.
[Sal94] S. L. Salzberg. C4.5: Programs for machine learning by j. ross quinlan. Machine
Learning (ML), 16(3):235–240, 1994.
[Sam01a] P. Samarati. Protecting respondents’ identities in microdata release. IEEE Trans-
actions on Knowledge and Data Engineering (TKDE), 13(6):1010–1027, November
2001.
[Sam01b] P. Samarati. Protecting respondents identities in microdata release. IEEE Transac-
tions on Knowledge and Data Engineering (TKDE), 13(6):1010–1027, 2001.
[Sch91] C. P. Schnorr. Eﬃcient signature generation by smart cards. Journal of Cryptography
(JC), 4(3):161–174, 1991.
[SCR+11] E. Shi, T.-H. H. Chan, E. G. Rieﬀel, R. Chow, and D. Song. Privacy-preserving
aggregation of time-series data. In Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System
Security Symposium (NDSS), 2011.
[SER12] A. Shabtai, Y. Elovici, and L. Rokach. A Survey of Data Leakage Detection and
Prevention Solutions. SpringerBriefs in Computer Science (SBCS). Springer, 2012.
[SHKS12] M. Schla¨pfer, R. Haenni, R. Koenig, and O. Spycher. Eﬃcient vote authorization in
coercion-resistant internet voting. In Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference
on E-Voting and Identity (VoteID), pages 71–88, 2012.
181
[SKK09] M. Shaneck, Y. Kim, and V. Kumar. Privacy preserving nearest neighbor search. In
Machine Learning in Cyber Trust (MLCT), pages 247–276. 2009.
[SR92] A. Skowron and C. Rauszer. The discernibility matrices and functions in information
systems. In Intelligent Decision Support, volume 11 of Theory and Decision Library,
pages 331–362. 1992.
[ST04] B. Schoenmakers and P. Tuyls. Practical two-party computation based on the condi-
tional gate. In Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT (LNCS), volume 3329, pages
119–136. 2004.
[STW+12] E. Shmueli, T. Tassa, R. Wasserstein, B. Shapira, and L. Rokach. Limiting disclosure
of sensitive data in sequential releases of databases. Information Science (IS), 191:98–
127, 2012.
[SVLN+10] S. Sedghi, P. Van Liesdonk, S. Nikova, P. Hartel, and W. Jonker. Searching keywords
with wildcards on encrypted data. In Proceedings of the 7th International Conference
on Security and Cryptography for Networks (SCN), pages 138–153, 2010.
[SW05] A. Sahai and B. Waters. Fuzzy identity-based encryption. In Proceedings of the 24th
annual International Conference on Advances in Cryptology (EUROCRYPT), pages
457–473, 2005.
[Swe02a] L. Sweeney. Achieving k-anonymity privacy protection using generalization and sup-
pression. International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Sys-
tems (IJUFKS), 10(5):571–588, 2002.
[Swe02b] L. Sweeney. K-anonymity: A model for protecting privacy. International Journal of
Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems (UFKS), 10(5):557–570, Octo-
ber 2002.
182
[SWP00] D. X. Song, D. Wagner, and A. Perrig. Practical techniques for searches on encrypted
data. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S & P), 2000.
[Tam03] R. Tamassia. Authenticated data structures. In Algorithms - ESA (LNCS), volume
2832, pages 2–5. 2003.
[Tas14] T. Tassa. Secure mining of association rules in horizontally distributed databases.
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering (TKDE), 26(4), 2014.
[TH13] P.K. Tysowski and M.A. Hasan. Hybrid attribute- and re-encryption-based key man-
agement for secure and scalable mobile applications in clouds. IEEE Transactions on
Cloud Computing (TCC), 1(2):172–186, July 2013.
[TMK08] M. Terrovitis, N. Mamoulis, and P. Kalnis. Privacy-preserving anonymization of set-
valued data. Proceedings of the 34th International Conference on Very Large Data
Bases (PVLDB), 1(1), 2008.
[TMK11] M. Terrovitis, N. Mamoulis, and P. Kalnis. Local and global recoding methods for
anonymizing set-valued data. The International Journal on Very Large Data Bases
(VLDBJ), 20(1), 2011.
[TRN08] V. Teague, K. Ramchen, and L. Naish. Coercion-resistant tallying for stv voting. In
Proceedings of the Conference on Electronic Voting Technology (EVT), pages 15:1–
15:14, 2008.
[VC05] J. Vaidya and C. Clifton. Privacy-preserving top-k queries. In Proceedings of the 21st
International Conference on Data Engineering (ICDE), pages 545–546, 2005.
[VLSD+10] P. Van Liesdonk, S. Sedghi, J. Doumen, P. Hartel, and W. Jonker. Computationally
eﬃcient searchable symmetric encryption. In Proceedings of the 7th VLDB Conference
on Secure Data Management (SDM), pages 87–100, 2010.
183
[VTK12] A. Vogt, T. Truderung, and R. Kusters. Clash attacks on the veriﬁability of e-voting
systems. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S & P),
2012.
[WABL+08] D. J. Weitzner, H. Abelson, T. Berners-Lee, J. Feigenbaum, J. Hendler, and G. J.
Sussman. Information accountability. Communications of the ACM, 51(6):82–87,
2008.
[WAEA11] S. Wang, D. Agrawal, and A. El Abbadi. A comprehensive framework for secure
query processing on relational data in the cloud. In Proceedings of the 8th VLDB
International Conference on Secure Data Management (SDM), pages 52–69, 2011.
[Wat11] B. Waters. Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption: an expressive, eﬃcient, and
provably secure realization. In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on
Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography (PKC), pages 53–70, 2011.
[WCH+07] W. K. Wong, D. W. Cheung, E. Hung, B. Kao, and N. Mamoulis. Security in outsourc-
ing of association rule mining. In Proceedings of the 33rd International Conference on
Very Large Data Bases (PVLDB), 2007.
[WCKM09] W. K. Wong, D. W.-L. Cheung, B. Kao, and N. Mamoulis. Secure knn computation on
encrypted databases. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGMOD International Conference
on Management of Data (SIGMOD), pages 139–152, 2009.
[WCL+10] C. Wang, N. Cao, J. Li, K. Ren, and W. Lou. Secure ranked keyword search over
encrypted cloud data. In Proceedings of the IEEE 30th International Conference on
Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS), pages 253–262, 2010.
[WCW+13] C. Wang, S. S. M. Chow, Q. Wang, K. Ren, and W. Lou. Privacy-preserving public
auditing for secure cloud storage. IEEE Transactions on Computers (TC), 62(2):362–
375, 2013.
184
[WDWS04] Z.-F. Wang, J. Dai, W. Wang, and B.-L. Shi. Fast query over encrypted character data
in database. In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Computational and
Information Science (CIS), pages 1027–1033, 2004.
[WFY07] K. Wang, B. C. M. Fung, and P. S. Yu. Handicapping attacker’s conﬁdence: An alter-
native to k-anonymization. Knowledge and Information Systems (KAIS), 11(3):345–
368, 2007.
[WHZ+14] O. A. Wahab, M. O. Hachami, A. Zaﬀari, M. Vivas, and G. G. Dagher. Darm: A
privacy-preserving approach for distributed association rules mining on horizontally-
partitioned data. In Proceedings of the 18th International Database Engineering &
Applications Symposium (IDEAS), pages 1–8, 2014.
[Wil14] Z. Wilcox. Proving your bitcoin reserves. https://iwilcox.me.uk/2014/proving-bitcoin-
reserves, Feb. 2014.
[WL06] H. Wang and L. V. S. Lakshmanan. Eﬃcient secure query evaluation over encrypted
xml databases. In Proceedings of the 32nd International Conference on Very Large
Data Bases (PVLDB), pages 127–138, 2006.
[WLFW06] R. C.-W. Wong, J. Li, A. W.-C. Fu, and K. Wang. (α, k)-anonymity: an enhanced
k-anonymity model for privacy preserving data publishing. In Proceedings of the 12th
ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining
(SIGKDD), pages 754–759, 2006.
[WLL12] B. Wang, B. Li, and H. Li. Oruta: Privacy-preserving public auditing for shared
data in the cloud. In Proceedings of the IEEE 5th International Conference on Cloud
Computing (CLOUD), pages 295–302, 2012.
[WR13] P. Wang and C.V. Ravishankar. Secure and eﬃcient range queries on outsourced
databases using R̂-trees. In Proceedings of the IEEE 29th International Conference
on Data Engineering (ICDE), pages 314–325, 2013.
185
[WSC08] P. Williams, R. Sion, and B. Carbunar. Building castles out of mud: Practical access
pattern privacy and correctness on untrusted storage. In Proceedings of the 15th ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), pages 139–148, 2008.
[WWP08a] P. Wang, H. Wang, and J. Pieprzyk. Keyword ﬁeld-free conjunctive keyword searches
on encrypted data and extension for dynamic groups. In Cryptology and Network
Security (LNCS), volume 5339, pages 178–195. 2008.
[WWP08b] P. Wang, H. Wang, and J. Pieprzyk. Threshold privacy preserving keyword searches.
In SOFSEM 2008: Theory and Practice of Computer Science (LNCS), volume 4910,
pages 646–658. 2008.
[WWP09] P. Wang, H. Wang, and J. Pieprzyk. An eﬃcient scheme of common secure indices
for conjunctive keyword-based retrieval on encrypted data. In Information Security
Applications (LNCS), volume 5379, pages 145–159. 2009.
[WWS05] Z.-F. Wang, W. Wang, and B.-L. Shi. Storage and query over encrypted character
and numerical data in database. In Proceedings of the 5th International Conference
on Computer and Information Technology (CIT), pages 77–81, 2005.
[XT06] X. Xiao and Y. Tao. Anatomy: simple and eﬀective privacy preservation. In Proceed-
ings of the 32nd International Conference on Very Large Data Bases (PVLDB), pages
139–150, 2006.
[XXY10] Y. Xiao, L. Xiong, and C. Yuan. Diﬀerentially private data release through multidi-
mensional partitioning. In Proceedings of the 7th VLDB Conference on Secure Data
Management (SDM), pages 150–168, 2010.
[Yao82] A. C. Yao. Protocols for secure computations. In Proceedings of the 23rd Annual
Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (SFCS), pages 160–164, 1982.
186
[Yao86] A. C.-C. Yao. How to generate and exchange secrets. In Proceedings of the 27th Annual
Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (SFCS), pages 162–167, 1986.
[YLW11] Y. Yang, H. Lu, and J. Weng. Multi-user private keyword search for cloud comput-
ing. In Proceedings of the IEEE 3rd International Conference on Cloud Computing
Technology and Science (CloudCom), pages 264–271, Nov 2011.
[Yon14] W. Yongge. Privacy-preserving data storage in cloud using array bp-xor codes. IEEE
Transactions on Cloud Computing (TCC), 99, 2014.
[ZRZ+13] F. Zhang, C.-M. Rong, G. Zhao, J. Wu, and X. Wu. Privacy-preserving two-party
distributed association rules mining on horizontally partitioned data. In Proceedings
of the International Conference on Cloud Computing and Big Data (CLOUDCOM-
ASIA), 2013.
187
